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Current discourses in development studies signal an almost provoking “religious 
turn” in development policy. The high impact of religious agency in the context of 
global development work shines through in a programmatic statement, launched 
at the “Evidence Summit”, held in mid-2015 in Washington, DC. The timing of 
this multiparty conference, as well as the list of convenors and the range of par-
ticipating organisations is revealing. High-profile representatives of the World 
Bank and important national development institutions, such as the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, and the UK Department for International Development, 
convened with representatives of religious institutions and faith-based develop-
ment organisations (FBOs) during the passage period that prepared for a new 
agenda of sustainable development coined by the United Nations (UN) as Agenda 
2030. They jointly published a policy paper that combines the key-terms in recent 
UN development strategies, namely, poverty eradication and sustainability. This 
common policy statement on “Religion and Sustainable Development: Building 
Partnerships to End Extreme Poverty”, heralded the systematic inclusion of FBOs 
at large in development cooperation. The initial sentence in their “key findings 
and recommendations for action” states: “The question is no longer whether reli-
gion matters for development. . . . The question now is: how to systematically 
include the potentials of religious organizations for development, and according 
to what principles and criteria?” (Joint Learning Initiative on Faith & Local Com-
munities 2015, p. 3).
The statement climaxes the new role of religion and FBOs in developmental 
geopolitics. In broad terms it testifies a re-narration of ideas that remained mostly 
undisputed in development theory and practice thus far. Over and above, devel-
opment discourse was shaped by modernisation theory with its implicit assump-
tions about the negative impact of religion for development. By contrast, the 
statement cited above emphasises religious agency in international governance 
of development. The former approaches, which marginalised religion and faith-
based institutions as hindrance to development, seem to be replaced by positions 
supporting the transformative potentials of religion (cf. Heist and Cnaan 2016; 
Heuser and Koehrsen 2020; Mtata 2013). While FBOs were formerly linked to 
“tabooed” themes in development studies, they are now identified as decisive 
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agents of development initiatives in what some observers have recently termed 
the  “religious turn” in development cooperation (Garling 2013; cf. Jahnel 2015).
This volume engages with the vital role credited to FBOs in current discourses 
on development. FBOs are social organisations with a development focus, based 
on values intrinsic to a specific religion. They usually relate to generic religious 
traditions of charity and dignity that inspire their particular theological social 
ethics. Yet, far from identifying FBOs as salvific porters of social visionary and 
praxis, this volume sketches both potentials and limits of FBOs in actual fields 
of development. Although few FBOs can claim an entangled history with devel-
opment politics on global levels, they emerged as potent actors in the field of 
multilateral development policy on a broader scale from the 1990s. Against the 
backdrop of FBOs’ increasing integration into international development circles, 
there is a need for empirically based, interdisciplinary research on these organisa-
tions (see also Carrette 2017; Carrette and Miall 2017). This volume provides an 
interdisciplinary analysis of FBOs in current development discourses.
The collection of case studies in this volume highlights the particularities of 
FBOs, their development concepts and activities in diverse geographical and 
political contexts. At the United Nations, depending on the survey, between well 
over half and up to three quarters of all FBOs have a Christian faith-background 
(cf. Beinlich and Braungart 2019; Berger 2003; Haynes 2013; Lehmann 2016, 
p. 35). This volume places a specific emphasis on Protestant FBOs. Forming a cen-
tral strand of Christianity, Protestant FBOs represent the lion’s share of Christian 
FBOs and constitute some of the most powerful among them. The focus on Prot-
estant FBOs reflects not just the enduring but also the intensified developmental 
significance of these organisations. The surge of Protestant FBOs is a trend line in 
the present arena of development politics. With protestant newcomers appearing 
in FBO sectors at an almost constant rate, this trend line mirrors both the ongoing 
diversification of Protestant churches on a global scale and their  growing share 
in global Christianity. It also reflects the economic potential of many  Protestant 
churches that have developed into more affluent social actors than ever before 
(Barnett and Gross Stein 2012). The volume thus echoes the heavy weight of 
Protestant FBOs on the global scale of development cooperation.
Nevertheless, Protestant FBOs are not a homogenous block of development 
organisations. Although sharing a “family resemblance” due to common origins 
in the Reformation and post-Reformation era (Graf 2006), they are highly diverse: 
Protestantism constitutes a heterogeneous universe of manifold Protestant tradi-
tions which are often classified into evangelical-conservative, mainline, and non-
orthodox strands. These strands have evolved their own development discourses 
and FBOs, potentially leading to substantial differences in faith-based develop-
ment. This volume undertakes in-depth case studies on a variety of Protestant 
FBOs. We explore FBOs anchored in mainline Protestantism, such as Mission 21 
from Switzerland and development wings of the Anglican Church and the Presby-
terian Church in Rwanda. These are balanced by case studies on FBOs represent-
ing strands of evangelical Protestantism, commonly perceived as conservative in 
socio-political terms, such as World Vision and Micah Challenge. Moreover, this 
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volume also features a case study on non-orthodox Protestantism by exploring 
the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) in Guyana. As such, the 
sample illustrates the plurality of Protestant FBOs, thereby answering to the call 
“to work more consistently through the complexity of individual cases” (Jones 
and Petersen 2011, p. 1301). The case study approach provides surprising insights 
on differences and overlaps of their development approaches, as will be discussed 
in the following sections.
Studying the heterogeneous universe of Protestant FBOs, this volume reveals 
their ability to act as boundary agents: FBOs move between different discursive 
fields such as national and international development discourses, their specific 
religious constituencies, and theological discourses. By combining influxes from 
these different contexts, FBOs generate unique perspectives on development: 
anchored historically in a range of protestant traditions, they express alternative 
views on development. Thereby, FBOs have the capacity to become develop-
mental entrepreneurs, shaping development discourses with their genuine con-
cepts. The case study approach illustrates a comparative sighting of what may be 
termed (Protestant) theologies of development. In order to analyse heterogene-
ous types of FBOs, their development concepts and activities, this volume draws 
upon interdisciplinary research. It is the outcome of a research project in which 
scholars from anthropology, economics, political sciences/international relations, 
sociology, and theology have worked together for two years. The contributions 
have been produced in the context of the fellow programme “Religion and Devel-
opment in the Global South” of the Centre for Religion, Economy and Politics 
between 2015 and 2017. The Centre is run by several Swiss universities, while 
this particular fellow research programme was located at the University of Basel’s 
Faculty of Theology. The Swiss University Conference, Swiss National Science 
Foundation, Foundation for Basic Research in Human Sciences, and the Volun-
tary Academic Society Basel (Freiwillige Akademische Gesellschaft Basel) have 
financially supported this undertaking.
The studies apply different methodologies such as narrative and ethnographic 
interviews, participant observations, archival and web research, and content anal-
ysis. In the context of the fellow programme, the contributors have taken the chal-
lenge to actively engage with other academic disciplines. The close exchange 
between the researchers from various disciplines in numerous meetings and feed-
back processes has contributed to the exploration of the institutional plurality and 
outreach of FBOs as well as to venturing into different discursive fields of devel-
opment at local, national, and international levels. Such close interdisciplinary 
collaboration points to a productive way of studying FBOs and creating aware-
ness for their manifold dimensions (e.g. theological, political, social, legal). The 
research collaboration focused on the internal (re)organisation of development 
discourses of FBOs and their search for appropriate alignments with developmen-
tal geopolitics. As a result, this volume characterises the selected Protestant FBOs 
as boundary organisations, navigating diverse discourses and settings.
This introductory chapter is structured as follows: the next section briefly out-
lines the emergence of FBOs on the international development scene, placing an 
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emphasis on historical conjunctures that pushed FBOs into the universe of devel-
opmental geopolitics. Based on the results from this volume’s empirical case stud-
ies, the following section draws conclusions regarding the embeddedness of FBOs 
in different discursive fields and their potential to bridge these fields. The last two 
sections summarise the case studies and present avenues for future research.
FBOs and developmental geopolitics:  
historical developments
The breakthrough of FBOs in global arenas of development happened from the 
1980s and particularly in the 1990s. Until then, FBOs were profiled in devel-
opmental arenas as part of the large sector of autonomous, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). This was the legacy of post – Second World War politi-
cal taxation. Since its foundation FBOs were relating to the United Nations 
(Boehle 2010a, p. 278). However, their religious background – more precisely 
their Roman Catholic background (Lehmann 2016) – was not recognised as an 
identity marker. Rather, these FBOs were coined as “non-governmental organi-
sations”. The term first appeared in the 1950s in resolutions of the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the major UN policy sections (Lehmann 
2016). A quite unspecific referent in its original usage, “NGOs” referred to all 
kinds of intermediary organisations operating within the range of UN structures, 
including business enterprises (Stockmann 2016, p. 545). This did not change 
much until the 1990s. Like any other NGO, FBOs were located in civil society 
to represent a participatory model of social organisation mostly on the grassroots 
level. In the international architecture of development politics, NGOs gained 
importance gradually – and along with them, so did FBOs, albeit implicitly. Yet, 
they were catapulted into global governance systems particularly from the 1980s 
onwards. One causative factor of their emergence was the obvious incapability of 
state-organised development. This had led to the formation and relevance of civil 
society as the “third sector” between state governance and economic systems. 
A novel architecture supported a more strategic cooperation in global partnerships 
between states, multilateral organisations, and civil society (Korten 1990). This 
also created a “new opportunity structure” for religious actors, opening new ave-
nues for their participation in international politics and development (Baumgart-
Ochse 2019, p. 5). The recent discovery of NGOs was soon after categorised as 
the “NGOisation” of developmental geopolitics (Messner 1996). In this terrain of 
reconstruction, FBOs also became discernible as specific agents in development 
theory and praxis.
The growing awareness of FBOs in the tapestry of international development 
policy found momentum in two phases: the first phase that roughly stretches over 
the 1990s climaxed with the adoption of UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2000; the second phase relates to the transition period that led to the 
implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.
The first phase saw a multisited effort to revisit the impact of “religion” in 
dynamics of social change and development. A paradigmatic shift in strategising 
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development was taking shape. Previous policies were inclined to linear, material 
growth-based visions of development, and implicitly “religion” was either catego-
rised as negligible or as a hindrance factor to development (Senghaas 1985; Men-
zel and Senghaas 1986). By consequence, in development circles, “little [was] 
known about the role of spirituality in the development process, and little or no 
guidance [was] given to development practitioners as to how to address spiritual 
issues, resulting in less effective and even damaging development efforts” (Beek 
2000, p. 38; brackets by authors). The ignorance about the social transformative 
potentials of religion diminished through coincidental proceedings in develop-
mental geopolitics.
The most remarkable process was a joint initiative by the World Bank – headed 
by its former president James D. Wolfensohn – and religious organisations – 
 spearheaded by the then Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey. It 
resulted in the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) from 1998. Between 
1998 and 2005 a vivid consultation process paid new attention to religion in 
development scenarios. Numerous FBOs were pushing the thematic cluster of 
religion and development (Haynes 2013; Rees 2011), accompanied by the World 
Bank department on Development Dialogue on Value and Ethics – founded in 
2000 – the Bretton-Woods institutions of World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) together with major national and international development agen-
cies, and alongside various global religious players such as the World Council 
of Churches (WCC). These fresh impulses coincided with the implementation of 
UN Millennium Development Goals. Drawn up over the course of the 1990s as 
a joint endeavour in global development governance, the MDG formulae poten-
tially envisaged the incorporation of religiously motivated actors in development 
activities. By such a radical turn in the agenda of development policy, the MDGs 
sought, amongst others, to cut poverty levels in half by 2015, and to consolidate 
development programmes especially around rural and grassroots as well as human 
rights – based projects. This vision was already profoundly established as the 
preferential option in the development work of FBOs for some time (Bornstein 
2002). FBOs did not only support the adoption of this “longest standing paradigm 
that has ever emerged in developmental thinking” thus far, but lauded the MDGs 
(ACT Executive Committee 2013, p. 2; Boehle 2010a). Meanwhile, numerous 
publications from multidisciplinary angles indicated a widely shared interest in 
the connection between religion and development: FBOs became slowly more 
identifiable as social actors in their own right (Haynes 2007; Clarke 2008; Ter 
Haar and Wolfensohn 2011; Mtata 2013; Marshall 2001; Clarke 2013).
This prepared the ground for the second phase in the discovery of FBOs as 
genuine partners in international development politics around 2015. The symbolic 
date stands for the implementation of a 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Agreed by 193 countries, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were 
envisaged by the international community as a decisive step into a “Great Global 
Transformation” (Nuscheler 2012, p. 390). In a move towards sustainable modes 
of production, consumption, and resource use, the SDGs form a set of 17 develop-
ment goals, diversified into 169 targets. The agenda’s preamble refers back to the 
6 Jens Koehrsen and Andreas Heuser
ambitious MDG commitment to ending poverty: “Eradicating poverty in all its 
forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge 
and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development” (United Nations 
2015, p. 1). Yet, the SDGs span an expanded range of issues. The “great transfor-
mation” anchors sustainability in conjunction with social and ecological justice, 
taking into account issues ranging from human rights and gender inequality to 
climate change.
The 2030 Agenda is characterised by a multistakeholder, participatory, and 
value-oriented approach to sustainable development. In this process a “newfound 
enthusiasm” on FBOs was stirred (Occhipinti 2015, p. 333). Attention is given to 
the organisational strengths of FBOs, their access to global and local networks 
coupled with management experiences of small-scale and large-scale projects. 
Additionally, their normative and spiritual expertise that becomes manifest in 
the fields of education, public welfare, and in conflict mediation is considered a 
constitutive element in a value-oriented agenda of sustainability (Boehle 2010b). 
The FBO orientation on basic needs and advocacy in the field of poverty eradica-
tion and ecology underscore the central goals of sustainable development. FBOs 
assume prestige as facilitators of public discourses on development and are seen 
as vehicles for trust-building relationships at the grassroots level. In the case of 
Christian FBOs, the social and moral capital can rely on long-standing, historic 
relationships between local partners in both northern and southern hemispheres. 
In the case of Muslim FBOs, research highlights their capacity for reaching other-
wise unreachable populations at the grassroots level (Petersen 2012a, p. 137). Put 
together, FBOs currently attract the attention of national and international devel-
opment cooperation. Roughly over the past two decades FBOs have helped in 
condensing novel concepts of development and in reviewing development agen-
das. Although still in the initial stages of realising the Agenda 2030, FBOs render 
coherence to ideas of sustainable development, intensifying grassroots levels of 
efficiency. Rainer Tetzlaff estimates that within this new global architecture of 
sustainability and poverty, FBOs can even “offer alternative paths of survival” 
(Tetzlaff 2015, p. 39).
Yet, a more sceptical note on the impact of FBOs on development structures 
cannot be overlooked. This may still be true in view of the “data-poor” humani-
tarian sector as such (Barnett and Gross Stein 2012, p. 9). Due to the limited 
empirical data, the FBO impact on development processes is almost impossible 
to establish at this stage. However, FBOs are widely considered to bring about “a 
more people-centred, transformative and sustainable development” (Jones and 
Petersen 2011, p. 1299). Furthermore, intending to improve the effectiveness 
of their developmental work, numerous FBOs are currently revising organisa-
tional structures along the principles of commercial firms. FBOs are becoming 
increasingly aware of the competitiveness in the development market (Hopgood 
and Vinjamuri 2012): if they fail to raise revenues, minimise costs, protect their 
reputation, and hire specialised staff, they cannot meet their development objec-
tives. Alongside the supposedly strong personal dedication of FBO staff, and a 
motivated constituency, all such aspects point at FBOs as capable development 
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actors. But, so far, empirical evidence thereof remains a desideratum in devel-
opment studies (Stockmann 2016, pp. 471–481; Ware et al. 2016, p. 331). 
Additionally, FBOs are frequently confronted with the allegation of conduct-
ing proselytism and, in the case of Muslim FBOs, are sometimes even alleged 
of being linked to terror organisations (Petersen 2012a, pp. 135–136; Petersen 
2012b, pp. 771–774). Moreover, in development circles the “newfound enthusi-
asm” for FBOs is coupled with a Janus-faced challenge: On the one side, politi-
cal development agency is confronted with improving their “religious literacy”; 
the legacy of an implicit negligence of religion in modernisation approaches to 
development is still enduring. On the other side, numerous FBOs are challenged 
to improve their “development literacy” (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internation-
ale Zusammenarbeit/German Association for International Cooperation (GIZ) 
2015, p. 22f.). The case studies collected in this volume can help filling this 
lacuna. By and large they are stretching these two main phases around the for-
mulation of MDGs and SDGs in which FBOs appeared on grand scale in devel-
opment geopolitics.
Crossing boundaries: findings from the case studies
This volume explores how FBOs relate to the discursive fields in which they 
move: religious discourses of their specific Protestant constituencies, develop-
ment discourses of international bodies, state agencies, and secular NGOs, as 
well as transnational theological discourses. Each of the FBOs investigated in 
this volume moves in a particular constellation of discourses that to some extent 
influences its development notions and activities. For instance, national political 
cultures in countries such as Guyana or Rwanda create specific contexts for the 
development activities of local FBOs, shaping their approaches to development, 
as will be discussed in the case studies by Kloß and Schliesser. Similarly, major 
sea-changes in transnational theological discourses on development are likely to 
affect the development approaches of those FBOs that are connected to these dis-
courses, as will be shown in the case studies by Hoffmann and Freeman. However, 
FBOs are no passive recipients of their social environment: they may also try to 
shape prevalent development notions through activities directed towards its reli-
gious constituencies (see Freeman’s study of the Micah Challenge Campaign in 
this volume) or international communities (see Haynes’ study of World Vision in 
this volume).
Defining FBOs is challenging. We suggest that FBOs can best be described 
by their boundary-crossing character: they move beyond established lines. The 
following elaborations on the findings from the case studies in this volume are 
structured in terms of the boundary-crossing character of FBOs: They cross the 
boundaries between secular and religious organisations (subsection 1), denomi-
national lines (subsection 2), and different development contexts and discourses 
(subsections 3–4). Therefore, they become boundary agents that mediate between 
different discourses (subsection 5). By combining influxes from different con-
texts, they generate unique perspectives on development and have the capacity to 
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become developmental entrepreneurs (subsection 6). The following sections will 
discuss these characteristics of FBOs based on the case studies in this volume.
Unique organisations
FBOs are neither traditional religious organisations nor simply NGOs with a 
religious labelling. They constitute a unique type of organisation that combines 
characteristics of NGOs and religious organisations. The contributions to this 
volume show that FBOs share some elements with NGOs, while simultaneously 
cultivating characteristics that mark their faith-background and distinguish them 
from other NGOs in development work. There are opposing views on the par-
ticularities of FBOs in comparison to NGOs (Clarke and Ware 2015): On the 
one extreme are assessments that perceive FBOs as genuinely distinctive from 
NGOs, given that their worldviews and guiding values strongly differ from that 
of NGOs (cf. James 2009). On the other extreme, scholars speak of a false and 
arbitrary division between FBOs and NGOs, pointing towards their similarities 
in development practices and their shared origins in civil society (cf. Green et al. 
2012; Carrette 2017; Ware et al. 2016, pp. 322–324). Hence, Ware et al. claim that 
“the dichotomy between FBOs and secular NGOs is rather artificial” (Ware et al. 
2016, p. 322). The contributions in this volume find evidence for both positions, 
indicating that FBOs differ in some respects from NGOs while showing similari-
ties in others.
FBOs share similar development goals and practices with NGOs, often strongly 
engaging in the provision of health services and education (Berger 2003; Green 
et al. 2012; Heist and Cnaan 2016; Lunn 2009; Marshall 2001; Ware et al. 2016). 
Against the backdrop of rising environmental concern, their activities also increas-
ingly tackle climate change and environmental degradation (Glaab 2017; Glaab 
et al. 2019; Koehrsen 2018, 2020). Paralleling secular NGOs, the FBOs in this 
volume conduct projects on poverty alleviation, health, gender equality, educa-
tion, peace etc. Their development activities match with the goals fixed in the 
international development agendas of the MDGs and SDGs. Moreover, in order to 
plan, organise, and conduct their projects, they frequently collaborate with secular 
NGOs and FBOs from various faith-backgrounds (see also Boehle 2010b). In 
particular, large FBOs often partner with organisations not committed to Christian 
faith and values. For instance, World Vision works with Islamic Relief and many 
UN agencies (see Haynes 2019 in this volume).
However, in many other aspects FBOs do differ from secular NGOs: their 
foundational philosophies, moral and cosmological orientations, and motivations 
often draw upon their specific faith-basis (see also Berger 2003; Clarke 2006; 
Jennings and Clarke 2008, p. 272). Moreover, FBOs are embedded in religious 
networks and receive their funding from religiously motivated donors (Berger 
2003; Kirmani 2012; Ware et al. 2016). For instance, the FBO Mission 21 in this 
volume outlines in its mission statement that the “Gospel of Jesus Christ” and 
the “vision of the Kingdom of God” guide the organisation in its activities. Mis-
sion 21 works closely with local churches in the global south and forms part of 
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a worldwide community of churches and missions organisations; in addition it is 
linked to the ecumenical movement of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and 
the Reformed Church in Switzerland (see Hoffmann 2019 in this volume). Other 
organisations form an integral part of single churches: the Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency, investigated in this volume, is strongly linked to the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church (see Kloß 2019 in this volume). Being related to religious 
networks and discourses, the FBOs in this volume subscribe to specific notions of 
development, distinct from secular concepts of development. Examples for these 
notions are “spiritual development”, “holistic development”, “transformational 
development”, and “integral mission”. FBOs evolve their own “theologies” of 
development. Thus, there is no systematic “theology of development” in sight. 
However, the development concepts of Christian FBOs outlined in this volume 
share a holistic vision of human wellbeing which prominently feature spiritual 
wellbeing and individual self-transformation (see, for instance, Kloß 2019 in this 
volume).
Another potential difference between FBOs and “secular” NGOs concerns the 
presumed tendency to proselytism. Proselytism consists in active efforts to con-
vert others to a particular religion, confession, or ideology (Lynch and Schwarz 
2016). FBOs are frequently subject to the allegation of proselytism. The prime 
motivation of FBOs, the argument goes, is to exert a religious hegemony by 
instrumentalizing development discourses and practises of charity. Historic epi-
sodes known primarily from Imperial mission politics in colonial India have 
nurtured the accusation of proselytism. The motif of distributing food against 
the promise to convert has layered down in accounts about the so-called “rice 
Christians” (Bauman 2008, pp. 71–100). Such practices remained exceptional and 
have been substantially delegitimised by contemporary mission societies (Becker 
2015, pp. 338–342). As an expression of a rather marginal and controversial evan-
gelistic praxis, the proselytism formula however still overshadows contemporary 
FBO praxis in actual development studies.
The allegation of proselytism has facilitated the “othering” of Christian FBOs 
in opposition to non-religious (or other religious) NGOs. In particular, Muslim 
FBOs (Petersen 2012a) and evangelical FBOs (Berger 2003, p. 17; Clarke 2006; 
Heist and Cnaan 2016; Lunn 2009, pp. 944–946) are frequently suspected of 
using development work as an instrument for gaining new followers. For instance, 
Pelkmans (2009) observes that evangelical groups in Kyrgyzstan use their devel-
opment activity for proselytising aims: they adopt a development language to gain 
access to new missionary fields and disguise their conversion efforts by dress-
ing them in the welcomed rhetoric of humanitarian development. Moreover, the 
evangelical FBO sector seems to be sensitised in special ways to donor policies. 
Evangelical donors supporting FBOs may tend to have an interest in proselytism 
and, accordingly, evaluate the organisation’s legitimacy based on its effective-
ness in spreading the given faith (Lister 2003). However, religious donors are not 
the only stakeholder group of evangelical FBOs. Other important stakeholders, 
such as governmental agencies, international institutions, secular donors and col-
laboration partners, have different interests and are likely to repudiate religious 
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proselytism. Moving between these different settings, evangelical FBOs form 
their own critical agendas and do not necessarily follow their religious constituen-
cies. Many evangelical NGOs, including the two evangelical organisations in this 
volume (World Vision and Micah Challenge), disavow proselytism. They agree to 
national ethical statements renouncing proselytism (Harriss 2014) and/or affirm 
the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross (Thaut 2009).
This is to say that the generalizing criticism of FBO proselytism has to be criti-
cally reviewed. Just in view of Christian FBOs, the general assumption of pros-
elytism neglects and denies its internal diversity (Lynch and Schwarz 2016; Thaut 
2009). Although Christian FBOs will not expressly outrule the option of individu-
als to convert by their free choice, religious proselytism concerns only a share 
of the more evangelical FBO spectrum. The majority of Christian FBOs reject 
strategic proselytism and tend to identify with standards of secular humanitarian-
ism (Thaut 2009). Although linked to a religious tradition, the primary mission of 
most FBOs is neither to enlarge the sphere of influence of a certain religion nor 
to disseminate specific religious doctrines. Thus, proselytism does not constitute 
a characteristic that could clearly distinguish FBOs from non-religious NGOs. 
Moreover, any effort to draw a sharp line between religious and secular FBOs on 
grounds of proselytism overlooks the normative bias in secular humanitarianism 
(Barnett and Gross Stein 2012) and does not reflect on the “role of religion in 
ostensibly non-religious organisations” (Jones and Petersen 2011, p. 1298). Turn-
ing the other way round, attributing the problem of proselytism solely to FBOs 
masks the prevalent “donor proselytism” (Lynch and Schwarz 2016) of secular 
(and religious) organisations spreading, for instance, concepts of liberal capital-
ism, efficiency, and sustainability (Fountain 2015). If proselytism is regarded as 
illegitimate, then this also concerns secular development agents.
In a similar vein, allegations of gender conservatism are sometimes voiced 
against FBOs. Among Christian FBOs, features of gender conservativism can be 
found in some evangelical FBOs while, arguably, FBOs with a historic back-
ground in mainline Christianity are engaging for gender equality (Agadjanian 
2005). Therefore, gender conservatism cannot be upheld as a general character-
istic of FBOs.
In total, FBOs cannot easily be attributed to one of the two categories “religious 
organisations” and “secular NGOs” (Clarke and Ware 2015, pp. 40f., 45f.): they 
form a category of their own that moves beyond the boundaries of religious/secu-
lar organisations – institutional in-betweens, located “between religious organisa-
tions and secular organisations” (Torry 2005, p. 117). FBOs involve elements 
from both worlds and constitute “a unique hybrid of religious beliefs and socio-
political activism” (Berger 2003, p. 16). The hybridity metaphor leaves space for 
interpretation. Although it does not direct towards definitional clarity, it works 
with an assumption of FBO-distinctiveness in terrains of development. On the 
one side, it dispenses from drawing precise lines between religious and secular 
spheres; on the other side, it relates to the special symbolic resources available to 
FBOs for development work. The particular religious traditions of FBOs and their 
theological justification of “social engagement at large” gain attention.
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Moreover, there is a certain terminological range of how to define these organi-
sations. FBOs are also labelled as “spiritual NGOs”, arguably to avoid interpre-
tive reductions to monotheistic interpretations of “faith”. In this vein, the acronym 
RNGOs, or “religious NGOs”, is the preferred terminology in contexts of the 
United Nations. In addition, FBOs are sometimes qualified as specific “faith-
based development organisations”, specifying the development wings of larger 
religious bodies such as churches. All these notions stress the religious dimension 
of these organisations, comprising particular worldviews and ethics. The contri-
butions published here prioritise the term “faith-based organisations”. It is from 
this vantage point of genuine religious worldviews and ethics that FBOs are moti-
vated to create favourable conditions for a “good life”. Following Julia Berger’s 
definition of what she prefers to call “religious NGOs” represented at the UN, 
we consider FBOs as “formal organisations whose identity and mission are self-
consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual tradi-
tions and which operate on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote 
and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or 
international level” (Berger 2003, p. 16).
Internal diversity: beyond classical lines of separation
Categorising FBOs as a unique type of organisation says little about their exten-
sive internal diversity and the different types of FBOs (James 2009; Kirmani 
2012). The enormous variety is due to their structures as well as their respective 
religious backgrounds. FBOs differ in their organisational and management cul-
tures, in their access to budgets, and in their radius and focus of activity, amongst 
others. Some FBOs are resource-rich international organisations operating within 
transnational networks; others are small locally active FBOs, dedicated to one-
purpose projects. The diffuse scenery is still more complex given the existence of 
global north and global south FBOs adapting to contextual policy requirements 
(Nuscheler 2012, p. 387).
It is challenging to provide insightful internal classifications of FBOs. Catego-
rising FBOs based on their denominational background (e.g. evangelical vs. main-
line Protestant) or their organisational type (e.g. churches vs. religious NGOs) 
barely allows for drawing conclusions on the intensity that their faith-background 
plays in their development agendas and practices.
This volume studies three organisational types of FBOs: development sections 
of churches, missionary organisations, and autonomous faith-based development 
organisations. Although missionary organisations and churches are traditionally 
related closer to the religious field and act according to its logics (e.g. seeking 
to spread their religious message), they are sometimes also strongly committed 
to development programmes (see also Öhlmann et al. 2016). The case study by 
Schliesser in this volume shows how Christian churches in Rwanda engage in 
improvements in health, poverty alleviation, education, and, in particular, conflict 
resolution. Hoffman’s contribution underlines the historic involvement of mis-
sionary organisations related to mainline Protestantism in education and other 
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welfare activities. Missionary organisations and churches have historically played 
a crucial role in providing welfare services (e.g. education, health services) in 
many countries of the global south as well as the global north such as the USA 
(Deneulin and Rakodi 2011; Heist and Cnaan 2016). Their approaches to develop-
ment do not necessarily differ from religious NGOs. As such, classifying FBOs 
into churches, missionary organisations, and religious NGOs does not lead to 
clear categories, which would enable researchers to distinguish their development 
approaches.
Another way of categorising FBOs draws upon their denominational back-
grounds. The selection in this volume comprises case studies of FBOs mainly 
from a Christian tradition. Within Christianity there is a diversity of FBOs, includ-
ing, among others, Catholic (e.g. Catholic Relief Services, Caritas International, 
Misereor), Orthodox (e.g. International Orthodox Christian Charities), and Prot-
estant FBOs. Our focus is on Protestant Christianity, including FBOs related to 
evangelical, mainline, and “non-orthodox” (Seventh Day Adventists Church) 
forms of Protestantism. Often lines are drawn between mainline and evangelical 
Protestantism, while attention has traditionally been focussed on mainline Protes-
tantism (Clarke 2006). Both expressions of Protestantism are based on different 
theological traditions that have informed their endeavours in development work, 
resulting in dissimilar histories of involvement. While mainline Protestantism 
has a long history of engagement in development work and its FBOs are often 
related to the ecumenical movement, evangelicals with their traditional empha-
sis on personal development and salvation have engaged in this topic to a lesser 
extent. Therefore, one may assume that an FBO being either mainline Protestant 
or evangelical will determine its development agendas and activities: FBOs from 
a mainline Protestant background will have a higher propensity to engage with 
secular topics and focus on structural inequalities, whereas FBOs with an evan-
gelical background stress individual development and avoid structural inequali-
ties. However, this volume sheds a critical light on this assumption and provides 
an alternative perspective: while mainline Protestants engage in theological pro-
grammes, evangelical FBOs focus on structural topics. The cases of Mission 21 
(see Hoffmann 2019 in this volume) and Micah Challenge (see Freeman 2019 in 
this volume) illustrate these tendencies. Although Mission 21 as a mainstream 
Protestant FBO has a long tradition of collaborating with secular development 
partners, it has recently extended its theological programmes and religious focus. 
By contrast, Micah Challenge is an evangelical FBO that places an emphasis on 
advocacy work. Its activities reflect a broader transformation of the development 
approaches within the evangelical Lausanne Movement, more precisely the evan-
gelical “left”, increasingly emphasising the socio-political responsibility of evan-
gelical Christians at large.
These insights indicate that boundaries between evangelical and mainline 
FBOs are blurring and that both types of FBOs are coming closer to each other in 
terms of their development agendas. Consequently, the development approaches 
of evangelical and mainline FBOs cannot easily be distinguished based upon their 
denominational background: FBOs with an evangelical background may focus on 
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topics that appeared originally to be dominated by mainline FBOs, while mainline 
FBOs expand their spiritual development work.
In total, categorising FBOs according to their organisational forms (e.g. 
churches vs. religious NGOs) and denominational backgrounds barely allows 
for raising conclusions about the way in which their faith-background influences 
their development agendas and activities. More insights are gained from clas-
sifications that specifically focus on FBOs and group them by their “religious-
ness” (cf. Clarke 2008; Sider and Unruh 2004). For instance, Sider and Unruh 
(2004) suggest a classification ranging from faith-permeated FBOs to quasi- 
secular organisations. This categorization provides information about the degree 
of attachment to their religious circles. It, therefore, defines the extent to which 
the discourses of their religious constituencies may shape the development agen-
das of the given FBOs, as will be further discussed below.
Flexibility and accommodation
FBOs are sometimes stereotyped as stuck in their religious discourses, being soli-
tary and divisive (cf. Kirmani 2012). While Heist and Cnaan (2016, p. 12f.) find 
that there is very limited data on the collaboration of FBOs, the contributions in 
this volume show that FBOs are highly collaborative organisations and have a 
strong ability to adapt to different (non-religious) contexts.
Each of the FBOs discussed here relates to a specific religious constituency and 
has its specific religious identity, involving particular theological concepts. How-
ever, this does not imply that these organisations remain stuck in their theological 
discourses and religious contexts: in order to fund, organise, and conduct develop-
ment work, FBOs go beyond their religious networks and move in non-religious 
contexts that are sometimes even hostile towards religion (see also Clarke 2008, 
pp. 4–5; Glaab 2017; James 2009): here, they find it difficult to be heard if they 
stick to their religious arguments. As such, it is impossible for them to carry their 
Christian identity through in different contexts: “To survive they must adapt” 
(James 2009, p. 10).
We are surveying activities and trajectories of FBOs within complex discursive 
fields, characterised by diverse regional, national, and international development 
discourses. These fields are inhabited by numerous stakeholders with occasionally 
conflicting interests and demands: religious constituents, donors, international 
development organisations, nation-states, regional governments, and recipients of 
development activities. As FBOs strongly depend on their socio-cultural environ-
ment, they have to respond to these discourses and demands.
The FBOs that have been studied in this volume demonstrate a strong ability 
to adapt to different contexts and sometimes pragmatically deal with heterogene-
ous expectations. In particular, this becomes manifest in their use of language. 
FBOs use varying discourse styles with governments, secular NGOs, religious 
donors, and churches. In each context, they have to follow the given commu-
nication standards and must know what type of reasoning convinces the com-
munication partner(s) (e.g. what appeals to secular donors and what appeals to 
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churches?). This is, for instance, illustrated by World Vision which reserves a 
Protestant vocabulary for its religious constituency: using this vocabulary helps 
to maintain its relationships with its evangelical donor communities. However, 
in international development circles, World Vision abstains from employing reli-
gious language (see Haynes 2019 in this volume).
Another example of FBOs’ strong ability to adapt to non-religious contexts is their 
development agendas. FBOs design their agendas in interaction with their socio-
cultural environment. International development agendas that have been fixed in 
the MDGs and SDGs form reference points for the FBOs in this volume: focussing 
on topics such as poverty alleviation, education, conflict resolution, and women’s 
empowerment, the FBOs relate to the international development goals. As such, the 
FBOs studied in this volume refer to the SDGs. For instance, World Vision works 
on six SDGs (see Haynes 2019 in this volume): good health and wellbeing (SDG 3), 
quality education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), sustainable cities and commu-
nities (SDG 11), peace and justice, strong institutions (SDG 16), and partnerships for 
the goals (SDG 17). While it is of little surprise that large FBOs which engage at the 
level of the UN are committed to the SDGs, the contributions in this volume find that 
even smaller FBOs engage with the international development agenda. For instance, 
the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda (Église Presbytérienne au Rwanda) conducts 
projects related to various SDGs, as for instance, peace and justice (SG 16), quality 
education (SDG 4), and good health (SDG 3) (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume). 
Moreover, evangelical FBOs that have been stereotyped as focusing on charity and 
individual life improvement also move actively into the direction of the MDGs and 
SDGs and address structural development issues. For instance, the evangelical FBO 
Micah Challenge actively campaigns for political advocacy work among evangeli-
cals to promote the MDGs (see Freeman 2019 in this volume).
FBOs relate to international development agendas, but still make their own 
choices in how they approach development and what development goals they pri-
oritise. Setting these priorities also depends on the regional context in which they 
move. As such, in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, FBOs place an emphasis 
on reconciliation (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume), while FBOs operating in 
the Guyanese context of ethno-religious competition regard their development 
activities as a way of counteracting the influence of FBOs related to other ethno-
religious group (see Kloß 2019 in this volume).
In total, this volume highlights the flexibility of FBOs. In contrast to expecta-
tions that FBOs are stuck in their religious discourses, we find flexibility and a 
high ability to adapt their practices, processes and communications to different 
contexts (see also Koehrsen 2017b). Nevertheless, moving simultaneously in het-
erogeneous contexts, they evolve strategies that go beyond simple accommoda-
tion, as will be shown in the following section.
Coping with heterogeneous discourses
The involvement in heterogeneous contexts does not only require FBOs to be 
flexible, but also to evolve strategies for handling the occasionally conflicting 
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demands. Apart from flexible adaptation these strategies also include active ven-
tures to transform these contexts, reducing the tensions between their conflicting 
demands.
Being embedded in different discursive fields is not a particularity unique to 
FBOs. FBOs share this characteristic with other NGOs which also deal with 
diverse and sometimes conflicting discourses and demands. However, FBOs dif-
fer from other types of NGOs in that they also relate to theological discourses and 
have a religious constituency. Institutional memberships in umbrella organisa-
tions and associations, donor relationships, and denominational affiliations create 
stable institutional connections between FBOs and the particular religious dis-
cursive field. Being related to a wider faith community provides them with an 
extensive social network and access to financial and organisational resources, as 
is frequently highlighted (cf. Berger 2003; Ware et al. 2016). Berger, for instance, 
stresses that FBOs can mobilise vast networks of believers and religious organisa-
tions and, therefore, have an extensive local reach (Berger 2003). While academic 
contributions usually highlight the potentials of affiliations with religious net-
works, they disregard the challenges that these may create for these organisations. 
Connections to religious networks make the development work of FBOs all the 
more complex by adding extra demands and views, given that FBOs are account-
able to their religious stakeholders. As their financial influx and legitimacy often 
depends on the engagement with these stakeholders and their discourses, FBOs 
have to underpin their faith dimension by linking their development notions and 
activities to these discourses (James 2009; James and Crooks 2009). For instance, 
religious donors may require FBOs to clarify their faith identity (cf. James 2009, 
pp. 10–11). This creates difficulties for FBOs in situations in which other types 
of stakeholders view parading the faith dimension as inappropriate. As such, the 
“religious” extra-demands may conflict with the expectations of international or 
national development discourses (e.g. secular donor institutions) or even constrain 
effective development activities (see also Bradley 2005; Clarke 2008, pp. 24–32). 
For instance, in the case of Micah Challenge, the evangelical constituency places 
a strong emphasis on personal development and salvation (see Freeman 2019 in 
this volume). This emphasis hinders effective advocacy work. However, Micah 
Challenge has to draw upon this constituency to pursue its goals.
Nevertheless, the strength of the connection to religious discursive fields dif-
fers between FBOs. Drawing upon Sider and Unruh’s (2004) classification of 
FBOs, these organisations can be grouped by their “religiousness” and degree 
of involvement with religious discursive fields (see also Petersen 2012a). While 
faith-permeated organisations are strongly embedded in the religious discursive 
field of the given constituency, in the case of quasi-secular organisations there 
are little or no connections at all to a religious discursive field. In the first case, 
the given FBOs mostly move in their religious discursive fields, strongly shap-
ing their development concepts, and barely participate in national or international 
development discourses. In contrast, in the latter case of FBOs as quasi-secular 
organisations, the impact of religious discourses on the development concepts of 
these organisations is low or absent.
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The FBOs that have been studied in this volume have maintained their con-
nections to the religious discursive fields. At the same time, they are not embed-
ded solely in these discourses, as they move simultaneously in other discourses. 
They constitute a type of FBO that balances its membership in different discursive 
fields. This concerns many, if not most, FBOs engaging in development work at a 
national or international scale.
The simultaneous participation in heterogeneous discursive fields can create 
tensions, as development concepts and expectations may differ between religious 
constituencies (e.g. spiritual development and poverty mitigation) and interna-
tional development discourses (e.g. emphasis on sustainability). The case studies 
in this volume point towards different strategies of FBOs in handling their partici-
pation in heterogeneous discourses.
World Vision carefully balances potential tensions by flexibly adapting its use 
of language to each context, using more religious concepts for its religious donor 
constituency and abstaining from them in the field of international development 
(see Haynes 2019 in this volume). This is what Jeremy Carrette calls the “chame-
leon politics” of religion given that religion appears and disappears in the strategic 
processes of the UN (Carrette 2017). World Vision’s strategy lends itself to FBOs 
that strongly participate in international development discourses and therefore 
must adjust to its logics while seeking to maintain their relationship to their reli-
gious constituency.
Micah Challenge, in contrast, chooses an entrepreneurial strategy (see Freeman 
2019 in this volume): it endeavours to transform the religious discourse. Aspir-
ing to establish advocacy work among its constituency, it seeks to bring the reli-
gious discourse of its constituency closer to the theological discourse on integral 
development and the international development discourse. If this undertaking is 
successful, it will decrease tensions between the discursive fields and place FBOs 
that move between them in a more comfortable situation. This strategy requires 
vast social networks and long-term efforts in persuading the given religious con-
stituencies. At the same time, it is uncertain and potentially hazardous, as it runs 
the risk of failing due to inertia of the religious discourses or even breaking with 
the religious constituency.
In national contexts where “religion” is negatively connoted, FBOs may choose 
to deny affiliation with any religious discourse. For example, the Save Abee Foun-
dation in Guyana neglects a religious affiliation and suggests that its Christian 
competitors have links to religion (see Kloß 2019 in this volume). Hence, neglect-
ing and/or attributing connections to religious discourses may form a competi-
tive strategy of FBOs in national development discourses marked by a negative 
perception of religion. Finally, other strategies include distancing from specific 
discourses. FBOs can appeal more strongly to their religious constituency and its 
discourses and distance themselves from national or international development 
discourses. Or they may, as described above, leave their religious background and 
the discourses related to it behind.
As the contributions in this volume show, FBOs develop strategies to han-
dle their simultaneous participation in heterogeneous contexts. These strategies 
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comprise balancing, adaptation, distancing, entrepreneurship, and denial. Depend-
ing on the heterogeneity of the discursive fields to which FBOs connect, there will 
be more or less pressure to develop such coping strategies. Often, FBOs may 
experience none or only marginal tensions. This is, for instance, shown by the 
case study on Rwanda where local religious organisations connect with their reli-
gious development concepts and resources to national development goals (see 
Schliesser 2019 in this volume).
Whenever FBOs move between heterogeneous discourses, they are not only 
likely to evolve abilities over time to manage the differences between them, but 
also to create a nexus that connects these discourses.
Boundary agents
Ware, Ware, and Clarke (Ware et al. 2016) point to the boundary-keeping role 
of FBOs. Nevertheless, their position in between the boundaries of different dis-
cursive fields also converts FBOs into boundary agents. They cross boundaries, 
balance different discourses, and intermediate with their activities and concepts 
between the heterogeneous discursive fields (cf. Boehle 2010a; Guston 1999). 
This becomes evident in their development notions which combine secular and 
religious elements. For instance, the holistic development concept of the Pres-
byterian Church of Rwanda brings religious and secular dimensions of develop-
ment together, stressing the spiritual as well as the social, economic, intellectual, 
cultural, and ecological dimensions of life (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume). 
Members of FBOs in Guyana regard a pure focus on materiality as short-sighted 
(see Kloß 2019 in this volume). For this reason, they prefer “holistic develop-
ment” which combines the material aspects of development with the idea of 
spiritual development (“spiritual wealth”) as personal development. The latter 
contrasts material wealth, as it is conceptualised as a form of wealth that people 
can keep with them after death.
FBOs combine influxes from religious and secular discourses to their specific 
notions of development and feed these notions back in to the discourses. Thereby, 
their development notions become devices for connecting different discourses and 
stakeholder demands (cf. Koehrsen 2017a; Star and Griesemer 1989). Through 
their development concepts, they can create a nexus between religious constituen-
cies and theology discourses, as well as international and national development 
discourses combining “religious literacy” and “development literacy”. FBOs pro-
vide an intellectual and practical space for exchanges between religious and secu-
lar actors and concepts.
Developmental entrepreneurship
We consider FBOs as developmental entrepreneurs. FBOs should not be regarded 
as passive recipients of their socio-cultural environment. The need to cope with 
conflicting expectations does not exclude agency, but rather creates incentives and 
opportunities to actively shape discourses. Being embedded in different discursive 
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fields, FBOs do not only strategically adapt themselves to these discourses, they 
also actively participate in them and seek to shape prevalent development con-
cepts. They do so based on their development priorities and notions. Thereby, and 
in the sense of developmental entrepreneurship, they bring alternative approaches 
into ongoing development debates (see Tetzlaff 2015).
This becomes particularly evident in the cases of Micah Challenge and World 
Vision which endeavour to influence development discourses (see Freeman 2019 
and Haynes 2019 in this volume). These organisations feed their concepts and 
priorities of development back into the discourses in which they move and shape 
these discourses. For instance, by pledging US $3 billion to the programme on 
Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health, World Vision contributes 
to the relative relevance of this development field and will have a stake in the 
projects related to this programme (see Haynes 2019 in this volume). Moreo-
ver, by organising side-events at the UN, World Vision promotes child-focussed 
goals in development work among government officials and UN entities. Micah 
Challenge, in contrast, seeks to shape the discourses of its evangelical constitu-
ency by promoting advocacy work together with a new evangelical theology (see 
Freeman).
FBOs also contribute to critical reflection in ongoing development debates. 
In particular, FBOs’ connections to religious worldviews and discourses allow 
them to take a critical distance and act as watchdogs in international development 
debates. FBOs’ religious values constitute normative standards on the basis of 
which they critically assess existing concepts of development and develop alter-
native ways of thinking about development (see also James 2009, p. 8; Deneulin 
and Rakodi 2011, p. 46). Thereby, they can provide “emancipation from current 
conventional development models” (Lunn 2009, p. 948). For instance, from the 
late 1960s, FBOs related to the WCC criticised the reduction of development to 
material wellbeing and effectively promoted more encompassing concepts (see 
Hoffmann 2019 in this volume; Marshall 2001): these take into account the human 
dimension of development (“human development”), considering social justice and 
the general quality of human life. Given their potential to bring in critical reflec-
tion and actively shape development discourses, FBOs can become developmental 
entrepreneurs that advance alternative perspectives on development. This becomes 
evident in the specific notions of development that the FBOs in this volume employ 
(e.g. “spiritual development”, “holistic development”) and which include spiritual 
dimensions of life usually disregarded by secular development actors.
Outline of the volume
The following paragraphs summarise the case studies ordered along their national 
or international focus: while the three case studies of the Christian FBOs, Mission 
21 (Hoffmann), Micah Challenge (Freeman), and World Vision (Haynes), spe-
cifically address their involvement in international development discourses, two 
case studies on Rwanda (Schliesser) and Guyana (Kloß) highlight the impact of 
national discourses on FBOs’ development notions and activities.
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Claudia Hoffmann’s case study focusses on Basel’s Mission 21. This organi-
sation is strongly related to mainline Protestantism and has its roots in a mis-
sion agency (Basel Mission), founded in 1815 in Basel, Switzerland. From a 
development perspective, its beginnings as a missionary agency in the early 19th 
century bear some characteristics of a religious development organisation which 
facilitated its collaboration with secular organisations such as the state-run Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) from the mid-20th century. 
Hoffmann’s contribution explores the ways in which Mission 21 has changed its 
approach to development and mission over time.
While the organisation’s concept of mission widely remained stable over 
the course of time, its approach to development has been subject to significant 
transformations. Hoffmann situates these transformations within the context of 
the WCC changing debates around mission and development. Since the 1970s 
ecumenical development debates within the WCC have placed an emphasis on 
“human development” and the JPIC-trilogy “justice, peace, and the integrity 
of creation”, rejecting the predominant, economically focussed development 
approaches of that time. As Mission 21 forms part of these changing discourses, 
these have implications for the organisation which increasingly stressed the 
importance of “justice” and “peace” in its communications. Moreover, while Mis-
sion 21 originally separated development and missionary activities and followed 
a technical development approach, it started to integrate both development and 
mission, and substituted the technical notion of development with a holistic con-
cept of development. The changing focus in the development work also becomes 
evident in the rising theological focus: “For Mission 21 the classical development 
projects to reduce poverty and end hunger are “nice to have”, but their centre-
piece is the theological and cultural exchange” (Hoffmann 2019 in this volume). 
Instead of becoming more secular in the face of rising collaboration with state-run 
agencies, the FBO has even managed to extend the theological dimension of its 
development activities.
The case of Mission 21 shows how development notions within an FBO change 
over time and how these changes relate to the discursive contexts in which the 
FBO is moving (e.g. the WCC). Moreover, it illustrates how FBOs resist tenden-
cies to turn into “secular” agencies of development by increasingly integrating the 
religious dimension within their development activities.
Similar to Hoffmann’s study, Dena Freeman observes transformations within 
the discursive field of FBOs. However, in Freeman’s contribution, the transforma-
tions refer to the evangelical field and are, partly, of a purposive nature. Freeman 
focusses on the evangelical campaign Micah Challenge and explores its endeav-
ours to disseminate a new theology among its evangelical constituency that facili-
tates evangelical advocacy work.
Studying the evolution of evangelical development discourses, Freeman 
describes a gradual process of change towards a new theology of development: 
while evangelical Protestantism is originally marked by a strong focus on per-
sonal development and salvation, theologians such as René Padilla and Samuel 
Escobar sought to extend the traditional evangelical theology by bringing in the 
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social dimension, integrating personal and social development. Inspired by Latin 
American theology of liberation, the new theology conceptualises structural 
inequalities as structural sin and redemption as a social affair. This approach 
came to be known as “transformational development” and “integral mission” 
within evangelical Christian circles. The Lausanne Conference in 1974 was “a 
key moment” in the discussion about integral mission: the Lausanne Covenant 
defines socio-political involvement as a duty of Christians. However, this aspect 
remained highly debated within evangelical Christianity. The discursive shift 
implied transformations in evangelical development work: similar to the afore-
mentioned case of Mission 21, evangelical FBOs started to conceptualise their 
development work as a form of religious practice. Moreover, they increasingly 
focussed on small-scale projects with local churches. As the idea of transforma-
tional development became widespread in the following years among the evan-
gelical constituency in the UK and Australia, some evangelical FBOs started 
to push for further changes and sought to establish political advocacy work as 
a feature of evangelical engagement. In 2001, Micah Network was founded as 
a network organisation of several evangelical FBOs with the aim of promoting 
the idea of integral mission in the evangelical world. Pursuing the promotion 
of evangelical advocacy work, from 2004 until 2015, Micah launched a trans-
national campaign that sought encouraging evangelicals to influence govern-
ments to fulfil the MDGs. This campaign was called Micah Challenge and aimed 
“to transform the church and to get it and its members to engage in popular 
advocacy and campaigning as part of the living out of their faith” (Freeman 
2019). Yet, the analysis is also about the limits of such transformation endeav-
ours. Although national campaigns were established in 41 countries, the overall 
campaign faced strong difficulties to mobilise national evangelical communi-
ties which related back to the premillennial dispensationalist theology of many 
evangelicals. Micah employed different strategies to overcome these difficulties 
by establishing new theological arguments, highlighting, for instance, the bibli-
cal nature of justice and the difference between politics and advocacy work. 
Nevertheless, the campaign concluded with mitigated results: its impact on the 
evangelical community was small and it led to little evangelical advocacy work 
as it did not manage to overcome barriers among religious constituencies regard-
ing advocacy.
The study on Micah Challenge presents an intriguing case of purposive innova-
tion within a religious tradition, exploring the potentials and limitations of steered 
transformations to render its own religious constituency more “development-
friendly”. However, the firmly established focus on personal salvation has, so 
far, impeded a comprehensive transformation. Therefore, the case illustrates the 
potential discrepancies between FBOs and their religious constituencies: within 
the evangelical field, the theological discourse of FBOs appears to differ signifi-
cantly from the discourse of its constituencies. While both seek to influence each 
other, they remain based on partly separated theologies. The case also indicates 
that FBOs committed to work with their religious constituency remain, to some 
extent, relegated to the theological discourses of their constituencies.
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Interestingly, Freeman and Hoffmann observe similar transformations among 
evangelical and mainline Protestant FBOs, as the religious dimension becomes 
increasingly integrated into their development activities, switching from a material 
approach towards a holistic concept of development. In both cases, these changes 
relate to transformations in the theological discourses of their communities.
Paralleling the aforementioned cases, Jeffrey Haynes focusses on a Christian 
FBO involved in international development circles. In this case, however, the 
organisation is deeply involved in the world of international development, ventur-
ing to shape international and national development agendas. Haynes analyses the 
activities of World Vision, a large FBO with an evangelical background at the UN. 
World Vision developed from a small Christian-focussed FBO to a global player 
in the world of international development with an annual budget of approximately 
US $1 billion. Today, the UN constitutes a key environment for this organisation 
to lobby its development concerns to international and national decision makers 
and the wider public. Its development concerns largely relate to the development 
outcomes for children and women – regardless of their faith – in the global south. 
Haynes studies the ways in which World Vision seeks to promote these concerns 
at the UN and sheds light on four of its strategies: (1) engagement with the SGDs 
(and MDGs) as a door-opener for cross-sectoral collaboration, (2) sponsoring of 
large UN programmes, (3) flexible adaptation of its vocabulary, and (4) co-organ-
isation of side-events.
World Vision strongly engages with the SDGs. As described previously, the 
SDGs (and MDGs) facilitate the integration of FBOs into the world of interna-
tional development, enabling cross-sectoral collaboration with NGOs, govern-
mental, and international bodies such as the UN and its subunits. As the SDGs 
(and MDGs) provide a joint development agenda for various types of develop-
ment actors (e.g. religious and non-religious NGOs, nation-states), engagement 
with them facilitates collaboration on the basis of shared goals in order to strategi-
cally build up partnerships and pool resources for higher development impacts. 
World Vision places an emphasis on 6 of the 17 SDGs, primarily relating to the 
domains of health, education, gender equality, sustainable communities, peace, 
and partnerships. To promote these goals, it uses vast funds to sponsor exten-
sive UN programmes that fall into its development concerns: for instance, it has 
pledged US $3 billion between 2016 and 2020 to the programme, Global Strategy 
for Women’s and Children’s Health. Investing vast sums into UN programmes, 
World Vision focusses a significant proportion of its financial resources on the 
UN to influence and accompany its development work. In the context of the UN, 
World Vision has built up strong partnerships with an extensive variety of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organisations that pursue similar development 
goals. Its multilingualism and ability to adapt to different social environments con-
tribute to its capacity of building up networks with diverse types of development 
actors. Moving between the rather “secular” world of the UN and its Christian 
constituency, World Vision has learned to adapt to different contexts: it flex-
ibly adjusts its language style to the given constituency, using a more Christian- 
based discourse style for its religious constituency and a secular discourse style 
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when interacting with states and international bodies. Finally, an important strat-
egy for World Vision to influence development discourses at the UN is the co-
organisation of side-events which are activities organised outside the formal UN 
programme. Hosting side-events together with national representatives at the UN 
(e.g. Canada, Paraguay) and other NGOs, World Vision seeks to inform the devel-
opment views and policies of government officials and UN entities. The events 
aim to underline the importance of child-focussed goals in development work, by, 
for instance, giving a voice to children from the global south. Haynes concludes 
that, by engaging in the United Nations, World Vision has the potential to posi-
tively influence international development outcomes.
By exploring the strategies of World Vision, this case illustrates the strong 
stance that FBOs – in this case, an FBO of evangelical origin – may take in inter-
national development discourses: FBOs may not only seek to influence the dis-
courses of their specific religious constituencies or home countries, but also the 
very international development agendas which will shape the development activi-
ties of nation-states, NGOs, and regional authorities.
In contrast to the aforementioned studies that place emphasis on FBOs’ embed-
dedness in international development discourses, the following two studies by 
Kloß and Schliesser focus on the activities of FBOs in specific national contexts.
Sinah Kloß’ contribution analyses the development concepts of two FBOs from 
different faith backgrounds in Guyana: the Save Abee Foundation (SAF) and the 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). While ADRA is a transna-
tional Christian FBO and forms part of the Seventh Day Adventists Church, SAF 
is a small NGO with a Hindu background that operates mostly in the rural areas of 
Guyana and was founded by a Guyanese Indian living today in the USA.
As activists of both organisations draw no clear lines between the “spiritual” and 
“secular” spheres of life, they perceive development in a holistic way. Although 
partly conceptualising it from a material angle – for instance, by regarding growth 
in the availability of material products as central indicator of “development” – and 
placing an emphasis in their activities on the improvement of physical infrastruc-
tures, health, and education, activists from both FBOs highlight the importance of 
spiritual development. Studying these organisations and their socio-cultural con-
text through anthropological field work, Kloß places a specific focus on the way in 
which ethno-religious groups negotiate status through development activities. The 
organisations operate in a post-colonial context shaped by strong ethno-religious 
power struggles between “Indians” (often conceived of as Hindu or Muslim) and 
“Africans” (often conceived of as Christian) who compete over social status and 
the access to resources (e.g. funding for industries, political power). This compe-
tition shapes national development discourses and activities: while development 
work is often perceived as a strategy of influencing power-relations between the 
ethno-religious groups, faith-based organisations, in particular, are suspected of 
proselytism. For instance, the founder of SAF and other Hindu informants regard 
charitable work of Hindus as a necessary means to counteract the perceived Chris-
tian missionary activities, cloaked in the costume of charity. Furthermore, the 
“giving” and “taking” of development aid has strong connotations for local actors. 
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As being labelled as “giver” or “receiver” of charitable work conveys unequal sta-
tus to actors, the “giving” and “taking” of different ethno-religious groups informs 
the Guyanese fabric of ethno-religious hierarchies. For instance, fearing being 
labelled as “impoverished others” and “receivers” of development aid, communi-
ties in need may reject development aid of NGOs. In contrast, those operating in 
development NGOs (such as some of Kloß’ informants from SAF), may proudly 
portray themselves as “givers”. Therefore, in the specific context of Guyana, 
the development activities of FBOs are enmeshed in the complex status nego-
tiations between ethno-religious groups: “Both organisations compete for status 
and negotiate power relations in the Guyanese community through practices of 
giving, taking, or rejecting” (Kloß 2019). Development becomes a means of con-
testing the power of the other ethno-religious groups, claiming status by “giving” 
and allowing members of their own group to “reject” charity from the “other”. 
Thereby, Kloß’ chapter highlights the ways in which national cultural discourses 
and power dynamics shape FBOs’ approaches to development.
Christine Schliesser’s contribution explores the involvement of Christian 
churches in conflict resolution in the context of Rwanda. Having experienced a 
devastating genocide perpetrated by parts of its own population, the country’s 
government strives for reconciliation. Schliesser raises the question of how reli-
gious organisations contribute to reconciliation and thereby to the development 
of the country. To address this question, she explores the reconciliation activities 
of the Anglican Church, the Presbyterian Church, and a Pentecostal Church by 
means of semi-structured interviews.
The general development activities of the organisations in the study relate to 
international development goals such as the SDGs as their activities focus on 
health, poverty alleviation, and education. Furthermore, they draw upon the 
broader concept of holistic development, which seeks to address “all dimensions 
of life” and integrates material and spiritual development. However, operating 
within a country that is marked by strong reconciliation efforts, the churches 
perceive reconciliation as a crucial feature of development: “Development in 
Rwanda, as it is viewed by the churches, cannot be separated from reconciliation” 
(Schliesser 2019). Therefore, the Christian churches in this study launch their 
own reconciliation activities. These efforts comprise, among others, theological 
training camps for pastors to lead reconciliation programmes, the preaching of 
forgiveness, projects to build relationships between perpetrators and victims, and 
radio shows. For instance, by facilitating micro loans to perpetrators and victims, 
the Presbyterian Church encourages the creation of joint businesses. Interestingly, 
all of the three churches in the study run activities that bring perpetrators and 
victims on a regular basis together, thereby pursuing the creation of stable social 
ties between them.
Comparing the FBOs’ activities with those of the government, Schliesser finds 
some differences: although there is a strong partnership between churches and 
government in reconciliation and developmental activities, FBOs have their own 
approach to reconciliation work. They follow a bottom-up approach, in contrast 
to the top-down approach of the government. Moreover, churches can contribute 
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to reconciliation with specific resources that are not equally available to the gov-
ernment: they build strong social ties, provide emotional support, and bring in 
their specific religious dimensions through the Christian message of forgiveness, 
healing, and love. In sum, by stressing reconciliation, the religious organisations 
in the study relate their development activities to the specific national context of 
Rwanda, but they do so with their own abilities and concepts.
Paralleling Kloß’ contribution, Schliesser addresses how FBOs deal with divi-
sions between “ethnic” groups. Stressing the importance of reconciliation as a 
prerequisite for development, Schliesser’s study illustrates how religious groups 
seek to build peace and overcome ethnic divisions. By contrast, in Kloß’ study, the 
ongoing power struggles between ethno-religious groups thwart the development 
work of FBOs and drag their activities into the very fabric of these struggles: the 
FBOs themselves become part of the ongoing ethno-religious competition, partici-
pating in the reproduction of these divisions. Though the religious groups studied 
by Schliesser endeavour to create new bridges, similar dynamics to that of Kloß’ 
study cannot be fully excluded: the expansion of heterogeneous Christian denomi-
nations might in the end involve the creation of new – faith-based – boundaries 
in Rwanda, substituting the old ethnic ones. Therefore, both studies refer to the 
twofold ability of FBOs to bridge as well as (re)produce divides. Whether and to 
what extent they bridge or (re)produce divides appears to depend, inter alia, on 
the national context: with active reconciliation policies in place, Rwanda enforces 
ethnic reconciliation, while perhaps opening space for the creation of new divides. 
The absence of similar policies in Guyana paired with active efforts of ethnic entre-
preneurs to consolidate divides and the almost unquestioned everydayness of these 
divides creates a fertile ground for the reproduction of these boundaries by FBOs.
Outlook
FBOs have become a relevant player and in some regions even key players in 
international development (see also Heist and Cnaan 2016). They constitute a 
unique type of organisation that combines characteristics of NGOs and religious 
organisations and move between different discursive fields and contexts. Their 
ability to act effectively in heterogeneous contexts and flexibly adapt to these 
contexts allows FBOs to mediate between them. Therefore, FBOs are boundary 
agents: they can create discursive spaces for the exchange between different types 
of actors, particularly religious and non-religious actors, on development.
As FBOs are simultaneously enmeshed in heterogeneous contexts involving 
different discourses, they are sometimes confronted with conflicting demands 
and tensions. Handling these tensions is challenging. FBOs respond with differ-
ent strategies to the multiple demands. These strategies may also involve active 
efforts to transform existing discourses and views on development. As such, their 
relationship with the heterogeneous contexts in which they move is reciprocal: 
on the one hand, FBOs are influenced by the contexts in which they move; on the 
other hand, they undertake ventures to proactively shape them and have an impact 
on development discourses.
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Moving within different contexts enables FBOs to generate alternative perspec-
tives on development: the simultaneous involvement in religious and development 
discourses informs their development concepts. Based on these perspectives, they 
provide new impulses and critical reflections to ongoing development debates.
As FBOs are increasingly important players in international development, 
there is a need for more research on these organisations. Based on the insights 
of the case studies in this volume, research may address the complex relation-
ship with the heterogeneous discursive fields in which they move. Aside from 
assessing how they handle the tensions resulting from their participation in these 
fields, studies could explore the specific capacities that result from their embed-
dedness in different fields for development work and where these capacities can 
provide advantages (e.g. advocacy work). Another instructive path of research 
could be to compare FBOs from different faith traditions. While this volume 
places an emphasis on Protestant FBOs, more research is needed on FBOs from 
other faith backgrounds. Comparing Protestant FBOs with other FBOs, it may 
turn out that the particularities that have been highlighted here – such as the 
involvement in heterogeneous contexts and flexibility – are especially pro-
nounced among Protestant (or Christian) FBOs, whereas FBOs from other faith 
traditions show other particularities and capacities for development work. For 
instance, it is unclear whether Christian FBOs are more inclined to form bound-
ary agents than other FBOs, as it is easier for them to connect to international 
development discourses due to their higher acceptance in these circles. There-
fore, studies could explore how FBOs from non-Christian faith backgrounds 
connect to different discourses and what development notions they evolve in 
this interplay. Thereby, studies may determine whether these FBOs face other 
challenges when simultaneously engaging with the discourses of their religious 
constituencies and those of international development and whether they need to 
evolve alternative strategies to handle them, different to those of the Protestant 
FBOs examined in this volume.
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Introduction
Mission 21, based in Basel, Switzerland, emerged through the union of several 
missionary organisations – Basel Mission is the best known amongst them – and 
was officially founded on 1 January 2001. Mission 21 sees its key tasks today in 
reduction of poverty, health care, agriculture, fair trade, education, the advance-
ment of peace, the empowerment of women and gender equality. Coincidentally, 
the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated around the 
same time, in September 2000, at the United Nations headquarters in New York 
by world leaders, “committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce 
extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets” (United Nations 
2016). The aims and goals of Mission 21 are therefore very similar to the agenda 
of secular development agencies trying to achieve the MDGs. Despite this simi-
larity to secular development organisations, Mission 21 is very keen to show the 
continuity between their work nowadays and their initial history in the early 19th 
century. Although there have been several considerable frictions, particularly dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century, their profile did not substantially change.
This mission organisation had to come across with changes, not only recently 
in the early 2000s, but also during the 1950s and in the 1960s Basel Mission 
had to deal with several frictions that affected their work and self-concept. This 
interesting time of transition to post-colonialism constitutes an underestimated 
period in the history of Christianity in the 20th century. During these years a 
paradigmatic shift occurs in Mission history: it is the time where the international 
missionary movement transformed, the ecumenical movement was differenti-
ated, and independent – later called contextual – theologies from the South joined 
forces (Heuser 2016). The decolonisation in the 1960s forced missionary agencies 
to define themselves in a new way. In almost every country in the world, local 
autonomous churches emerged. The relationship between these churches and the 
mission organisations in Europe and USA had to be redefined. During the World 
Mission conference in Bangkok at the turn of 1972/1973, a proposal was made 
for a temporary moratorium on sending missionaries and money from the North to 
Africa, Asia and Latin America (World Council of Churches 2016b). The morato-
rium was never really accepted yet had an important impact on the self-concept of 
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mission organisations and also on the purpose and meaning of mission. Craig Ott 
and Stephen Strauss, both professors of intercultural studies and mission, stress 
in their mission book that “In the 1960s the ecumenical movement proclaimed, 
that the age of ‘missions’ was thus passed. The age of ‘mission’ had come . . .” 
(Ott et al. 2010, pp. 218–219). Thus, the sending of missionaries to distant and so 
called “unreached” peoples should stop and every church should become a mis-
sion church in its own locale. The age of real ecumenism began. Instead of mis-
sionaries, fraternal co-workers1 were needed in the newly established churches in 
the South.
In Basel Mission, the whole process of change in the understanding of mis-
sionaries began only in the 1970s yet much earlier than in other places: the self-
identification of missionaries changed dramatically due to the eviction of all 
missionaries from China during the years after Mao Zedong’s seizure of power 
from 1949–1952 (Jenkins 1998, pp. 21–22). This experience was a shock for 
Basel Mission; they no longer felt welcome in the missionary territories. After the 
missionary seminary in Basel was closed in 1954, Basel Mission decided to send 
out missionaries only on demand of their partner churches.2 Basel Mission had to 
redefine itself. The notion of “development” and how evangelisation and diaconia 
are linked together played a significant role in this redefinition process.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the notion, implications and activities 
of development within Basel Mission/Mission 21, coming from a purely mission-
ary agency and heading to a faith-based development organisation.3 How did they 
change over time? Mission 21 sees its key tasks today as working in the areas of 
poverty reduction, health care, agriculture, fair trade, education, the advancement 
of peace, the empowerment of women and gender equality. Despite all the frictions 
described above, the emphasis on continuity between the work in the early days of 
Basel Mission and the work of Mission 21 today will be explained. I will answer 
these questions through a comparative analysis of two projects or programmes of 
Mission 21 in Kalimantan, Indonesia. The first project is the Farming Centre in 
Tumbang Lahang which was opened in 1955, right after the China disaster, and 
closed in 2011. The second project is called “Empowerment of Basic Groups” and 
was implemented in 2015, when the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 
were formulated. Furthermore, this contribution deals with the fact that mission 
organisations fit within the definition of “invisible NGOs” in the field of develop-
ment (Clarke 2006, p. 843). Exploring the project work of Mission 21 helps to show 
the “added value” of mission organisations in development work that is assumed 
by several researchers (James 2011; Clarke 2012b). The case illustrates that faith-
based organisations (FBOs) can become “development entrepreneurs” (Koehrsen 
and Heuser 2019 in this volume) by assuming critical positions towards prevalent 
development concepts and suggesting alternative notions of development.
Mission organisations as “invisible NGOs”
Generally speaking, the role of mission organisations in development co-operation 
has been ignored. In development discourses they have long been regarded as 
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suspicious organisations by the development sector: mission organisations save 
souls and proselytise and are therefore not allowed into the development sector 
(Fountain 2015, pp. 89–90). However, in mainstream Christian teaching, mission 
is understood as “a continuation of Jesus’ mission of service rooted in ‘love’, 
which itself was entrusted to his disciples whom He had sent out to share His 
Good News”. The roots of mission seem to be quite clear however the practice of 
mission always has been very diverse, ranging from religious conversion through 
preaching and evangelisation “to serving the poor and the marginalised without 
being vocal in faith” (Clarke 2012a, p. 2). Furthermore, missionary organisa-
tions should be considered important forces in development co-operation due to 
their strong links to local communities. Community-focused models of devel-
opment have become increasingly important during the last decade. Missionary 
organisations could be attractive stakeholders: development service of missionary 
organisations is hold to be very efficient, because they are locally rooted and have 
national, international and ecumenical networks. Furthermore, mission organisa-
tions profit greatly from voluntary work. Volunteering is often understood as a 
part of the calling of practising Christians. Moreover, the work of missionary 
organisations often concentrates on areas which are difficult to access for the state. 
Finally, but no less importantly, mission organisations as religious organisations 
have better possibilities to work together with religious leaders. Religious leaders 
are often the most trusted people in developing countries (James 2011, p. 111). 
Through analysing the project work of Basel Mission/Mission 21 these statements 
will be accentuated later.
Criticism related to religious character is an issue dealt with not only by mis-
sion organisations, but by any FBO. The critiques are not limited to the issue of 
proselytization. FBOs are also accused of acting alone and in isolation, not will-
ing to collaborate with other FBOs or secular organisations, and of contributing 
to tensions and conflicts (Heist and Cnaan 2016, pp. 11–13). Furthermore, it is 
not only mission organisations nor FBOs that have been a disputed topic in the 
development discourse: religion and spirituality on the whole have been long-
time neglected subjects. In the year 2000, spirituality was still considered taboo in 
development theory and practice. The sociologist Kurt Allen Ver Beek sees four 
possible reasons for this: a “fear of imposing foreign perspectives, a dichotomis-
ing Northern perspective, a fear of conflict, or the lack of precedent or models” 
(Beek 2000, p. 40). While Ver Beek emphasises the important role of spiritual-
ity in development issues, other authors stress the distinction between FBOs and 
NGOs and the importance and contribution of faith-based organisations to devel-
opment work (Ware et al. 2016). During the last 15 years, spirituality, religion 
and FBOs have played an increasingly important role in development discourse – 
contemporary development studies also deal with the impact of religion and spir-
ituality (Déneulin and Bano 2009). Many topics have been researched in this field, 
for instance, the impact of distinct religious beliefs on development (for the impact 
of Pentecostalism see Freeman 2012; for the impact of different religious beliefs 
Mtata 2013 or Faschingeder and Six 2007), and how FBOs seek to influence the 
debates at UN level (Haynes 2014). Historical and contemporary case studies 
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on the connection between mission and development also have emerged (Clarke 
2012b; Lounela 2007; Biehl 2013). Secular development discourse is slowly 
opening towards the longstanding and contemporary involvement of Christians 
in development initiatives.
The discourse on development has changed: Today it is a discourse against 
a concept of materialistic development, only concerned with economic growth. 
Today, the discourse on development fosters a holistic understanding of develop-
ment, including human beings in all their aspects. This approach becomes visible 
in the SDGs meaning that mission organisations can strongly contribute to such 
a discourse. For a long time, mission organisations have been dealing with the 
understanding of mission. The connection between evangelisation and diaconia – 
meaning caring for your neighbour or social welfare – in the missionary work was 
very much disputed and scrutinised. The concept of “Missio Dei” that emerged 
in the 1950s widened the scope and understanding of mission. Mission is not an 
activity of the church, but a movement from God to the whole world and is under-
stood as a “holistic mission”, targeting the whole creation in all its aspects (Bosch 
1991, pp. 389–393).
From Basel Mission to Mission 21: historical  
background and self-concept
Mission 21 was founded in 2001 but it has a long history. We will have a closer 
look at two important dates: 1815 and 1963.
In 1815, Basel Mission – the strongest supporter of today’s Mission 21 – was 
founded. Since the founding days, Basel Mission has always been a heterogene-
ous, interdenominationally organised institution with a very hierarchical structure. 
Basel Mission was founded at the beginning of the “great missionary century” 
(Warneck 1880), when many other mission organisations were born. There are 
several reasons for this emergence. On the one hand, at the beginning of the 
19th century the political circumstances in many colonies changed, and mission 
organisations were increasingly tolerated. On the other hand, the reasons for this 
departure can be found in a new awakening movement, through which new net-
works occurred, linked together transnationally and interdenominationally (Mack 
2013, pp. 44–45). Basel Mission is an interdenominational mission organisation 
as belonging to a specific church is not a condition for the admission of a mis-
sionary, so the organisation is therefore unable to build upon a specific church 
community to back them up (Schlatter 1916, p. 277). Basel Mission is, like many 
other mission organisations, a “parachurch” (Pierard 1999, p. 11) and is strongly 
based on the principle of volunteering. Theologically, Basel Mission is rooted 
in the tradition of pietism, a religious renewal movement within the Protestant 
churches, starting in the 17th century and having its prime times in the 18th cen-
tury. Pietism, broadly spoken, pushes for individualising and internalising of the 
religious life. New forms of personal piety and communal life emerged. Further-
more, caring for the poor, diaconia, became increasingly important (Wallmann 
2005, p. 21). Within the work of Basel Mission, individual conversions were very 
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important; the “targets” of a missionary were individuals, not clans, tribes or peo-
ples. It was important to educate the individuals in Christian faith before they 
could be baptised. Eschatological and biblical motives were central in their work 
due to these pietistic foundations. From their beginnings Basel Mission always 
linked evangelisation and diaconia. Poverty reduction, better schooling and social 
welfare were as important as preaching and spreading the gospel within the work 
of Basel Mission.
In 1963, KEM (Cooperation of Evangelical Missions in Switzerland)4 was 
founded. This cooperation was in some way similar to Mission 21 today. It 
amalgamated several Protestant mission societies in Switzerland, but there was 
one important difference: one main ambition of KEM was to work more closely 
together with the reformed churches in Switzerland, not only for financial motives 
but also for theological reasons. Mission was seen as a part of the church. The 
aims of this new co-operation entailed the co-ordination of the work in Switzer-
land, joint finances and building a future where mission is part of every church 
and every Christian. This close link between the reformed churches and the mis-
sion societies released a mood of new beginnings all over Switzerland. Mission 
was now understood as something which is also important at home, not only over-
seas (Huppenbauer 2014, p. 11). In 1983, this new understanding of mission led 
to guidelines for developmental thinking and action. These guidelines had the aim 
of showing possibilities and limitations of political joint responsibility in mission. 
Many new relief and development projects emerged at that time. They led to the 
critique that KEM was too heavily involved with the churches in Switzerland 
and with developmental questions and was forgetting the real task of mission 
(Huppenbauer 2014, p. 64). In 1999 Basel Mission resigned from KEM, predomi-
nantly due to financial reasons, but theological reasons, also led to this breakup: 
In the eyes of Basel Mission, KEM was heading too much towards being a relief 
organisation and their work was not focussing enough on a holistic understanding 
of mission (Huppenbauer 2014, pp. 130–134). KEM was dissolved in Decem-
ber 2000. Mission 21 was founded in January 2001 and, unlike Basel Mission, 
the Protestant churches of Switzerland were not part of its founding organisations.
Today, Mission 21 is a worldwide community of churches, missions and devel-
opment organisations. The work of Mission 21 extends to different countries. 
The partner organisations associated in continental assemblies are members of 
Mission 21; the Basel Mission, the Evangelical Mission in the Kwango and the 
Moravian Church are supporting associations of Mission 21. The 200-year-old 
Basel Mission is the strongest supporter and supplies the background of Mis-
sion 21. The board or the management of Mission 21 in Basel is not the highest 
decision-making body of Mission 21: the Mission Synod has this position, where 
all the sponsoring organisations are represented by a total number of 45 delegates. 
It decides upon the programmatic and theological orientation of Mission 21, upon 
intermediate and long-term aims and upon the financial planning. The Mission 
Synod meets once every three years. Mission 21 sees itself as an international 
learning community (Mission 21 2016b), thus all aims and projects have to be 
developed together with the partner organisations. Differences in understanding 
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of the aims and goals of Mission 21 or of the whole project work can lead to 
severe conflicts between the management board in Basel and the partner organisa-
tions. The aims and principles of Mission 21 are very much rooted in the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ and in their history. A short film, which was produced for the 200-
year anniversary of Basel Mission, tries to link the history of Basel Mission with 
the work of Mission 21 today (Mission 21 2016c). This film depicts where Mis-
sion 21 comes from and is very much interested in presenting the similarities and 
the differences between the early missionary days and the situation today: Mission 
21 did not just turn from being a missionary to a development organisation. The 
core themes and goals in the past and the present day are very much alike. Mission 
21 wants to present itself to the public as a non-profit and charitable organisation 
with a religious background and motivation. The central words in this short film 
are “hope” and “justice”, words which are crucial not only in a religious context. 
The film does not use language limited to a Christian audience. One finds no bible 
verses, no links to Jesus or mission; even broader theological terms like charity or 
diaconia are omitted. “Hope”, “justice”, “love” and “respect” are frequently used 
catchwords which can be used both in secular and religious contexts.
The WCC and ecumenical approaches to development
Basel Mission and Mission 21 belong to the ecumenical movement of Christian-
ity. The World Council of Churches (WCC) is the broadest and most inclusive 
organisation within the organised expressions of this ecumenical movement. The 
348 member churches reflect, speak, act, worship and work together on several 
topics, always with the goal of visible unity (World Council of Churches 2016a). 
Regarding the notion of development within the ecumenical movement several 
conferences and considerations within the WCC have been crucial. I will give a 
brief overview in the following section.
Peace, justice and sustainability are very important terms within development 
organisations today. The WCC has considered the connection between justice, 
peace and sustainability for about 40 years. The term and concept of a sustain-
able society was introduced in Bucharest in 1974 (World Council of Churches 
1974, p. 2). The WCC General Assembly adopted this concept in Nairobi in 1975. 
Because social justice was at least as important as sustainability, they chose to 
speak of a “sustainable and just society” as the goal of the ecumenical movement 
(Albrecht 1991, p. 963). In his speech in Nairobi, Charles Birch, an Australian 
biologist and theologian, emphasised that the “struggle over the body of earth . . . 
involves a programme of de-development of the rich world” (Birch 1976, p. 69), 
meaning that fundamental change of heart and mind about humankind’s relation-
ship to nature is needed to obtain a just and sustainable society. In the following 
decades, the discourse on sustainable development obtained new elements, and 
thus ecological questions appeared. At the Vancouver Assembly in 1983 the tril-
ogy of Justice, Peace, Integrity of Creation (JPIC) was promoted. In 1988 the 
WCC launched its Climate Change Programme. After the Assembly in Harare 
in 1998, environmental questions became strongly connected with the subject of 
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indigenous people around the world. In 2006 the commission for Justice, Peace 
and the Integrity of Creation presented an alternative globalisation programme in 
Porto Alegre addressing people and earth. The programme is called “a call to love 
and action: Agape”. The commission emphasised that a world without poverty – 
the goal of the MDGs – is not only possible but is in keeping with the grace of 
God for the world (Commission for Justice, Peace and Creation 2005).
The discussion within the WCC was, from the beginning, questioning an 
understanding of development which was solely orientated on economic growth. 
The discussions within the WCC on development were influencing the changes 
in the overall concept of development over the last 50 years (Zaugg-Ott 2004, 
p. 22). The climax of the debates on development within the WCC lies in the 
time between 1968 and the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. The most 
important decisions were taken throughout this period, which have been shap-
ing the developmental attitude within the WCC ever since. Since the end of 
the 1960s the WCC has been committed to a developmental model which is 
not focused on economic growth, but on a responsible society with justice for 
everybody. Development within the ecumenical world means that development 
is “human development, which allows the individual as well as the society to 
bring the possibilities of human life in social justice, self-reliance and economic 
growth to its full realisation” (Gruber 1970, p. 122; translation CH). Aside from 
this definition, development was increasingly becoming a taboo word, because 
it was associated with economic growth only, for example the WCC Com-
mission on Churches’ Participation in Development clearly states: “As early 
as 1957 the then existing South East Asia Conference of Churches declared: 
‘Development is not our word’ ” (CCPD 1990, p. 5). Within a solely material-
istic notion of development, social concerns and environmental issues would 
not be sufficiently considered. The ecumenical meaning of development had to 
be recaptured where development means a people-centred and justice-oriented 
process. Such a process can fit within a Christian context, guided by the words 
of Jesus in Matthew 6:33: “Set your mind on God’s Kingdom and his justice 
before everything else” (CCPD 1990, p. 6). Until the end of the 1970s the term 
“liberation” – coming from the liberation theology from Latin America – was 
the alternative to the term development; Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation 
became leading concepts in the development policy of the WCC (Zaugg-Ott 
2004, pp. 393–405).
We can conclude with Kurt Zaugg-Ott that the early claims for an orientation of 
the development programmes for the very poorest of the world resonated with the 
secular world. The term “human development”, which was present in the WCC 
in the 1970s, became the title of a UNDP report in 1990: “Human Development 
Report”. But it can be critically argued that the problems of the world focused 
in the WCC were only in a prophetic manner. The constructive dispute and the 
collaboration of churches regarding concrete solutions took a backseat behind 
accusations and confessions of resistance.
Aside from this theological understanding of development work, a holistic 
understanding of mission is important for the ecumenical movement. The term 
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“Missio Dei” has become crucial for the ecumenical movement since the second 
half of the 20th century. Missio Dei means that the Trinitarian God is the subject of 
mission. Mission is therefore not church-centred but theologically centred. Such 
an understanding of mission can be interpreted socio-critical and church-critical. 
Mission in this sense of the word is not limited to a historical phenomenon of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, but understood as a transformative dynamic: God is 
constantly working towards the salvation of the whole world, “This mission spir-
ituality has a dynamic of transformation which, through the spiritual commitment 
of people, is capable of transforming the world in God’s grace” (World Council 
of Churches 2012, pp. 4–5).
To sum up, the ecumenical discussions on development and mission deliver an 
alternative approach to development, both in practice and in theory. The focus lies 
on human development and eco-justice, not only on economic wellbeing. Values 
of inclusion, compassion and justice play important roles in religions and can 
broaden the approach to development. Development is understood as an expres-
sion of the church’s mission, but not in the sense of modernising using West-
ern role models (Faschingeder 2007, p. 18). Development within an ecumenical 
understanding is a call for transformation not involved in an ideological construct 
linked to geopolitical interests. Such an understanding of development comes 
from the capacity to create visions of a “life in abundance” and from engaging 
patiently and in the long term with others.
Principles of development work within Mission 21
The ecumenical understanding of mission and development and the three key 
terms of ecumenical considerations and discussions, Justice, Peace and the Integ-
rity of Creation, have been crucial in the project work of Mission 21 over the last 
few decades. The work and self-identity of Mission 21 is clearly rooted in the ecu-
menical movement. The two projects that I explore in this contribution are related 
in different ways to the ecumenical understanding of mission and development: 
the Farming Centre Project is very much engaged with the “integrity of creation” 
and “justice”, while the newer programme “Empowerment of Basic Groups” 
has “peace” and “justice” as two main foci. Although Mission 21 is confronted 
with similar problems as other organisations and institutions of development 
work, the work of Mission 21 has its roots very much in its theological- 
ecumenical foundations, rather than in secular concerns about development. The 
principles on which Mission 21 is built make it a faith-based organisation.5 Its 
self-identification in its mission statement speaks clearly – Mission 21 is perme-
ated by Christian faith:
Our hopes and plans for the future are guided by the Gospel of Jesus Christ. 
The Gospel gives us the vision of the Kingdom of God, where there is justice, 
freedom, reconciliation and healing. This vision motivates us to take respon-
sibility for the world in which we live.
(Mission 21 2014a, p. 6)
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The Christian faith is an important but not an exclusive foundation for the work of 
Mission 21. Believing in Jesus Christ is not a condition for working within Mis-
sion 21. Nevertheless, acknowledging that spiritual dimensions are very impor-
tant for the organisation’s transformation and development work is self-evident 
for Mission 21’s employees. If the organisational form of Mission 21 is taken 
into account, its degree of formality and relationship with other structures, it is 
quickly apparent that Mission 21 is more than an exclusively Christian mission. 
It is a formally independent NGO, and it has strong ties to the Reformed Church 
in Switzerland, but also to other faith-based and secular structures. Almost 15% 
of their financial resources are state funded (Mission 21 2014b, p. 32). Mission 
21 received a government seal (ZEWO) for its development work in Decem-
ber 2014. The highly regarded seal guarantees an efficient and effective use of 
the resources, transparent information, open communication and fair fundraising 
(Zewo Foundation 2016). Donors have benefitted from tax deductibility since 
2012 (Mission 21 2016a).
Mission 21 is active in different development fields in which secular develop-
ment organisations are also engaged. Recently, Mission 21 has been very active 
in the fields of advocacy and gender equality, but the reduction of poverty, rural 
development, health care and peace work are still important activities. Policy 
making, networking and classical development work are core tasks of Mission 21. 
Programmes and Projects on Interreligious Dialogue and Theological Education 
illustrate that Mission 21 is a faith-based organisation. The specific characteristic 
of the development work of Mission 21, distinguishing it from the development 
work of secular NGOs, is their religion-based context and the setting of long-term 
partnerships. Most of the partner organisations of Mission 21 emerged through its 
missionary work and today are independent churches. These relationships have 
developed into a partnership of equals since the independence of the churches 
in the mission fields in the second half of the 20th century (Mission 21 2013b, 
pp. 7–8). The one-sided subject – object approach, which shaped early mission 
and development work, has changed into a dynamic and multipolar network of 
relationships.
The work of Mission 21 has two foci, which are closely linked together: theo-
logical work and development work. This is very much visible in the Tumbang 
Lahang Farming Centre project: in a boarding school that forms part of this pro-
ject, young men not only learn new agricultural techniques to achieve better har-
vest, but the whole education system is built upon Christian doctrines. Mission 
21 is based on a holistic understanding of mission: the proclamation of the gospel 
and diaconia, social and welfare work, all belong closely together. The Gospel 
has spiritual and social aspects and implications which Mission 21 considers in 
their development work. Development work within Mission 21 means “church 
related social work and lived multipolar relationships within the worldwide ecu-
menical movement” (Mission 21 2013b, p. 10; translation CH). The aim of such 
development work is to “protect human rights of the marginalised and vulner-
able communities of the poorest countries, irrespective of their religion, gender, 
ethnicity, social status or sexual orientation”, to foster resources and capacities of 
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such communities. Partner churches and organisations implement these aims and 
Mission 21 supports this work through financial aid and professional know-how 
(Mission 21 2013b, p. 10; translation CH). For Mission 21 the classical develop-
ment projects to reduce poverty and end hunger are framed by theological and 
educational programmes. Theological and cultural exchange is Mission 21’s cen-
trepiece, its identity, and constitutes a great difference to non-religious develop-
ment NGOs.
How does this focus go along with projects in development co-operation? 
Jochen Kirsch (Director of Mission 21 since September 2019, before Head of 
International Relations and member of the Executive Board) describes theological 
education as the motor of social transformation, therefore the motor of develop-
ment. The starting point of Mission 21’s work is to consider the burning issues 
of their project partners, for example land grabbing, ethnic minorities or inter-
religious conflicts. These issues are then included in their theological education 
programmes. The outcomes and insights, which are found through the process of 
theological education, are then brought back to the burning issues where develop-
ment work is the output. The idea of such a theological education is to increase the 
Churches’ awareness of the significant problems in their countries. Only through 
such awareness will they become motivated to implement development projects.6
Funding structures in Switzerland forced Mission 21 to differentiate between 
religious and development projects. State money is only granted for secular pro-
jects, as no religious programmes can be supported with the funding that comes 
from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Despite the 
fact that Mission 21 only receives a comparatively small amount of state money, 
it was forced to separate two areas that – in its understanding – belong closely 
together. Why is the relatively small amount of state-funded money so important 
for Mission 21? It is not the money which is important per se, but the relationship 
to the state. Being supported by the SDC improves Mission 21’s recognition in 
the Swiss public view: an organisation with links to the state is considered to be 
more trustworthy by donors.
Project work of Mission 21
After outlining Mission 21 as an organisation and its principles, this chapter now 
turns to the examination of two development projects of Mission 21 in Kaliman-
tan, Indonesia. Before the analysis of these two projects is presented, investigat-
ing whether the notion of development has changed over the years, the following 
section will provide details of the context of the projects.
Project context
Kalimantan, formerly known as South Borneo, was the last missionary territory 
of the Basel Mission. Basel has been sending missionaries to South Borneo since 
1920. The war years and the Japanese occupation 1941–1945 was a watershed 
for Kalimantan. Neither the attempt to re-establish the Dutch colonial rule nor 
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the approach of a federal system was successful. A complete break with the past 
was needed. The younger generation in Kalimantan took the initiative to end for-
eign domination and to incorporate Kalimantan in the independent and Unitarian 
Republik Indonesia in 1950 (Gin 2013, p. 148).
Kalimantan is the biggest island of Indonesia, a country with a Muslim major-
ity. About 88% of the population belong to the Islamic faith. Christian organisa-
tions such as Mission 21 can only survive due to the particular Indonesian politics 
of religion. Indonesia is not an Islamic state and it is not built on Islamic Rights. 
Indonesia is a democratic and secular state, yet religion plays a very important 
role in politics. The concept of Pancasila – meaning five pillars – on which the 
whole modern state of Indonesia is built upon, has as its first principle the faith 
in one god: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Belonging to a religion is compulsory 
for every Indonesian citizen, and the state tries to protect all accepted religions 
(agama), which covers Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Confucianism.
In 2014, the new president Joko Widodo – called Jokowi – was elected. This 
election was seen as a turning point in the era of reformasi (since the downfall of 
Suharto in 1998): Jokowi is the first president who neither belongs to the elite of 
the Suharto dictatorship, nor is he a member of one of the political dynasties. He is 
not connected to corruption and stands for religious tolerance. This is significant as 
during the last couple of years Indonesia has been confronted with problems due to 
a growing fundamentalist Muslim population. Fundamental Islamic teachers from 
abroad have been influencing the local population and the traditional and tolerant 
Islam. This has led to several difficulties; for example, conflicts around church con-
structions have emerged, and in some regions in Java and Sumatra churches had to 
be closed down. The evangelical wing of the Christians reacted with strong mission-
ary work and crusades in areas which are mostly populated by Muslims (Woischnik 
and Müller 2014). In order to have better control over  fundamentalist teachers and 
preachers, the state began to check all foreign workers. As such, receiving a working 
visa is becoming increasingly difficult. Kalimantan is not so much confronted with 
problems around a growing fundamentalist population, but with conflicts between 
different ethnic groups. After 1998 the tensions between the local Dayak groups and 
the immigrants from Madura increased and caused violent conflicts between the 
years 1999 and 2004. As well as these socio-political conflicts, deforestation is also 
causing ecological and economic problems. Mission 21 takes these circumstances 
very much into account when working in the area. The emphasis on educational 
programmes in Kalimantan today has its roots in the deforestation of the island. The 
local population is still capable of living from the crops of their land, but often the 
money for school fees, books and uniforms is missing.
A classical development project: Farming Centre  
Tumbang Lahang
The Farming Centre in Tumbang Lahang – which was launched in 1955 and 
closed down in 2011 – was a project of the Kalimantan Church in connection with 
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Basel Mission. The project started not long after the inaugural speech of President 
Truman in 1949, which is considered the beginning of development policy (Rist 
2014, pp. 70–71). The initiative for the Farming Centre came from one of the first 
local pastors, Isom Birim. During a synod in Kasongan, Birim named the nomadic 
life and the type of agriculture of the local farmers – that is, shifting cultivation – 
as the cause for all their distress. The overall accepted assumption was that mod-
ern farming techniques would bring higher agricultural yields and better living 
conditions. Birim asked Basel Mission for help. The village Tumbang Lahang, 
situated in the upper basin of the river Katingan, donated 58 hectares of land for 
the Farming Centre. Basel Mission could not afford money for the project but 
allowed one of their missionaries, Gustav Flach, to support this Farming Centre. 
During his holiday at home in Switzerland, Flach was able to collect 20,000 Swiss 
Francs to buy tools and materials which were most needed for the project (Stuby 
1967, pp. 28–34). In January 1955, more than one ton of agriculture equipment 
such as ploughs, harrows, chains and scythes was shipped on the river Katingan 
towards Tumbang Lahang (Flach 1956a, p. 3). The Farming Centre Project was 
in at least two ways “avant la lettre”. It was based on a co-operation between the 
local autonomous church, the political community and foreign assistance. Fur-
thermore, this local and church-related initiative started five years before the Fed-
eral Council of Switzerland established a service for technical assistance, a very 
early form of federal development co-operation (Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation SDC 2016).
The aim of the project was to keep the young men in their villages in regions 
far away from the cities and to help them enhance their agricultural income. The 
Evangelical Church of Kalimantan did not want a “leap from the old to the very 
latest, the most modern, but a healthy way of improvement” (Flach 1956a, p. 4; 
translation CH). Some new technologies, like the plough and the harrow, were 
brought to the upper river basin of the river Katingan. A classical development pro-
ject in the field of poverty reduction was implemented. The project was designed 
to lead the local farmers “from agricultural exploitation (by burning of forests) 
to profitable modern farming techniques” (Basler Mission 1969, p. 1; translation 
CH). The Farming Centre Tumbang Lahang was an official church agency, not a 
private or a governmental project. It was not affiliated with any larger association 
for development work, but worked together with one specific donor agency: Basel 
Mission. The Training Centre received not only capital funds from the donors, but 
also equipment, expert guidance and training of personnel in the country. The pro-
ject was also part of the Indonesian government programme to multiply the food 
potential. Next to the Farming Centre there was also a health centre for several 
decades (Riwut 1964). These projects were strongly motivated by biblical con-
cepts. Project initiators spoke of Jesus being the bread of life. Another project, the 
school in Tumbang Lahang, was conceptualised as a sign of “loving your neigh-
bour as yourself ” – the most important commandment in Christianity.
However, the school will offer more than pure development; it wants to be a 
sign of charity and a place of fraternal encounter and thus bear witness to Christ. 
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The agriculture students will be guided to a new understanding not only of fel-
low humans but of all of nature, which no longer has to be feared as a sinister 
power and unpredictable fate, but can be experienced as the creation of God.
(Dumartheray 1967, p. 64; translation CH)
Material development aid was strongly connected to a certain kind of spiritual 
development. The whole understanding of development was based on Christian 
theology. In the 1960s, conversion to a new understanding of nature was one 
important aim of the project. The new understanding was clearly defined: it was a 
Christian understanding. The presence of a missionary, or later called fraternal or 
ecumenical co-worker, could lead to the impression that evangelisation or pros-
elytization was an aim of the work of Basel Mission in Tumbang Lahang. The 
Europeans were only responsible for the development work, not for counselling 
or theological tasks. This duty was fully under the authority of the local pastors 
and evangelists. Proselytizing was therefore not an explicit goal of the work of 
the Basel Mission in Kalimantan (Flach 1961). Furthermore, proselytizing was 
not only a problem within Christian circles, but also secular development projects 
had “transformative goals” (Fountain 2015, pp. 89–90).
Gustav Flach (1908–2001) was the first project manager. Flach, a male nurse, 
was sent out to Kalimantan in 1938 as a classical missionary with the task of 
spreading the gospel and helping the local people to become “civilised”. In these 
colonial times this meant having access to school, hygiene and health concepts, 
which were imported by Europeans. After six years at the river Kahayan and an 
internment during the Japanese occupation 1944–1945, Flach returned to Switzer-
land as a mission preacher for two years. In 1947, he was sent out to Kalimantan 
again, where he first replaced his colleague Hans Schärer after his sudden death 
in Banjarmasin, and then came to the Katingan River, where he spent five years 
in Kasongan. In 1954, he was then sent to Tumbang Lahang to lead the Farming 
Centre (Flach 1956a, p. 2).7 Flach and his wife left Kalimantan in 1965. Gustav 
Flach embodies the figure of a classical missionary. He stayed for a very long 
time – almost 30 years – in one mission field. During all these years, he gained a 
high level of knowledge of the local language and culture, which helped him to 
implement his development work in a more effective way. Due to the motivation 
of his work through his faith, he also made sacrifices such as being separated from 
his children for 10 years. How he managed the different tasks in the 1930s and the 
1950s is difficult to say. Did he leave the evangelisation to the local pastors, and 
did he only focus on farming techniques in the 1950s and 1960s? Or was evange-
lisation even understood as agricultural training?
In July 1955, the first farming course for young men started. Six young men 
from the upper river basin participated. In the meantime, a course on how to run a 
household for girls was also initiated, in which 22 girls participated. In Tumbang 
Lahang, corn was planted in the spring months, then sweet potatoes, peanuts, 
soybeans and small green peas. In September, rice could also be planted. The first 
harvests were very rich (Flach 1956b). The reaction of the local population to the 
Farming Centre and these changes was ambivalent. On the one hand, they were 
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already used to the presence of European missionaries. The village of Tumbang 
Lahang appreciated the presence and work of missionary Hans Schärer during the 
1930s very much (Flach 1956b). Schärer was collecting myths and traditions of 
the local population and was thus able to compile an important heritage. On the 
other hand, the distrust of the local population was quite strong in the beginning 
of the Farming Centre. They saw the new farming methods as the cause of their 
problems. Despite these reservations, in 1958 there were a lot of young men from 
all regions of Kalimantan who wanted to join the Farming Centre, and a school 
village with 20 houses was built; however, the people of the village remained 
sceptical. In the late 1960s, the persons responsible for the Training Centre men-
tioned that the involvement and co-operation of the people of the village still lay 
below their expectations. The cause was seen in the traditional way of life and 
thinking, which was very difficult to change (FAO 1969, p. 10).
The pupils of the Farming Centre’s boarding school had to be older than 
15 years. They did not have to be Christians; they only had to want to work and 
know how to read and write before they could join the two-year course. The 
students received theoretical education in plant cultivation, commercial plants, 
husbandry, manure use, vegetable gardening, dendrology, tool and machine use, 
economy and agriculture. Right from the beginning the emphasis was placed on 
practical education. The teachers were a mix of Indonesian locals and foreigners. 
The Farming Centre proved very important for the rural and agricultural develop-
ment of the region (Stuby 1967, pp. 52–59).
After a successful foundation phase, by the 1970s this project started to gain 
criticism within Basel Mission. Christoph Zimmermann (1932–2003), who was 
a teacher at the Theological Seminary in Banjarmasin from 1964 to 1970, was 
very critical towards centres like Tumbang Lahang, where new technologies were 
set up. In his eyes, these were means which remained unreachable for the local 
farmers. Moreover, he criticised that the conditions which were very different in 
every village were not seriously taken into account. According to Zimmermann, 
the local farmers already knew what was good for their land. After an agricultural 
education in Switzerland, Christoph Zimmermann and his family were invited 
by the East Kalimantan church GKPI to work with them. In the years from 1974 
to 1980 Zimmermann, together with the church management and an agricultural 
team, developed another method. All his thinking was nourished by the concept of 
the gospel of “caring for the small people”. He established a holistic service which 
linked the gospel to the daily problems of a farmer (Lutz 2004). Together with 
the local church in East Kalimantan, Zimmermann developed a training course 
for farmers in three steps. The first step was a pre-course for farmers in Tarakan, 
where the farmers had to show whether they really loved farming and were not 
afraid of getting dirty hands. The second step was a course in Bali, where they 
should learn the caring system from the Hindu people. After these two months, 
they came back and had a lot to discuss, which was the third step. This is where the 
Sekolah Penyambung Lidah, the tongue extension school, was born. In this way a 
network of farmers, teachers and church leaders was built who travel from village 
to village and talk about improving their farming systems (Zimmermann 2004).
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In the 1970s two types of training or educating farmers were practised within 
Basel Mission in co-operation with their partner churches. Although these two 
kinds of projects led to conflicts within the management board in Basel, it dem-
onstrates that Basel Mission was not a homogenous organisation where only one 
opinion or strategy prevailed. Several strategies were practised to achieve the 
important goal of improving the living conditions of the people at the margins. 
Local creativities and experiments were taken into account to reach this goal.
In the 1980s the Farming Centre in Tumbang Lahang was confronted with 
different problems. A church journal was speaking of “development victims” 
(kurban pembangunan) in the outback of Kalimantan. Due to an improved road 
system, many young people did not stay in the villages anymore, but were trying 
their luck in the bigger cities. Farming was becoming increasingly unattractive. 
Deforestation also frequently caused severe problems for farming in the outback 
such as flooding (Horoni 1985). As a result, the number of students in the Farming 
Centre declined. The students realised that the technical and mechanised training 
they received in Tumbang Lahang was not practical when they were back in their 
villages. To educate students and send them back to their traditional surround-
ings did not bring the expected change to the traditional farming system (Siebert 
1978). The main goal of the project, to overcome shifting cultivation through the 
introduction of settled crop rotation agriculture, was not achieved. In 1986, a new 
concept of the Farming Centre was arranged by Basel Mission and the Kalimantan 
Church. The Farming Centre should have three sectors: a consultation programme 
for farmers, nine family farms in Tumbang Lahang with internship places and a 
service and co-ordination office. The formal training should be put in the hands of 
the government, whereas the Farming Centre should offer only informal training. 
This new concept was never really implemented (Basel Mission 1990). In 1989 
the Dutch government started to finance an Agricultural High School in Tumbang 
Lahang, but in 1992 the Indonesian government prohibited all financial help from 
the Dutch government. It was then when Basel Mission took responsibility for the 
Agricultural High School, and it survived for another 10 years. In 2003, formal 
education that combined theory and practice was still seen as the right way for 
education in the outback of Kalimantan. In 2001 the school was accredited by the 
state. The farming skills and working ethos, which were achieved by the practical 
work that supplemented theory in the Farming Centre of Tumbang Lahang, were 
highly commended. This dual system, with roots in Switzerland and Germany, 
gave the students the possibility to achieve a degree in their original location, 
while the practical work ensured a significant added value to other curricula which 
are only based on theoretical knowledge. However, the practical work was not 
sufficiently planned and organised in Tumbang Lahang (for further reading: Hein-
rich 2003). Besides this, both the educational and the income-generating parts 
of the project were not sufficiently separated. A strategy and financial plan were 
missing, the education of the local personnel was not professional enough and the 
relation to the state development programme remained unclear (Heinrich 2003). 
These circumstances caused increasingly severe problems. Furthermore, person-
nel constellations and differing interests – above all different ideas for leading the 
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project between the responsible persons in Basel and Kalimantan – led towards 
huge conflicts. These conflicts were responsible for the phasing out of Basel Mis-
sion’s support in 2011. With this phasing-out, the whole project of the Farming 
Centre in Kalimantan failed: the once very important Farming Centre in Tumbang 
Lahang was no longer of any importance to the GKE church. The long-term goal 
of the church is now to maintain land and property in Tumbang Lahang. The fail-
ing of this project brings to light to two distinct problems of development work. 
Firstly, co-operating closely with local partners can be very difficult because of 
differing expectations and backgrounds. Secondly, when the financial subsidy of 
a project withdraws, the whole project is in danger of failure.
To close this section, we discuss the notion of development that is highlighted 
in this project. A rather technical notion of development is evident within this 
project. The Farming Centre was understood as part of the construction and devel-
opment of this country, still in its infancy. The project was very much in line with 
secular projects with the aim to eradicate hunger. The education in the Farming 
Centre should have led to another farming system – settled crop rotation agri-
culture instead of shifting cultivation – which in turn should have led to higher 
harvests; however, this goal was not achieved. The interesting part of this pro-
ject is not its success or a specific notion of development, but the engagement 
of a development organisation from Europe with local partners. As many other 
mission organisations, Basel Mission/Mission 21 has a long history of active 
engagement with material wellbeing and a long-term partnership with local actors 
(James 2011). The Centre in Tumbang Lahang was a vivid sign of Basel Mission’s 
engagement for the local Dayak people. A pastoral concern – that the shifting 
cultivation makes a strong community life impossible – led to the launching of 
an educational centre concerned with development. The pastoral engagement for 
the Dayak people is a golden thread in the work of Basel Mission in Kalimantan. 
Despite the paradigmatic shift in Mission History in the 1950s and 1960s, after 
which foreign missionaries were not as tolerated in many countries, the Farm-
ing Centre in Tumbang Lahang was a legendary project of co-operation between 
the local church GKE and Basel Mission. Decisions were made together – the 
Centre was led by a local; foreign co-workers only came by invitation of the 
GKE. For almost a hundred years Basel Mission/Mission 21 has worked together 
with the same partner. Their work is based on a strong relationship, which has 
already endured several difficulties. The ecumenical co-worker marks a difference 
to other development co-operation agencies. The ecumenical co-worker stands 
under the authority of the local partner institution and guarantees the exchange 
between the local organisation and the programme managers in Basel. He or she 
is an intermediary between two cultures, strives for the flow of information and 
can mediate in conflict situations. During the high times of the Farming Centre 
of Tumbang Lahang, the co-worker still had a very important role and kept his 
influence even after the 1950s. He was the linchpin in the mission field between 
the local Christians and the “motherhouse” in Basel. Nowadays, the relationships 
have totally changed. Neither the missionary nor the “motherhouse” in Basel play 
this central role anymore. Given that Mission 21 seeks an equal partnership with 
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their partners abroad, the position of the ecumenical co-worker has drastically 
changed. Nevertheless, he or she still is very important for successful project 
work.
A new programme: empowerment of basic groups
Since 2011 many amendments to the programme and Mission 21’s project work 
have been made, which caused major changes to the support of Mission 21 in 
Kalimantan. The range of financial support for projects overseas has been shrink-
ing over the last few years due to fewer donations to Mission 21 and to the orienta-
tion of the organisation towards state-funded subsidies. As discussed above, state 
money is not allowed for religious projects.
Moreover, institutional core themes have been defined only over the last few 
years. All programmes of Mission 21 have to belong to one of the four core 
themes: Education, Advancement of Peace, Agriculture and Income, or Health. 
The goals of Mission 21 are very clear: through the measures in the four core 
themes, Mission 21 aims to contribute to a life in dignity and enable the local 
population to manage life self-determinedly and independently in order to support 
social processes and changes. Co-ordinated programmes have been established 
for every continent over the period of 2015–2018. Regarding the Asian context, 
Mission 21 now has a regional focus on Indonesia (Java and Kalimantan), Malay-
sia (Sabah) and Hong Kong. This geographical scope is wider than the whole of 
Europe. The thematic focus lies on three of the four main foci of Mission 21: Edu-
cation, Advancement of Peace and Agriculture and Income. Projects in the area of 
Health are being phased out (Mission 21 2015a).
“Empowerment of Basic Groups” is the newest programme from Mission 21 
in Indonesia. It is established within the core theme of Education (Mission 21 
2016e). This programme is concerned with the holistic living and thinking of Mis-
sion 21’s partner organisations, which are mostly churches or church-related insti-
tutions. In this programme, theological education and classical development work 
refer to and question one another. In the beginning, Contextual Theology was the 
subtitle of this programme. Due to structural financing reasons described above, 
the subtitle was discarded. However, within the activities of this programme, con-
textual theology still plays a crucial role. The programme is based on the assump-
tion that the fostering of contextual theology is important, because within such a 
theological thinking, the concrete needs and challenges in a region are taken into 
account. Theology transforms through the influence of proper information, and 
vice versa – theology can help to transform the perception of reality. Such a theo-
logical approach can furthermore assure that not only imported Western theology 
is taught in the Indonesian theological institutes. Mission 21 has made positive 
experiences from a theological distance-learning programme (TEE) in the Church 
of the Brethren (YEN) in Nigeria. Through this learning programme the environ-
mental awareness of the church leaders could be changed (Kirsch 2014).
Identity-forming organisations, such as churches or Islamic organisations, are 
held in high regard in Indonesia. Religious communities and their leaders often 
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enjoy more trust than governmental bodies. Church leaders are key persons, and 
therefore crucial for social transformations.8 Because of this, they could play an 
important role for initiatives of development co-operation. However, the churches 
in Indonesia do not see initiatives such as fighting poverty or social differences as 
their core tasks; they delegate these tasks to the state. This is where Mission 21 
sees a deficit in the education of pastors. A contextual theology is missing (Mis-
sion 21 2013a).
The goal of the new programme is for the church and community to take on 
contextual theology as both perspective and method in their work within multi-
cultural society of Indonesia. The term “contextual theology” is used in a very 
broad sense; it means developing a theology that reacts to the burning issues of 
the current context, in this case the Indonesian and Malaysian partner institutions 
of Mission 21. These core issues where found by a baseline study conducted by 
Indonesians and managed by the programme manager in Basel in 2013. Although 
academics where involved in the study, the discussion about what contextual the-
ology is or means was missing. The strength of the study lies in the involvement 
of different people, academics, practitioners and men and women of different ages 
and educational backgrounds. Through the perspective and method of contextual 
theology, church leaders are motivated and sensitised to social engagement and 
development co-operation. With this approach, Mission 21 also sees a possibility 
to make the relevance of a church development co-operation visible. The church 
is, in their eyes – and also in the eyes of their Indonesian partner organisations – 
an important stakeholder for social development (Yewangoe 2013).
Since 2015, a regional co-ordinator in Indonesia is guiding and monitoring 
this programme. Mission 21 works together with different institutions: Firstly, 
they have four theological institutes as their programme partners (Christian Uni-
versity Duta Wacana in Yogyakarta, two theological colleges of the Kalimantan 
church, theological seminary in Sabah); secondly, the communion of churches in 
Indonesia (PGI, Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia) and thirdly, three other 
national associations (such as the theological publishing house in Jakarta Gunung 
Mulia, women theologians PERUATI and theological institutes PERSETIA). The-
ologians, pastors, lecturers, activists, intellectuals and artists are communicating 
the core themes of the programme: Justice, Peace Building and Recognition of 
Diversities. Theological curricula and models of church services are also based 
on these core themes. The first and most important target group of this programme 
are the leaders of the theological institutes. With a theology linked to the social 
context, the pastors (the second target group) are motivated to participate in social 
engagement and can sensitise their communities to the burning issues Indonesia 
is confronted with today. The first output of this programme should be research 
concerning the questions of land grabbing, the relations between majorities and 
minorities and ethnic and religious discrimination. Publications and conferences, 
networks of contextual theologians in Indonesia should be established (Mission 
21 2015b).
Local experts are given priority within this programme. If there are not enough 
local experts, senior experts from Germany and Switzerland provide occasional 
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support. Long-term deployment of foreign personnel decreased because of the 
financial situation of Mission 21. In the field of theology, however, foreign experts 
are still essential, not only because of the lack of knowledge in Indonesia, but 
also because these experts are seen as ideal bridge builders. They are playing an 
important role for Mission 21’s identity as they guarantee the expected exchange.9 
The existence of such co-workers constitutes a difference to other development 
co-operation agencies. The ecumenical co-worker is part of the local church 
structure. Ecumenical co-workers are under the authority of the local partner 
organisations. For Mission 21 the exchange is their centrepiece; the ecumenical 
co-workers therefore play crucial roles.
It is still too early to see results of this programme, only the pursued result 
can be named: social change can be achieved in Indonesia through religious key 
persons. If the theological education is more sensitive to social problems, the 
future leadership can be motivated to deal with social engagement and develop-
ment work. For example, due to his research in rural areas of Kalimantan, pastor 
Marko Mahin10 learned that education is the only way to escape poverty. He set up 
a scholarship programme which yearly gives 200 young people from rural areas 
of Kalimantan the possibility to study at the Christian University in Palangkaraya. 
After their studies, they go back to their communities to bring the knowledge 
to the poorest members of the society (Mission 21 2015b, p. 24). To date, 600 
 students have been sponsored.
Churches as stakeholders of social development
To conclude this analysis, I will now highlight how the concept of development 
that became apparent through the description of these varied projects is related 
to the ecumenical understanding of development. First of all, it is important 
to record that the notion of development is regularly scrutinised and evaluated 
within Mission 21. It has always ranged from material to social or spiritual devel-
opment. The Farming Centre of Tumbang Lahang had a dual approach: on the 
one hand, the farming project to produce higher income; on the other hand, the 
boarding school to seek transformation of old and traditional behaviour. Newer 
projects place a stronger emphasis on social transformation. This is clear in the 
programme “Empowerment of Basic Groups”: churches are seen as stakeholders 
in social development. The task to further material development is left to other 
organisations or expected automatically from the social transformation. “Social 
development” became a keyword for the work of Mission 21. The notion of 
development shifted from a more technical approach to one that is more focused 
on empowerment and theology; this is strongly related to the discussions in the 
WCC. There, even since the 1960s, development is not focused on economic 
growth but on a responsible society with justice for everybody. Development 
within Mission 21 is also related to a holistic understanding of mission. Mission 
here means a transformative dynamic, where the world can be transformed in 
God’s grace. Therefore one could say that development is understood here as a 
“holistic transformation”, where spiritual and material dimensions are connected. 
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Within Mission 21, development in the sense of improvement or transformation 
has been understood as a part of mission since the beginnings of the work of 
Basel Mission in Kalimantan in the 1920s and 1930s. In those days, two kinds of 
“missionaries” were sent out. On the one hand, Basel Mission had “ordinary mis-
sionaries” in the field to spread the gospel and lead the population to conversion. 
These missionaries committed their lives to Basel Mission and were often in one 
missionary territory for decades. On the other hand, “development co-workers” 
with special education have been sent out with a limited working contract to help 
to improve the living conditions in a mission field. Mission doctor, Dr. med. Mat-
theus Vischer-Mylius, with specialist knowledge in surgery and tropical medicine, 
built up a health centre in the outback of Kalimantan in the 1930s Early on, Basel 
Mission had a focus on improving the health situation in other parts of the world. 
The doctor treated everyone – in his hospital there was also a prayer area for 
Muslims. The mission doctor had a difficult position among the ordinary mission-
aries; he was not accepted as one of them.11 In these early days a clear distinction 
between the missionary and his work and other co-workers and their work was 
made. Nowadays this distinction is no longer relevant as development work is 
clearly a part of mission, not something that can be separated.
Regarding this early development work of a mission doctor one question 
emerges: can humanitarian aid and charitable work provided by a mission doctor 
be classed as development work? The distinction between charity and develop-
ment is quite unclear. One could speak of social or human development when the 
work is for the long term and striving for a sustainable change. Charity would 
then mean short-term and donor-driven work, which provides help for disaster 
or humanitarian relief (Deacon and Tomalin 2015, p. 70). Within such an under-
standing of development, we can say that Mission 21 has engaged in development 
work right from the beginning in the 19th century. The work of Basel Mission 
was always for the long term and striving for sustainable change. Basel Mission 
realised very early on that religious convictions can either cause development or 
hinder such transformations. Long before the term and concept of development 
was created after the Second World War, Basel Mission was already dealing with 
the questions and problems that the concept of development involves.
Conclusion
The two central interests of this chapter were to investigate how the notion, impli-
cations and activities of development within Basel Mission/Mission 21 changed 
over time or to what extent a certain continuity becomes visible. Furthermore, this 
contribution wanted to shed light on the underestimated role of a mission organi-
sation within the development discourse.
Mission 21 has been adapting their self-concept and their notion of develop-
ment to the changing world. A certain shift was found from a more technical 
understanding of development work in the Farming Centre of Tumbang Lahang in 
the 1950s to the current understanding of development which is roughly based on 
social transformation. We can therefore conclude that despite its fixed foundation 
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on Christian faith, a mission organisation can be flexible in their thinking and 
perception of the world. Besides adaption, continuity is also an important feature 
within Mission 21’s understanding of development. The justification of develop-
ment work has always been the same. For Mission 21, theology and theological 
education is the centrepiece of their development work – all the rest follows. 
Without a Christian motivation, this work would not be done. Without theological 
thinking, the kind of development targeted by Mission 21 would not be achieved. 
The theological background of Mission 21 is strongly formed by a holistic under-
standing of mission. Mission is not only a means of attracting people to the Chris-
tian faith by evangelisation, it also stands for fighting for justice. Mission is not 
only words but also deeds. Diaconia and evangelisation are inextricably linked. 
Not only evangelisation but also diaconia have always been crucial within the 
Basel Mission. The letter of appointment to Christoph Gottlieb Blumhardt, the 
designated leader of the mission institute in planning, says that the aim of the mis-
sion institute should be to educate missionaries, “as disseminators of a charitable 
civilisation and preacher of the gospel of peace to different parts of the pagan 
world” (Basel Mission 1815–3.9.1818, p. 20; translation CH). This “charitable 
civilisation”, which dates back to the year 1815, was also seen as reparation of 
injustice, which was caused primarily by Europe in Africa for many centuries 
(Rennstich 2015, pp. 104–105).
The goals of mission target human wellbeing, the flourishing of life, which 
includes the physical and the spiritual wellbeing of human beings (World Council 
of Churches 2012). Mission always has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The 
vertical dimension concerns the relationship between God and His creation, the 
horizontal dimension the relationship amongst the whole creation:
A Christianity which has lost its vertical dimension has lost its salt and is not 
only insipid in itself, but useless to the world. But a Christianity which would 
use the vertical preoccupation as a means to escape from its responsibility for 
and in common life of man is a denial of the incarnation.
(Bosch 1991, p. 408, quoting the Uppsala Report of the 
World Council of Churches 1968)
Good technical knowledge can lead to development, but this is not sufficient. 
Development also needs a vertical dimension. This is a very clear statement, 
which has been adopted by Mission 21. By suggesting alternative perspectives 
on development, FBOs such as Mission 21 act as so-called development entre-
preneurs. Nevertheless, the question of how this vertical dimension can be linked 
to the responsibility for common life, and how this vertical dimension is linked 
to development work, has not yet been answered. It remains surprising that even 
a mission organisation like Mission 21 is still trying to work out how religion is 
related to development.
With the description of the work of Basel Mission and Mission 21 in Kalim-
antan, a reshaping of the idea of what type of actor started development could be 
achieved. Development work was not just invented after the Second World War 
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by the inaugural speech of President Truman. Long before, in several faith-based 
organisations, especially mission organisations, development work had been 
done. It is only recently that mission organisations have also been made visible 
for academic discussions on development. For a long time, religion and spiritual-
ity have been a taboo in discussions on development work. Mission organisations 
had a very difficult standing because of the assumption that they only wanted to 
convert people to Christianity and were not at all sensitive to local cultures and 
behaviours. We have seen that this assumption ought to be reconsidered. Conver-
sion is a problem which is not confined to faith-based organisations, but also to 
secular organisations which sometimes also work converting people to their secu-
larised worldview or civilisation theories (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 12).
The description and analysis of the two projects show that mission organisa-
tions have their limitations but can also add value to development work. The 
limitations concern their structures and their willingness to function in different 
discursive fields (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume) – in the secular field 
of development and state funding, but also in religious contexts. This often means 
a balancing act and can lead to severe tensions within an organisation. Tensions 
can also occur between the management board in Basel and the partner institu-
tions where the ideas how to lead a project can widely differ. In these cases, Mis-
sion 21 acts as a “boundary agent” (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume) by 
balancing the diverging expectations from different fields.
The four ways in which missionary organisations can contribute to devel-
opment work in a specific manner that were described at the beginning of this 
 chapter will now be outlined for the case of Mission 21: Firstly, the project work 
of Basel  Mission and Mission 21 in Kalimantan is efficient, because it was and 
is locally rooted within the local autonomous church and also within the political 
community. Furthermore, the projects can build upon ecumenical national and 
international networks, such as the communion of churches in Indonesia but also 
the WCC. Through the local church GKE, Mission 21 is connected with all other 
Protestant churches in Indonesia. In Switzerland, Mission 21 can also use church 
structures for funding. As such, Mission 21 creates a nexus between different 
types of actors from various fields. Secondly, about 30,000 hours of voluntary 
work per year is done within Mission 21 (Dietschy 2011, p. 3; Herrera 2011). 
Volunteering is strongly understood as part of the calling of many donors and co-
workers within the network of Mission 21. Thirdly, the work of mission organi-
sations reaches the poorest at the margins. Kalimantan is a region in Indonesia 
which is far from the centre and often not considered by the state. The develop-
ment work of Mission 21 in co-operation with their partners is therefore crucial. 
Finally, Mission 21 is a religious organisation and has therefore the opportunity to 
work together with religious leaders in Kalimantan. Mission 21 cooperates with 
churches and theological training centres, but also with other religious organisa-
tions. In Kalimantan, Mission 21 works together with LK3,12 a Muslim organisa-
tion. LK3 was not only able to establish a strong interreligious network (Mission 
21 2016d), but they also do a lot of research on Islam and society. These studies 
have an impact on the intellectual discourse in the society, and the studies can also 
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be applied to solving social problems. Therefore, this collaboration has an impact 
on the local development work in Kalimantan.
Notes
 1 In the 1980s, the term “fraternal co-worker” was changed to “ecumenical co-workers” 
by demand of the Women’s Commission of the Basel Mission.
 2 Oral information from Magdalena Zimmermann, Head of Department Education 
Exchange Research, deputy director of Mission 21, Basel 27 April 2016.
 3 The term “faith-based organisation” is controversially discussed. I use a very broad 
definition of this term. Faith based then means value based. For a further discussion 
see, for example, Nordstokke (2013).
 4 Kooperation Evangelischer Missionen. Evangelical is used in a broad sense and 
roughly means Protestant missions. In German we can differentiate between “evange-
lisch” and “evangelikal”. Dena Freeman’s contribution in this book deals with evan-
gelical missions, a certain wing of Protestant missions, which are more conservative 
and often more right wing.
 5 To research FBOs it is reasonable to use a defined typology in order to better know, 
what is meant by the term “faith-based”, see Occhipinti (2015); Clarke (2006). Occhip-
inti suggests characterising FBOs according to three dimensions. First the ways in 
which they are “faith-based”, second their activities and third the degree of formality 
and relationships with other faith and non-faith structures.
 6 Interview with Jochen Kirsch, Head of the Department for International Relations, 
Mission 21, Basel, 16 April 2015. See also a presentation by Jochen Kirsch at the 
Annual Meeting of DEZA (Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit), in which 
he gave an example from Nigeria where a theological correspondence course had a 
strong influence on the participants concerning their environmental awareness and 
behaviour (15 May 2014).
 7 In 1939 Flach married Elisabeth Wittwer (1907–1976) in Kalimantan and they had 
four children. The youngest died in a Japanese detention camp one day after his birth. 
The three remaining children of the Flach family stayed in Switzerland after a vaca-
tion in 1954. All information about Gustav Flach is taken from the personal records of 
Gustav Flach stored in the Basel Mission Archive (BV 2395).
 8 Interview with Christian Wagner, Programme Officer Indonesia-Malaysia Mission 21, 
Basel, 19 May 2015.
 9 One ecumenical co-worker is involved in this programme: Uwe Hummel, a lecturer at 
the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Church of Kalimantan in Banjarmasin. 
He is not the leader or co-ordinator of the programme – it is led by the Indonesian 
theologian Kinurung Maleh Maden – but he participates in the activities.
 10 Pastor Marko Mahin is not only the co-principal of the Christian University in 
Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, but also holds a doctoral degree in anthropology. 
He researched the traditional Dayak religion Kaharingan.
 11 Interview with Marianne Dubach-Vischer, daughter of the mission doctor Mattheus 
Vischer-Mylius (05.09.2016).
 12 Lembaga Kajian Keislaman dan Kemasyarakatan (Institut für das Studium von Islam 
und Gesellschaft).
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Introduction
Evangelical Christians are known for their inner worldly religion and their focus 
on personal morality and spiritual experience. Yet since the second half of the 
20th century a gradual process of opening up to consider also this-worldly mat-
ters has begun to take place in certain quarters of the Evangelical world. One of 
the drivers behind this ‘new evangelical social engagement’ (Steensland and Goff 
2014) has been the involvement of Evangelical relief and development NGOs in 
humanitarian work in the global South. The number of Evangelical development 
NGOs has increased exponentially during this time and the amount of money 
donated by Evangelicals and their churches has also soared (Reynolds and Offut 
2014, p. 248). Evangelicals have developed their own theology of development, 
known as ‘integral mission’ or ‘transformational development,’ and which now 
guides the development work of most Evangelical NGOs (Freeman 2018). This 
theology has sought to open up traditional notions of sin and redemption and to 
shift them from being seen as personal matters and to argue that they are deeply 
social. And a focus on the coming of the just and harmonious Kingdom of God 
has shifted the locus of redemption from the individual to ‘all of creation’ and 
from the far future to the ‘already/not yet’.
The latest stage in this process of Evangelical opening to worldly matters has 
been the recent move towards Evangelicals getting engaged in advocacy on devel-
opment issues. At present this is quite a tentative step, still met with much reti-
cence and resistance. For most Evangelicals to start to engage with politics on 
behalf of the global poor is still a step too far. Nonetheless, in 2004 the first Evan-
gelical transnational advocacy campaign for justice for the poor was set up. This 
campaign, called the Micah Challenge, sought to mobilise the global Evangelical 
church to advocate to their national governments to do what they could to end 
global poverty, and in particular to support the Millennium Development Goals. 
This chapter looks at the genesis of the Micah Challenge and explores the way in 
which it sought to develop a theology of justice and advocacy in order to try to 
mobilise Evangelicals to campaign on behalf of the poor. It shows how the ten-
sion between the personal and the social, the inner-worldly and the outer-worldly, 
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shaped the way that Micah Challenge communicated about development advo-
cacy and ultimately led to a paradox which it could not overcome. To make justice 
and advocacy palatable to global Evangelicals it had to develop a theology which 
placed a great emphasis on personal morality and spirituality, and yet in doing so 
it lost focus on the global political and economic issues that it wished to raise.
This study also seeks to make a theoretical contribution to the literature on 
religion and development. While much of this literature has focused on the role 
of religion in development cooperation, particularly looking at how faith-based 
organisations (FBOs) may, or may not, be effective at implementing development 
projects (e.g. Clarke 2008; Ter Haar and Ellis 2006; Tomalin 2015), there have 
been calls to widen out the research focus to consider also other aspects of the reli-
gion and development nexus (e.g. Jones and Petersen 2011). This chapter seeks 
to consider the role of FBOs in mobilising the public, or a specific religious con-
stituency, to campaign for development outcomes. It thus speaks to other recent 
work that has sought to look at forms of religious action in the UN (Haynes in this 
volume; Haynes 2014) and forms of religious action in the global economy more 
generally (Dreher and Smith 2016). And by exploring the way that the Micah 
Challenge sought to change the development discourse of a particular religious 
constituency, the study presents an interesting case of development entrepreneur-
ship (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 this volume).
The chapter starts by giving a brief overview of the history of Evangelical social 
action and then goes on to explore the new Evangelical theology of development 
which came to the fore in the latter half of the 20th century and upon which all 
subsequent developments build. It then looks at Evangelical involvement in the 
Jubilee 2000 anti-debt campaign and shows how this laid the groundwork for 
the Micah Challenge to emerge a few years later. After exploring the genesis and 
rationale for the Micah Challenge, the chapter goes on to consider in detail the 
theology of justice and advocacy which it developed in order to mobilise Evan-
gelicals for development advocacy. It concludes by arguing that even though the 
Micah Challenge sought to connect the personal and the structural in their theol-
ogy, they ultimately did not manage to overcome the theological blocks which this 
constituency has regarding engaging in development advocacy.1
A brief history of Evangelical social engagement
It is important to start by looking at the history of Evangelical social engagement 
as this will show the changing context in the Evangelical world out of which the 
Micah Challenge emerged. Evangelicalism started in the 1730s as a Christian 
revival movement in the UK and Europe and quickly spread to America, where it 
grew rapidly to become one of the country’s largest religious movements. It was 
later spread round the world by Evangelical missionaries, and there are now Evan-
gelical churches in most countries. Evangelicalism offers an intensely personal 
Christianity by fostering a deep sense of spiritual conviction and personal redemp-
tion, and by encouraging introspection and a commitment to a new standard of per-
sonal morality (Bebbington 1993; Ditchfield 1998; Hutchinson and Wolffe 2012).
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During the 18th and 19th centuries Evangelicals engaged with society as part 
and parcel of the practice of faith. Prominent British Evangelicals, such as John 
Wesley and William Wilberforce, worked tirelessly for social reform and the end 
of slavery, and 19th-century Evangelical politician Lord Shaftesbury passed acts 
in parliament to alleviate some of the injustices caused by the Industrial Revolu-
tion, such as prohibiting the employment of women and children in coal mines 
and establishing a ten-hour day for factory workers (Heasman 1962; Finlayson 
1981).William Carey preached and planted churches in India, whilst also speak-
ing out against the caste system (Tizon 2011, p. 62). In Australia Evangelicals 
were amongst those leading the call for the rights and humane treatment of the 
indigenous population (Sloane 2011, p. 3). American Evangelicals established 
charities and philanthropic organisations to help the poor and were amongst the 
most active social reformers during this time, campaigning to improve the condi-
tions of prisoners, running orphanages and founding homes for juvenile delin-
quents (Steensland and Goff 2014, p. 5; Young 2006). Charles Finney, a leading 
American Evangelical revivalist, could write in the mid-19th century:
The great business of the church is to reform the world. The Church of Christ 
was originally organised to be a body of reformers. The very profession of 
Christianity implies the profession and virtually an oath to do all that can be 
done for the universal reformation of the world.
(cited in Tinker 1999, p. 2)
However, in the early decades of the 20th century two processes led to Evangeli-
cals retreating from their engagement with the world and developing an increas-
ingly privatised, inner-worldly religion. The first was a reaction to the so-called 
‘social gospel’, a theology that was growing in popularity in the liberal wings of 
the Protestant church, and that argued that the role of Christians was not to save 
souls so that they would get a place in heaven, but rather to reconstruct society 
on a Christian basis so that life on earth would become as harmonious as that in 
heaven. The second was a shift within Evangelical circles to a  dispensationalist 
premillennial theology which considered that there was no way that people could 
improve their worldly lot, and that things would only get worse and worse until 
Jesus returned and brought about heaven on earth. Within such a theology social 
reform was seen as futile and hopeless, while saving souls became a matter of 
utmost urgency. The combined effect of these two factors, within the broader 
context of the post-Enlightenment privatisation of religion, led to Evangelicals 
retreating almost entirely from any kind of social engagement in the first half of 
20th century (Moberg 1972). This approach to spirituality and the material world 
was then spread around the globe by Evangelical missionaries, with the result 
that most of the newly forming indigenous Evangelical churches in the global 
South largely also adopted this focus on the inner spiritual life, with little interest 
in social engagement (Tizon 2011, p. 62). The social gospel movement became 
firmly entrenched in the mainstream Protestant ecumenical movement as embod-
ied by the World Council of Churches, and Evangelicals distanced themselves 
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from this movement and instead built their own global ecumenical movement in 
the form of the World Evangelical Alliance.
Whilst the first half of the 20th century was characterised by an almost total 
lack of social engagement by Evangelicals, the second half of the century was 
increasingly taken up by discussions questioning this position. This was started 
in 1947 by the publication of The Uneasy Conscience of Fundamentalism by Carl 
Henry, a leading American Evangelical theologian, which reflected on earlier 
Evangelical social action and called for a return to this kind of activity. Since then 
increasing numbers of Evangelicals have started to engage in social issues. Many 
are focussing on the poor in their own communities and in nearby neighbour-
hoods. This is now increasingly common, for example, in the Vineyard Movement 
(Bialecki 2008, 2009) and in the Emerging Church movement (Bielo 2011, 2014) 
and even amongst conservative Evangelicals (Elisha 2008, 2011). There have also 
been calls from progressive evangelicals to engage with poverty more widely and 
to consider the poor across the globe (Gasaway 2014; Pally 2011; Sider 1977; 
Swartz 2012a, 2012b). In the global South, Evangelicals are also increasingly 
getting involved in politics (Freston 2001; Ranger 2008). These communities all 
represent very different wings of Evangelicalism, and they approach these issues 
in quite different ways. Nonetheless, this ‘new evangelical social engagement’ 
represents a major sea change in many quarters of global Evangelicalism and has 
only recently begun to receive serious scholarly analysis (Steensland and Goff 
2014). In this chapter I will focus on just one movement within this broader sea 
change, and that is the group of Evangelicals engaging in relief and development 
work overseas and promoting an approach called integral mission or transforma-
tional development.
This particular movement was largely started by Evangelicals living in the 
South, particularly in Latin America. Living close to poverty and inequality, and 
influenced by the social action of Catholic Liberation Theology, theologians from 
the Latin American Evangelical Fellowship, notably Rene Padilla and Samuel 
Escobar, sought to develop a new theology which would integrate both evange-
lism and socio-political involvement on behalf of the poor into a holistic unity. 
They wanted to respond to the same realities addressed by liberationists while 
still upholding their evangelical commitments to the authority of scripture, the 
divinity of Christ and the necessity of evangelism. Their solution, which they 
called ‘misíon integral’, or integral mission, emphasized an incarnational and 
kingdom-centred theology which claimed that because Jesus was Lord over all 
of creation and all spheres of life, there was no real distinction between serv-
ing spiritual needs and serving physical needs. From this perspective the mission 
of the church could not simply be reduced to winning converts but must also 
include action on behalf of the poor and for social justice (Carpenter 2014, p. 274; 
Clawson 2012, p. 792). In the 1960s they began to increasingly participate in 
international Evangelical conferences, and they started to push for their vision 
of a more holistic understanding of the gospel that included social engagement. 
This was not an easy discussion and many conservative Evangelicals pushed back 
and argued that their one and only focus should be evangelism. In the meantime 
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Evangelical missionaries working oversees and carrying out humanitarian work 
became troubled at the lack of theology to justify their actions (Padilla 2002, p. 2; 
Tizon 2011, p. 66).
These tensions came to a head at the Lausanne Conference in 1974, attended 
by some 2,500 Evangelicals from 150 countries. Rene Padilla and Samuel Esco-
bar both gave provocative plenary addresses presenting their theology of ‘mis-
íon integral’, and calling on Evangelicals to get involved in social action. These 
addresses generated a lot of discussion and in the resulting Lausanne Covenant 
there was an entire section on Christian social responsibility, which stated that 
‘we affirm that evangelism and socio-political involvement are both part of our 
Christian duty . . . the salvation we claim should be transforming us in the totality 
of our personal and social responsibilities’ (cited in Clawson 2012, p. 796).
Whilst Lausanne was a key turning point regarding Evangelical engagement 
with social issues, it was not the end of the story. In the following years fierce bat-
tles raged in the Evangelical world about whether Evangelicals should engage in 
social action or remain focused solely on evangelism, and whether mission should 
include humanitarian action or should focus only on converting the unreached 
peoples. The fundamentalists were not easily swayed, particularly those from 
North America, and they continued to argue for the focus on saving souls.
During this same time, and in parallel, several Evangelical relief and develop-
ment NGOs were formed. In America the National Association of Evangelicals 
established World Relief in 1944, World Vision was founded in 1950, Compas-
sion in 1952, Samaritan’s Purse in 1970 and Food for the Hungry in 1971 (Reyn-
olds and Offut 2014, p. 244). In the UK the Evangelical Alliance established 
Tearfund in 1968, and in the following years similar Tear or Tearfund organi-
sations were set up in Australia (1971), New Zealand (1973), the Netherlands 
(1973), Belgium (1979) and Switzerland (1984). Some smaller Evangelical 
development organisations were also set up in other European countries. These 
NGOs got involved in humanitarian relief work, and later in development work, 
even though there was no specific Evangelical theology of social engagement 
or of international development. For the most part they carried out development 
projects in much the same way as secular development NGOs worked at the time 
(Freeman 2018).
Development as transformation: the theology  
of integral mission
Starting in 1980, however, Evangelicals began to work on developing a new 
theology of international development to guide their actions. The first important 
steps were taken during the World Evangelical Fellowship consultation which 
culminated in the Wheaton Statement of 1983, and which set out the outlines of a 
specifically Christian approach to development. Crucially, the participants chose 
to move away from the term ‘development’, with its connotations of modernity, 
materiality and sole focus on economic growth, and instead adopted the term 
‘transformation’.2
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The Wheaton statement describes transformation in the following way:
Transformation is the change from a condition of human existence contrary 
to God’s purpose to one in which people are able to enjoy fullness of life in 
harmony with God. This transformation can only take place through the obe-
dience of individuals and communities to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, whose 
power changes the lives of men and women by releasing them from the guilt, 
power, and consequences of sin, enabling them to respond with love toward 
God and toward others. . . . The goal of transformation is best described by 
the biblical vision of the Kingdom of God.
(World Evangelical Fellowship 1983)
The statement goes on to talk about different aspects of transformation, and claims 
that to move towards living under God’s reign requires not just the spiritual trans-
formation of individuals, but also the transformation of economies, cultures and 
socio-political systems. It presents a vision of holistic change leading in the direc-
tion of the Kingdom of God.
The worldview underlying integral mission theology is based on the doctrines 
of creation, fall and redemption. In this view God created the world and created 
people to live together in harmony, to be stewards of the earth and to share its 
resources equitably. However the fall was brought about by the work of the devil 
and people’s innate tendency to self-interest. It led to human existence becom-
ing corrupted and bent away from God’s intentions. From an integral mission 
viewpoint this includes social sin and corruption as well as individual sin and 
corruption. Economic systems, political systems, cultures, society, all became 
infused with evil and twisted from what God had intended. This, then, is viewed 
as the fundamental cause of poverty and injustice. God’s intention, however, is 
redemption. In the theology of integral mission redemption is not solely a per-
sonal, private affair, but it also social and worldly. Redemption is for all of crea-
tion. A central facet of redemption, in this understanding, is bringing about the 
Kingdom of God, in which there will be harmony, peace and justice.
Followers of integral mission draw on the Kingdom theology developed in the 
1950s by George Eldon Ladd, Professor of Biblical Theology at Fuller Theologi-
cal Seminary. In his view, the Kingdom is not a special realm, but it is the reign 
of God. This reign has already been inaugurated, by Jesus Christ, but will only 
be completed on his return. Thus the Kingdom is ‘already/not yet’ (Ladd 1959). 
Whilst acknowledging that full redemption, and hence the ultimate resolution of 
earthly problems such as poverty and injustice, will only come about when Jesus 
returns, integral mission theology argues that it is still important to work towards 
them and thus draw in the Kingdom into the present.3
The focus on Kingdom opens out redemption from the individual to the social 
and calls Evangelicals to look at the world around them and to be involved in its 
betterment. It is a radically different view to the mainstream premillennial dispen-
sationalist theology that is predominant in many conservative Evangelical circles. 
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And it has radically different implications regarding the value of social action in 
the world. From the viewpoint of premillennial dispensationalism it is understood 
that the fallen world will only get more and more depraved until Jesus comes 
back to bring a spiritual redemption for the saved. For these Evangelicals, still 
the majority, redemption is thus a personal matter and the focus of action in the 
world should be only to save souls so that they too get to participate in the ulti-
mate redemption. Trying to improve life in the world, from the dispensationalist 
perspective, is both pointless and futile. Integral mission thus offers a radically 
different perspective.
In the late 1990s the leading Evangelical development NGOs tried to work 
out how to put this theology into practice in their overseas development work. 
World Vision led a series of meetings with practitioners to share ideas and expe-
riences and chose to adopt the language of ‘transformational development’. 
A few years later Bryant Myers, a member of Fuller Theological Seminary 
and a World Vision development practitioner, published Walking with the Poor 
(1999), a book about transformational development for the development worker 
from the perspective of World Vision. Around the same time Tearfund estab-
lished a team of theologians and development professionals to develop a clear 
theological understanding of what would constitute a truly Christian develop-
ment work (Freeman 2019). In 1996 this group launched Tearfund’s ‘Operating 
Principles’ (Tearfund 1996), which set out its understanding of a distinctively 
Christian understanding of poverty and development, and in 1998, following the 
appointment of Rene Padilla as Tearfund’s International President, they decided 
to adopt the language of integral mission.
In 2001 Tearfund was instrumental in establishing an international network of 
Evangelical relief and development NGOs with the express aim of promoting 
the vision and practice of integral mission. This network was named the Micah 
Network, taking its inspiration from the biblical passage Micah 6:8, which says, 
‘And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly, to love mercy and to walk 
humbly with your God’. It now has well over 500 members organisations and 
national networks in over 80 countries, all working to spread the idea of integral 
mission and to make it more mainstream. This has led to the concept of integral 
mission becoming widely accepted amongst Evangelical development NGOs and 
for the most part it now guides their approach to engaging in development work.
The shift to integral mission or transformational development had two major 
impacts on the development work of Evangelical NGOs. Firstly, it brought around 
a re-framing of this work from being a purely material matter to being a form 
of religious practice (see Freeman 2018, 2019). And secondly, in many cases 
it shifted their focus from large-scale projects to small-scale community devel-
opment, in most cases in partnership with the local church. The new approach 
stressed that moving towards God’s Kingdom required bringing about transfor-
mation at all levels – individual and social, spiritual and material. Thus transform-
ing communities and ‘restoring relationships’ was seen to be central. Since local 
churches were seen as the basic unit of Christian society, and they were located 
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within communities, it followed to integral mission thinkers that the local church 
that should be the agent of holistic community transformation:
[Integral mission] is fundamentally about restoring relationships – with one-
self, with others, with God and with creation. Indeed, broken relationships are 
at the root of poverty, for poverty is the result of a social and structural leg-
acy of broken relationships with God, damaged understanding of self, unjust 
relationships between people and exploitative relationships with the environ-
ment. The local church is at the heart of transforming these relationships.
(Raistrick 2010, p. 138)
And in this worldview evangelism and social action, or in more traditional Evan-
gelical language, proclamation and demonstration, should not simply be com-
bined, but it should be realized that they are actually part and parcel of the same 
thing. The Micah Declaration on Integral Mission states it thus:
Integral mission or holistic transformation is the proclamation and demon-
stration of the gospel. It is not simply that evangelism and social involvement 
are to be done alongside each other. Rather, in integral mission our proclama-
tion has social consequences as we call people to love and repentance in all 
areas of life. And our social involvement has evangelistic consequences as we 
bear witness to the transforming grace of Jesus Christ.
(Micah Network 2001)
As the theology of integral mission has become more widely accepted in some 
sections of the Evangelical church, particularly in the UK and Australia,  during 
the second half of the 20th century it has also become commonplace to see 
 Evangelical churches engaging with their surrounding poorer communities and 
giving money to Evangelical development NGOs. Most UK evangelicals would 
now agree that engagement with issues of poverty is important. A recent survey 
by the UK’s Evangelical Alliance found that the majority of UK Evangelicals now 
believe that evangelism and social action are equally important and that 85% say 
that their Church is currently engaged in social action with the local community 
(Alliance 2011; Green and Hewitt 2011, pp. 5–12). The Director of the Churches 
Team at Tearfund4 described the situation to me like this:
The UK church has been on a journey . . . about 15 years ago we were still 
having a lively debate about whether our faith was proclamation or works. 
We were still having that argument in the Evangelical church . . . people were 
still arguing amongst themselves about what the whole gospel was, about 
what the holistic gospel was. But I think that we have moved away from that 
debate now. There are really only a few people who would say ‘no, no, no, 
it’s only about proclamation’ . . . I think the church has come to a settled place 
where they are saying it’s both/and. . . . Now people are in that place where 
they believe that proclamation and works should go hand in hand.
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And the Head of Micah Australia described a very similar situation there:
At the start a theology of justice was not well developed amongst Evangeli-
cals at all. You had mainstream and liberal Protestant Christians and Catholics 
really grappling to understand and engaging with links between justice and 
faith. . . . But you had the majority of the Evangelical church defining itself in 
absolute opposition to that, because anything other than personal evangelism 
is some sort of second order priority. . . . But that has really shifted. I think 
part of the shift has been some really intentional investments by particular 
leaders in moving their congregations. For example Baptist World Aid has 
played a really pivotal role inside the Baptist movement . . . to help really 
deepen that sense of justice at the heart of people’s faith expressions. Early 
on Tear were distinctive by saying ‘we’re the Evangelicals that care about 
justice’ and they were a small and beleaguered sect within their church com-
munities. But increasingly it’s a mainstream concept.
Even in America there is an increasing trend for Evangelicals to get involved 
in social action with local poor communities and to give money to Evangelical 
relief and development NGOs working to alleviate poverty overseas (Reynolds 
and Offut 2014; Steensland and Goff 2014).
Integral mission, advocacy and Jubilee 2000
Once the theology of integral mission had become quite widely accepted in the 
Evangelical church in the UK and Australia, and to varying degrees in Evangeli-
cal churches in other countries, some Evangelical development NGOs started 
in the late 1990s to push for a deeper understanding of justice and for an exten-
sion of integral mission to focus not just on transforming communities, but to 
also look at transforming unfair global structures. They began to suggest that 
Evangelical development NGOs should also engage in political advocacy about 
the global and national structural issues that often underlie local instantiations 
of poverty. World Vision adopted a policy statement on advocacy in 1991 and 
now has an advocacy budget of around $7 million. Other American Evangelical 
development NGOs, including Food for the Hungry, International Justice Com-
mission and the Mennonite Central Committee now have offices in Washington 
and have also started to engage in political advocacy (Reynolds and Offut 2014, 
p. 247). In the UK Tearfund started advocacy and campaigning work in 1997 
and currently has an annual advocacy budget of around £4.4 million, represent-
ing some 8% of their total budget (Tearfund 2015). Since then other members 
of the Tear family have developed advocacy programmes to greater or lesser 
extents. This move towards advocacy was partly a result of developments in 
Evangelical social thought and partly something that was influenced by the gen-
eral shift of large secular international development NGOs towards an increased 
focus on advocacy around the structural issues affecting poverty and the begin-
ning of their involvement in transnational advocacy coalitions to address global 
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issues (Bryer and Magrath 1999; Fowler 1999; Hudson 2002; Rugendyke 2007; 
Yanacopulos 2015).
For the most part the advocacy carried out by Evangelical development NGOs 
since the late 1990s has been professional lobbying of politicians carried out by 
trained experts.5 However this changed in the UK and Australia when Evangeli-
cals became swept up in the massive Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel poor coun-
tries’ debt that ran from 1996 to 2000. This campaign was initiated in the UK, with 
the support of both Christian and secular development NGOs and soon spread to 
over 60 countries. Its centre point was a petition calling for the cancelling of debts 
of the world’s poorest countries, which was signed by 24 million people in 166 
countries and was presented to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at the UN Mil-
lennium Summit in 2000 (Pettifor 2006, p. 305). A key symbol of the campaign 
was the human chain, formed around various G8 summits and also around the 
World Bank, the IMF and several other sites of the global economy in the years 
leading up to the millennium.
The campaign was unusual because of its religious framing and the leading 
role of the churches. The Vatican, various national councils of Catholic Bishops, 
the Bishops of the Anglican Communion, the World Council of Churches and 
Evangelical churches associated with Tearfund were all involved. They utilized 
their extensive institutional networks of parishes, relief agencies, universities and 
lobbying organisations to support the campaign and call for debt relief for poor 
countries (Donnelly n.d., p. 20). The frame was rooted in the Judeo-Christian 
Book of Leviticus’ prescription that at certain points in time economic relations 
should be re-set by freeing slaves, returning or redistributing land and wealth, and 
canceling debts. The centrality of the religious frame drew faith-based organisa-
tions to the forefront of the campaign and motivated and inspired a fairly estab-
lishment group of people to join with more radical activists to call for debt relief 
for poor countries.
In the UK the first key supporters of the campaign were Evangelical groups 
connected to Tearfund. Whilst the idea of a global campaign on debt seemed 
quite radical to them, and was certainly more radical than any of the issues on 
which they had campaigned before, if they had campaigned at all, they were fired 
up and excited by the Christian framing (Pettifor 2006, p. 299). Stephen Rand, 
then Prayer and Campaigns Director for Tearfund and one of the people who a 
few years later would be foundational in the inception of the Micah Challenge, 
explained to me:
[The Jubilee framing] was enormously significant for the Tearfund constitu-
ency because they bought into the biblical argument quite strongly. That was 
the rolling tide that bought the Evangelical constituency into that movement.
Tearfund was the first major British NGO to send out a circular to its supporters 
asking them to donate to the Jubilee 2000 campaign, and a few years later Tear 
Australia led the formation of Jubilee 2000 Australia. In other countries Protestant 
and Catholic groups were more central in organizing Jubilee 2000 coalitions and 
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Evangelicals played a far smaller role, if they were involved at all (Donnelly n.d., 
p. 15; Friesen 2012, pp. 58, 65; Pettifor 2006, p. 300).
In the UK churches hired buses to take their congregations to the demonstra-
tions around the G8 in Birmingham, and church-goers that I interviewed spoke of 
the wonderful excitement of heading up to Birmingham together, singing hymns 
on the way. A senior Tearfund staff member told me:
People from my own church turned up at the demonstration in Birmingham. 
And they’d never been to a demonstration before in their lives. We didn’t call 
it a demonstration, of course, it was human chain.
Across the UK Jubilee 2000 activities became part of churches’ celebration of 
the millennium, along with parish parties and fireworks (Reitan 2007, p. 77). For 
many Evangelicals campaigning for debt reduction became a deeply meaningful 
religious experience. Stephen Rand describes a prayer vigil that was held in his 
Baptist church during the 2000 G8 meeting in Okinawa, Japan:
The G8 leaders were in Okinawa. A small group of us were in a West Lon-
don church. As we followed the Summit Watch vigil guide I realized that 
this was not just a routine ceremony. It was another step of faith; on a path 
that for many had included Birmingham and Cologne, the petition clipboard 
on the village green and outside the polling booth, the postcards and letters 
sent to [Prime Ministers] Tony [Blair] and Gordon [Brown] and the Japanese 
Embassy. As the vigil ended we were invited to light a candle, and place it 
at the front of the church. At first no-one moved. Then, in deep silence, one 
and another solemnly took their candles forward. The silent movement spoke 
eloquently of commitment, of determination, of faith, of hope. The candle 
flames flickered, as the highest aspirations of the human spirit were fueled 
again by God’s compassion and justice. The spirituality at the heart of Jubilee 
2000 had never felt so powerful.
(Stephen Rand, quoted in Barrett 2000, p. 19)
As well as bringing about a certain amount of debt cancellation, Jubilee 2000 had 
a profound effect on the Evangelical church in the UK. It educated a large number 
of Evangelicals about one of the most fundamental structural issues underlying 
global poverty and it made campaigning and advocacy something that was accept-
able, and indeed important. A survey in 2011 found that 94% of the UK’s Evan-
gelicals now thought that Christians should engage with government (Alliance 
2011; Green and Hewitt 2011, pp. 5–12). Stephen Rand explained the sea change 
to me like this:
From Jubilee 2000, from say 1997 to 2005, and I think because of Jubilee 
2000 largely, the Evangelical constituency broadly moved into acceptance 
of political campaigning. That’s a whole load of individual journeys, but it’s 
also about the tone and it’s about what church leaders are saying. And I think 
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more and more church leaders, the ministers in the pulpit, would be posi-
tive about signing petitions and all of those things. . . . I’d like to think that 
Tearfund itself, and the involvement in Jubilee 2000, significantly shifted 
the Evangelical constituency towards an understanding of concern for the 
poor . . . including campaigning for change.
Evangelicals in Australia went through a similar transition and also came to accept 
campaigning and advocacy. In other countries, however, where Evangelicals had 
been far less engaged with the Jubilee 2000 campaign, this transition did not take 
place. One of the aims of the Micah Challenge, which was being discussed in the 
UK already in the early 2000s, was to spread this new Evangelical engagement 
with advocacy for the poor to the rest of the global Evangelical church. Stephen 
Rand, who as pivotal in those early discussions, explained to me:
The context was very different [in other countries], because once you’ve got 
that sea change in the UK where the predominant wave is that this campaign-
ing stuff for third world poverty is acceptable, in a sense you don’t have to 
make the argument any more. . . . I think the challenge for Micah Challenge 
was that in many countries that battle hadn’t been fought.
Joel Edwards, another one of the initiators of the Micah Challenge and later its 
Director, echoes the same sentiment:
Globally was a very different picture from the UK. In a way we were trying to 
take the UK context and spread it globally. We were trying to use the muscle 
of the experience [of Jubilee 2000] . . . and that’s why the UK, and to some 
extent Australia, were real engine rooms for what Micah Challenge was seek-
ing to do globally. . . . Europe and other parts of the world were way behind 
in advocacy, way behind.
The Micah Challenge
As the Jubilee 2000 campaign was beginning to wind down, Joel Edwards, then 
Director of the Evangelical Association UK, and Stephen Rand, then Campaigns 
and Prayer Coordinator at Tearfund, started to talk about the idea of a global 
Evangelical advocacy campaign for the poor. They wanted to build on the Jubilee 
2000 experience and make advocating for justice a core part of the work of the 
global Evangelical church. When they heard about the new Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), ratified by most countries at the UN Millennium Summit in 
September 2000, they thought this would be a good basis for their campaign. Joel 
Edwards explained:
When we heard of the MDGs we thought ‘Incredible! These eight promises 
are historic. They reflect the promises of the prophets about justice’. And if 
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governments are holding themselves accountable to the poor, why should we 
not as the church get behind such promises and seek to mobilise Christians 
globally, particularly Evangelicals.
In May 2001, as a way of testing these ideas within the wider global Evangelical 
community, Stephen Rand crafted a resolution on global poverty and the MDGs 
and presented it at the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA) in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia.6 It started with the words:
As a global Christian community seeking to live in obedience to Scripture, 
we recognise the challenge of poverty across God’s world. We welcome the 
international initiative to halve world poverty by 2015, and pledge ourselves 
to do all we can, through our organisations and churches, to back this with 
prayerful, practical action in our nations and communities.
The resolution was the first of its kind at the WEA and Rand and his colleagues 
were delighted when it passed. It marked a new openness from the WEA to 
actively engage in worldly matters, including political advocacy for the poor. 
From 2001–2003, discussions continued between the UK’s Evangelical Alliance, 
the World Evangelical Alliance, Tearfund and the Micah Network about the pos-
sibility of organizing a global Evangelical campaign against poverty. After long 
discussions, it was eventually decided that the campaign should be a collabora-
tion between the Micah Network and the World Evangelical Alliance, that local 
Evangelical churches should be mobilized to advocate to their governments, and 
that the MDGs should form the central framework. According to Joel Edwards:
Micah Challenge was perceived as the campaigning bit of the Micah Net-
work family, so that Micah Network would do integral mission and be a term 
of reference for emerging NGOs. Micah Challenge would be a specific cam-
paigning arm, which had never happened before. And it would be a global 
campaigning arm which would draw on the intellectual property and the 
expertise of the NGO world and blend that with church, which is why at the 
very beginning Micah Challenge became the child of Micah Network and 
the WEA.
From the very beginning the aim was to fit advocacy work into the overall approach 
of integral mission. One of the key elements of this was that it would be the local 
churches that would carry out the advocacy and campaigning, and that it would 
become part of their religious practice.7 The Director of the Micah Network, who 
was also on the Board of the Micah Challenge, explained it to me like this:
They said this was a tremendous achievement, for the world to agree on these 
eight goals, let’s use that momentum and see how we can, through our inte-
gral mission lens, try to mobilise churches to take their responsibility.
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Thus the aim was never to establish an expert-led advocacy department where 
professionals met with politicians and lobbied them about various issues. The 
aim was always to transform the church and to get it and its members to engage 
in popular advocacy and campaigning as part of the living out of their faith. Joel 
Edwards explained:
A very important part of our work was raising the consciousness . . . and 
mobilising a section of civil society called the Evangelical church. . . . Chang-
ing the churches was the key part of it. Sensitising the churches. Sustainable 
long term engagement and paradigm shift was the idea . . . [We wanted to 
take] advocacy and build it in as integral to our Christian witness.
The Micah Challenge campaign was officially launched at the UN on 15 
 October 2004 and ran until 2015, when the deadline for the accomplishment of 
the MDGs was reached. It had two stated objectives: (1) to provide the global 
Evangelical community with a means of influencing national and international 
policies affecting key areas, and (2) to significantly increase the involvement/
action of Evangelicals in favour of the poor (Edwards 2008, p. 7). In 2004 
it issued the Micah Call, a statement of the vision and values of the cam-
paign, and which it asked individuals and church leaders to sign to show their 
 support. The call set out the prophetic vision of the church, made mention of 
holistic transformation and referred to the key biblical passage from Micah 
6:8. It also called on Christians to play their own part in working for the poor, 
as well as asking them to hold their national leaders to account for achieving 
the MDGs.
This is a moment in history of unique potential
when the stated intentions of world leaders
echo something of the mind of the Biblical prophets
and the teachings of Jesus concerning the poor, and
when we have the means to dramatically reduce poverty.
We commit ourselves, as followers of Jesus,
to work together for the holistic transformation of our communities,
to pursue justice, be passionate about kindness and to walk humbly with God.
We call on international and national decision-makers
of both rich and poor nations, to fulfil their public promise
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
and so halve absolute global poverty by 2015.
We call on Christians everywhere to be agents of hope
for and with the poor, and to work with others
to hold our national and global leaders accountable
in securing a more just and merciful world
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The basic structure of the campaign was an international secretariat of three to 
four people, based in London, and then national campaigns based in other coun-
tries in both the North and the South. Each national campaign had a coordinator, 
and occasionally a few other staff or interns. The global secretariat was overseen 
by a board, whose members came from both the Micah Network and the WEA. 
A similar structure was set up for each of the national campaigns, where a steering 
committee was set up with both NGO staff and people from the local Evangelical 
Alliance or the local Evangelical churches.
Initial conversations were held in 63 countries regarding getting involved in 
Micah Challenge and national campaigns of varying capacities were set up in 41 
countries (Winter and Woodhead 2014, pp. 26–28). In some countries the coor-
dinator was based in the office of a local Evangelical development NGO, often 
Tearfund, while in other countries they would be based in the office of the local 
Evangelical Association. The idea was that each national campaign would look 
at the situation regarding the MDGs in their country and would decide what spe-
cific issues to lobby their governments on to ensure that the MDGs were reached. 
It was hoped that the NGOs would bring expertise in development matters and 
policy issues and would develop specific policy asks which church leaders and 
members of the local churches could then campaign on. The international sec-
retariat would support the national campaigns by providing resources, training 
and inspiration and would also organise a number of ‘global moments’. These 
included Micah Sunday, which would take place on the Sunday closest to the 
International Day of Poverty in October, and three global campaigns in which all 
of the national campaigns would be invited to participate as the global church.
Mobilising the national campaigns, however, proved to be extremely difficult. 
There were a number of challenges. In many cases the national coordinators were 
young and inexperienced and there was often a lack of adequate funding. In other 
cases the local Evangelical Alliance was poorly organized and did not represent 
many of the Evangelical churches in the country. And in many countries in the 
global South it was difficult to do national level policy advocacy with undemo-
cratic governments. Notwithstanding these practical challenges, the most serious 
challenge proved to be one of theology. While the Micah Network had already 
been working for a few years to promote Evangelical social engagement through 
the theology of integral mission, and was seeing some shifts in attitude, by far the 
majority of global Evangelicals still followed the premillennial dispensationalist 
theology and thus did not believe that they should engage with worldly matters, 
let alone politics, and instead should focus on saving souls. This challenge was 
found in virtually every country in which the Micah Challenge worked. To give 
but two examples, the Coordinator of Micah Challenge Switzerland explained it 
to me like this:
It was difficult to create a movement inside of the Church. . . . They look at 
me and say ‘but that’s how it is. Jesus says that the world will go down and 
he will create a new earth, so why should we bother about the earth?’ . . . This 
theology in the head of people is one of the biggest problems.
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And the coordinator of Micah Challenge India relayed similar issues:
Lots of people were not convinced and raised questions. They said we would 
be diverting our attention and energies towards helping the poor but we 
are going to leave this world and have permanent abode of heaven, so we 
don’t need to be worried about this. The government has the responsibility, 
if the government doesn’t do it, why should we be worried about it? It will 
be unnecessarily diverting out attention from preaching the gospel to other 
things. . . . I had a lot of arguments like this.
A member of the international board summed up the global situation like this:
90% of [the Director’s] work was trying to win the argument with the 
churches. So he did a lot of raising awareness, but he had very few lobbyists. 
To move them to the actual lobby-campaign mindset was very hard. He first 
had to win a theological argument, in the church, that the church should be in 
politics. And that is a very hard one.
The rest of this chapter looks at the way that the Micah Challenge sought to 
win this theological argument to convince Evangelicals around the world that 
advocacy for the poor was biblical and Godly, and thus to mobilise them to 
get involved.
Mobilising Evangelicals for development advocacy
Whereas integral mission, or transformational development, provides a theology 
of development to guide the development work of Evangelical NGOs, Reyn-
olds and Offutt have argued that Evangelical engagement with advocacy around 
poverty issues has been hampered by the lack of a coherent underlying theology 
(Reynolds and Offut 2014, p. 249). Evangelical scholars have made similar claims 
(e.g. Davis 2009; Thacker 2015).8 It is thus significant that the Micah Challenge 
tried to take the first steps towards developing such a theology.
Justice is Biblical
The first step in developing an Evangelical theology of justice was to persuade 
Evangelicals that justice was biblical and central to God’s plan for the world. So 
the Micah Challenge team produced a lot of materials discussing the sections 
of the bible that deal with justice and showing its centrality in the bible, including 
the books Micah’s Challenge (Tresser 2009) Just Mercy (Edwards 2010) and Live 
Just.ly (Fileta 2014), the Jesus Agenda DVD and study guide (McLachlin and 
Edwards 2012), and a number of shorter booklets, articles and blogposts. These 
publications mainly dwelt on the teachings of the Old Testament prophets and on 
Jesus’s ministry in the New Testament. The Micah Challenge team sought to show 
the centrality of justice in the bible and to highlight the fact that many churches 
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were avoiding large sections of the bible in their sermons and teachings. The 
Director of Micah Challenge wrote in Just Mercy:
After idolatry, God says more in the Bible about injustice than any other 
subject. But, even so, many of us who have attended church for decades can 
still count on our fingers and toes the number of Sunday sermons we have 
heard on justice.
(Edwards 2010, p. 10)
In many churches round the world pastors would preach about the personal attrib-
utes of righteousness and holiness, but would ignore the more systemic issue of 
justice. The Micah Challenge team sought to connect these three elements and 
thus bring justice back into the picture. As Stephen Rand explained to me:
Right wing Americans tend to be quite strong on righteousness. . . . When 
I preached, it would be that justice and righteousness is about doing the right 
thing. The bit about justice tends to be the public sphere, and doing the right 
thing in your family or in your street tends to be regarded as righteousness 
and morality.
In Just Mercy (2010), the International Director defines justice as ‘righteousness 
responding to wrong’ and tries to make the theological argument that righteous-
ness, holiness and justice must be considered together. Building on the integral 
mission approach, which seeks to open out people’s focus from the personal to 
the social, he argues that righteousness, holiness and justice are all fundamentally 
social, rather than personal, attributes:
The Bible makes no distinction between God’s justice, which redeems us 
at the cross, his holiness, which we share, or his Righteousness, which we 
display. Justice is the river that flows from the heart of God, responding to 
our sin and sinfulness in all its private and public manifestation. A theology 
that puts a wedge between personal holiness and prophetic advocacy uses the 
Bible to build a dam in that river.
(Edwards 2010, p. 11)
And again in the study guide accompanying the Jesus Agenda DVD:
In much of our teaching holiness is typically moralized or privatized, but 
there is nothing more central to the Scriptures that describes everything from 
our relationship to God, our communal behavior and justice. Biblical holiness 
is far bigger than human sexuality, piety or personal morality. It empowers us 
to tackle two giants of oppression to humanity: materialism and corruption. 
This study encourages us to consider holiness, righteousness and justice in 
an integrated way.
(McLachlin and Edwards 2012, p. 16)
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In the integral mission approach biblical justice is seen as being restorative – it is 
about restoring the world to the way that God created it, restoring it to a state of 
‘shalom’. In a piece called The Message of Micah, a member of the steering com-
mittee of Micah Challenge Australia (who was also on the International Board) 
writes:
Biblical justice is incredibly comprehensive in its requirements and con-
sequences. Biblical justice is a restorative function – affirmative action on 
behalf of the powerless to restore their proper (meaning God-ordained) posi-
tion in human society. It is concerned with fair wages and fair trading, with 
equality under the law so that there is not one law for the rich and well- 
connected, and another for the poor and marginalized. Biblical justice is 
about ensuring that the weak have access to all that which is needed to play 
a full and dignified role in human society, to experience life as God intended 
it to be. Biblical justice is a consequence of the fact that all men and woman 
are created in the image of God, and equally loved by him. Along with love 
justice is absolutely fundamental to biblical ethics.
(Bradbury 2011)
The International Campaigns Manager explained to me how she would apply 
this biblical concept of restorative justice to the MDGs, about which they were 
campaigning:
When we talk about poverty, the MDGs, which was the underpinning of the 
campaign, there was a sense that poverty wasn’t just a personal choice or an 
accident, but it was the result of structures in the global economic and social 
system that kept people away from opportunity, from equity, and that these 
things made God angry, that God had always been angry about injustice. And 
that justice was about access to that sense of wellbeing and restoration and 
peace that is summed up by tzedek, I suppose, in the Old Testament. And 
justice was much more than ‘this is right, or wrong’, it was the sense of resto-
ration, equity and opportunity and hope to those people, for various reasons, 
didn’t have those things.
Furthermore, the Micah Challenge team felt that it was important to emphasise 
that justice was something quite different from charity. Whilst giving help or 
money to those in need was all well and good, they tried to communicate that 
there were systemic problems that were causing many people to live in poverty, 
despite their own choices and actions, and that therefore it was important to also 
lobby governments to change these bigger systemic problems in order to bring 
about justice and restoration, and ultimately, the Kingdom of God. The Interna-
tional Campaigns Manager explained it to me like this:
[The framing] was very much justice. We were working with lots of sup-
porters who would start from a charity perspective, ‘I am blessed so I should 
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bless others’, or ‘there is so much unhappiness in the world, I should be 
contributing to make the world a better place’. These are very valid places to 
start, but we would say it was also a matter a justice, that God was a God of 
justice, . . . tell them how people stood up against injustice, how they acted. 
And we would use those examples – Esther, Nehemia, daughters of Zelophe-
had, you know, the whole thing to show that this was a Biblical concept. And 
that it wasn’t just charity and sympathy, but that I guess God wanted us to 
bring in the Kingdom of God more on Earth, and the Kingdom of God was 
the Kingdom of Justice.
Advocacy is not politics
The team had to walk a fine line between talking about biblical justice and the 
Kingdom of God and then translating this into the practical action which they 
were seeking, namely advocacy to governments about the MDGs. If it sounded 
too political then people would pull away. The Coordinator of Micah Challenge 
Australia explained to me:
When you try to invite people to look at the systems that bind people and con-
strain choices and options . . . it’s not something we are in the habit of doing 
and it can be threatening because it feels like an alien political agenda being 
imposed on a church group or an organisation.
Similarly, if things began to sound too political many Evangelicals would get 
worried that they were losing their focus on what was actually the most important 
thing – saving souls. This issue would come up again and again, in pretty much 
every country where the Micah Challenge worked. The Coordinator of Micah 
Challenge USA gave me this example:
There was a guy who spoke at one of our events, and he was like ‘the Mil-
lennium Development Goals are great, but they won’t get you into heaven. 
So let’s not lose sight of proclaiming the gospel of Jesus Christ’. He wasn’t 
actually responding to anything we said, he was more responding to what 
he knew people were afraid of, which was that we would lose sight of the 
Gospel.
And thus the team had to put a lot of effort into convincing people that engaging 
with justice and advocacy was not ‘politics’, but that it was religious action. They 
sought to convince people that advocating on behalf of the poor was part of their 
living out their faith. Thus the Coordinator of Micah Challenge USA continued:
Part of that was that he didn’t understand that for us this was part of the 
Gospel. So we weren’t losing sight of the Gospel, we were preaching a more 
inclusive and encompassing Gospel that actually had ramifications for this 
life, not just the next.
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This theme is a clear extension of the integral mission theology to include justice 
and advocacy and it permeated most of the Micah Challenge publications and 
communications. It can be seen very clearly in the Just Mercy book, where the 
International Director writes:
Justice isn’t politics. It’s far more than that. Justice is righteousness respond-
ing to wrong. And this means that doing justice is central to the Christian 
faith. . . . God’s justice is more than a message. It’s God’s mission to a broken 
world.
(Edwards 2010, pp. 11–12)
However, in order to convince Evangelicals to take the step from caring about 
justice to actually engaging in advocacy it was also necessary to develop a theol-
ogy of advocacy. Again, the starting point was the bible, and much of Micah Chal-
lenge’s early writings on advocacy focus on biblical examples of advocacy. Many 
of the publications focus on the Old Testament prophets, particularly on Micah, 
Isaiah, Hosea who pointed out the injustice and corruption in the Israelite king-
doms, or on Esther, who is hailed as a biblical character who did advocacy with 
King Ahashverosh, or on Moses who is said to have done advocacy with Pharoah. 
In all these texts, advocacy is presented as something that is solidly biblical and 
profoundly Godly.
Esther’s story, told in the biblical book that takes her name, is a vivid reminder 
that advocacy is one of the most powerful tools God has given us to combat 
oppression and injustice.
(Micah Challenge Australia 2011)
It was emphasized again and again that advocacy was not political, but rather a 
way of living out faith. It was seen as a profoundly religious action, partnering 
with God in his work of redemption.
Christian witness is growing increasingly to encompass not only practical 
action but also prophetic advocacy for the poor. Advocacy – speaking up for 
the poor – takes us a step beyond practical action to prophetic engagement. 
Quite frankly, it’s not something we are always comfortable in doing. It looks 
on the face of it to be nothing more than political activism. However, there is 
a world of difference between political activism for ideological reasons and 
speaking to the powerful with and on behalf of the poor in the name of Christ. 
When Moses stood before Pharaoh and said ‘Let my people go!’ this was 
advocacy. . . . It does not come from political conviction but is the overflow 
behavior of people who walk in biblical humility and who love mercy. . . . 
Our advocacy is neither the easy nor the political option, but it is what right-
eousness demands.
(Edwards 2010, pp. 50–51)
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Advocacy as religious action
Across the Micah Challenge it was felt that in order to convince Evangelicals to 
do advocacy it was necessary to turn advocacy into a personal religious action. 
A new type of ‘lifestyle advocacy’ was developed across the Micah world. It was 
formulated most explicitly in the USA, under the name of ‘transformational advo-
cacy’, but the general ideas and approach were used across the movement. The 
International Director also developed a charismatic theology of advocacy inspired 
by the Holy Spirit to reach out to Pentecostals and Charismatics. Both approaches 
sought to shift advocacy from being purely a dry matter of dealing with imper-
sonal structural factors into a more personal activity that linked also with lifestyle, 
holiness and religious experience.
Activists in some parts of the movement worried that traditional advocacy felt 
very secular and disconnected from their other religious activity. The coordinator 
of Micah Challenge USA explained it to me like this:
We felt like traditional advocacy wasn’t working as far as it didn’t really con-
nect with the church. . . . We realised that there wasn’t any personal aspect to 
it. So I’d go to these churches and these college campuses and try to inspire 
people and get them to change their whole way of thinking about their lives. 
And then to say, ‘just keep living the same way you always lived but write a 
letter to Congress’ and so on, that just felt really empty to me.
And so, in collaboration with some other Evangelical development NGOs, they 
developed the concept of ‘transformational advocacy’. As transformational devel-
opment was to regular development, so transformational advocacy would be to 
regular advocacy. Transformational advocacy would be holistic religious action. 
It was something done by Christians, as Christians, and in a deeply Christian 
way. One of the main ways that transformational advocacy differs from traditional 
advocacy is that it has a personal morality and holiness lifestyle element to it 
and it includes a focus on the person doing the advocacy. Thus transformational 
advocacy widens out the concept of advocacy to include not just policy change, 
but also the behaviour change of individuals. The goal of transformational advo-
cacy is ‘changing attitudes, policy and behaviours that perpetuate injustice’. With 
this formulation it becomes important that the person advocating must also be 
working on their own personal righteousness and living justly themselves. In an 
interview on an Evangelical website the coordinator of Micah Challenge USA put 
it like this:
Transformational advocacy is the process of challenging ourselves and our 
leaders to change attitudes, behaviors, and policies that perpetuate injustice 
and deny God’s will for all creation to flourish. . . . Transformational advo-
cacy recognizes that there are systemic injustices that must be challenged in 
order to see God’s intention for all creation to flourish, but also recognizes 
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that we can’t ask our leaders to do something we ourselves aren’t willing to 
do. We can’t ask for integrity, generosity, justice, and compassion from our 
leaders if we too don’t embrace them in our hearts and actions. This differs 
from traditional advocacy which focuses on changing policy without recog-
nizing the logs in our own eyes so to speak. Traditional advocacy also tends 
to create an ‘us vs. them’ mentality when engaging people of power – trans-
formational advocacy recognizes that we are all guilty before God for the 
sins of injustice, and we are all invited to be a part of God’s solution to bring 
healing in the world (Fast. Forward. The End of Poverty).
Furthermore, transformational advocacy could also provide a new route through 
which Evangelicals could proclaim the glory of God to new groups of people. 
Transformational advocacy is holistic and it therefore has a spiritual component to 
it. As religious action transformational advocacy could be both a form of worship 
and a form of proclamation. The coordinator of Micah Challenge USA explained 
it like this in an educational video on the Micah Challenge USA website:
This is the beautiful work of advocacy. And we do it as worship, we do it to 
glorify God. God takes joy when His people stand up and speak out against 
unjust policies . . . and hold their leaders to account to a higher stand-
ard. . . . When we do that we don’t take off our Christian faith, we don’t 
take off our identity as followers of Jesus. We bring that with us, into these 
places which are often secular, into these places where conversations about 
faith are uncomfortable. We bring who we are into these places, we bring 
Jesus into the room. . . . Advocacy is a way that we tell the world about 
who our God is. We proclaim that God is a God of justice, that his concern 
for the vulnerable, for the oppressed, for the marginalized is so great that 
we, his followers, can’t help but speak out. When the world hears of our 
God who is deeply concerned about the lives of people who are marginal-
ized, who is deeply concerned about how policies impact the poor, they’ll 
take notice. . . . Advocacy is a chance for us to tell the world about who 
our God is.
The International Director further built on these ideas and sought to reach out to 
Pentecostal and Charismatic Evangelicals, who very much focus on the role of the 
Holy Spirit in their lives, and who constitute a substantial proportion of the global 
Evangelical church, particularly in the global South (Anderson 2004; Freeman 
2012; Martin 2002). As a British black Pentecostal, with roots in the Caribbean, 
he himself was motivated by the experience of the Holy Spirit in his life. And 
thus he sought to develop a theology of advocacy that made a direct connection 
between the intense spirituality that Pentecostals and Charismatics experience in 
their ecstatic worship and the act of political advocacy. He based this theology 
on the story of Moses who, according to the bible, was persuaded to advocate 
to Pharaoh on behalf of the Israelites during an intense episode at the burning 
Mobilising evangelicals 79
bush where God appeared to him and directly commissioned him for the task. He 
explained to me:
Advocacy is what the Holy Spirit does on our behalf. This appeal to God on our 
behalf. So the notion of advocacy is already there. We used Moses quite a lot, we 
like Moses as a paradigm for advocacy – God meets him at the burning bush, at 
the place of worship, and it’s at the place of worship that he is commissioned to 
go to Pharaoh. That’s high grade, it doesn’t get any higher than that in advocacy. 
And so what we tried to do, especially when talking to the church, was to build a 
theological line of continuity from worship at the burning bush to commission-
ing to go to Pharaoh’s house. Our argument was based on . . . [the idea that] you 
cannot start off at the burning bush and not find your way to Pharaoh’s house.
This theology was developed in the Jesus Agenda DVD, which ‘asks how the 
liberating power of the Spirit should lead 21st century Christians to become advo-
cates of the poor’ (McLachlin and Edwards 2012, p. 3), and again in the Use 
by 2015 booklet that was brought out in the same year. The key theme was that 
spiritual experiences of the divine should lead people to activism on behalf of 
the poor. The call to advocacy is framed as a deeply personal and intense reli-
gious experience. And if you have such an experience, then you must play your 
part in response and let the Holy Spirit drive you to engage in advocacy for the 
poor. Framed this way, advocacy for the poor is not simply political activism, it is 
something that is driven by spiritual forces and the experience of God. It is deeply 
religious action. Use by 2015 puts it like this:
Moses’ journey which began at the burning bush ended up in Pharaoh’s palace 
where he found himself advocating for the freedom of the Hebrew slaves. . . . 
What fuelled Moses’ passion was neither egotism nor a political philosophy: 
it was the mandate of the burning bush. That’s where it began. For God who 
called him to draw near without his sandals and sent him striding into the pal-
ace. Afraid and on a steep learning curve Moses became God’s first biblical 
advocate for justice. . . . Those of us who hunger for a Moses experience at 
the burning bush should walk with him to Pharaoh’s house.
(Micah Challenge International 2012, p. 10)
From theology to mobilisation
Taken together, the theological writings of the Micah Challenge go some way to 
developing an Evangelical theology of justice and advocacy. But it would be fair 
to say that this task is still to be completed. In their effort to make advocacy palat-
able to Evangelicals, Micah Challenge found it necessary to emphasise personal 
morality and spiritual experience and in doing so they tended to lose sight of 
the larger structural issues that they were trying to address. In all the writings of 
Micah Challenge there are very few references to global political and economic 
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issues such as trade or debt or structural adjustment programmes, and there was 
no analysis of how systemic global factors lead to poverty for many people in the 
world. While much effort was spent trying to convince Evangelicals that it was 
appropriate and biblically sanctioned for them to engage in justice advocacy for 
the poor, much less energy was invested in analysing the causes of contemporary 
global poverty and thus in suggesting precisely for which policies and practices 
they should actually be advocating.
This may be part of the reason why the Micah Challenge did not really succeed 
in carrying out very much advocacy. While the Micah Challenge campaigns in 
the Northern countries did a small amount of lobbying and campaigning, mainly 
focused on asking for an increase in their country’s aid budget, the campaigns 
in the South chose mainly to focus on educating Evangelicals about poverty and 
advocacy and in some cases carrying out direct practical action on behalf of the 
poor. The global campaigns motivated millions of Evangelicals to pray for the 
poor, but only a few thousand went further to talk to parliamentarians, to write 
letters to their MP or to march in the streets.
Australia was the exception.9 There Evangelicals had already been persuaded 
about the acceptability of advocacy through their experience in the Jubilee 2000 
campaign. With the theological battle already won, Micah Challenge Australia 
succeeded in bringing Evangelicals to Canberra each year to talk with their par-
liamentarians about global poverty. They campaigned on a variety of issues con-
nected to the MDGs, including maternal health, child health, water, sanitation and 
hygiene, climate change and environmental sustainability. They also did a number 
of creative public engagements. For example they organised a Giant Toilet tour, 
where they toured around the country with a huge 2m high toilet and then parked 
it outside Parliament House, in a campaign about water and sanitation. And they 
organised ‘Survive Past Five’ birthday parties, which were held in churches to 
celebrate increases in rates of childhood survival, and after which congregants 
were encouraged to write to a member of parliament about the issue.
But in most countries there was very little policy analysis and very little politi-
cal mobilisation. Evangelicals began to think about justice and poverty, and many 
started to pray for the poor. But very few actually took the step to engage in political 
advocacy. This is still an ongoing process, and things may change in the coming 
years. At the end of 2015 the Micah Network and the Micah Challenge merged 
to form Micah Global. National Micahs continue to operate in many countries, 
bringing together Evangelical development NGOs and local churches. As well as 
working to spread the idea of integral mission they plan to continue working on 
mobilising the local churches to engage in justice advocacy for the poor. So whilst 
the Micah Challenge has now come to an end, the process of shifting the Evangeli-
cal churches into an engaged justice mindset is still very much ongoing.
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at recent developments in Evangelical thought and 
action regarding social engagement, and particularly regarding engagement 
Mobilising evangelicals 81
in political advocacy around issues of justice and poverty. It has shown how 
the Micah Challenge, the first transnational Evangelical advocacy campaign 
for the poor, has been working to try to bring about a major change in Evan-
gelicalism, to open it out into a form of religion which holistically unites the 
personal and the social, the spiritual and the material, the moral and the politi-
cal. Whilst this process is far from complete and is often met with resistance 
in many quarters of the global Evangelical world, it is slowly and gradually 
having an impact and bringing about a shift in Evangelical theology and reli-
gious practice.
In particular this chapter has shown how certain sections of the Evangeli-
cal world, particularly those engaged in international development work, are 
deepening their interest and involvement in global social issues and are work-
ing to develop an Evangelical theology of justice and advocacy. Whilst many 
of the concepts in this theology bear resemblance to those developed in the 
mainline ecumenical world many decades earlier, they are being translated into 
a ‘lifestyle’ practice that is quite distinctive. This study has shown how the 
Micah Challenge was instrumental in developing much of this new theology, 
and in spreading it to Evangelicals in many countries in both the global North 
and South. As such, it is possible to see the Micah Challenge as a development 
entrepreneur.
There have been many tensions in this attempt to engage global Evangelicals 
in social action and political advocacy on behalf of the poor, and in this chapter 
I have shown how the Micah Challenge sought to mediate between different dis-
cursive fields in order to create a nexus between its evangelical constituency and 
the field of international development (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 this volume). 
It did this by seeking to overcome the divide between the personal and the social, 
the inner-worldly and the outer-worldly, and the religious and the secular. I have 
argued that it was not completely successful in overcoming these divides and that 
ultimately it faced a paradox which it could not overcome – that to make justice 
and advocacy palatable to Evangelicals it had to emphasise personal morality and 
spirituality, and yet in doing so it lost focus on the global political and economic 
issues that it wished to raise.
Nonetheless the Micah Challenge, and all the churches and NGOs that sup-
ported it, represent a major sea change in Evangelical thought and action around 
social justice, and it seems likely that this change will continue developing in the 
Evangelical world in the coming years.
Notes
 1 Research for this chapter was carried about between September 2015 and Novem-
ber 2016 and consisted of interviews with present and former members of staff of the 
Micah Challenge and Tearfund and brief periods of ethnography at Micah meetings in 
London. UK interviews were carried out face-to-face, while interviews with staff in 
other countries were carried out over Skype. This was supplemented by an analysis of 
internal and publically available documents, writings on Evangelical websites, and a 
review of the relevant academic literature.
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 2 The word ‘transformation’ was also chosen in contrast to the word ‘liberation’, which 
Catholic and ecumenical Protestants had chosen instead of ‘development’ (Tizon 2011, 
p. 69).
 3 Many of these theological ideas are similar to those in mainline Protestant ecumenical 
circles.
 4 All interviewees are referred to by their job title at the time of the interview. To respect 
privacy, personal names are not mentioned, with the exception of public figures who are 
widely known to have held a particular role.
 5 Tearfund is the notable exception here and it has been trying to educate and mobilise 
Evangelicals in the UK to engage in popular advocacy and campaigning since the late 
1990s. For a detailed study see Freeman 2019.
 6 Up to this point it was called the World Evangelical Fellowship, but from this meeting 
onwards it changed its name to the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA).
 7 This is very different to the approach of the World Council of Churches, which has a 
strong advocacy department, but where advocacy is carried out by expert professionals 
and not by local churches.
 8 But see Gordon (2002) for Tearfund’s approach to advocacy.
 9 Micah Challenge UK had different problems. There Evangelicals were already doing 
advocacy through Tearfund and many also supported the ecumenical Christian develop-
ment NGO, Christian Aid, and even the large secular NGOs such as Oxfam and Action-
Aid. The field was therefore already rather full and there was some competition between 
the various organisations. Thus Micah Challenge UK was only active from 2006–2010 
and never managed to become significant in the UK Evangelical scene.
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World Vision is a ‘Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedi-
cated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty 
and injustice’ (World Vision International 2016c). Founded in the US soon after 
the end of World War II, World Vision is today one of the largest development-
focused faith-based organisations (FBOs), with an annual income of $826.9 mil-
lion in 2013, rising to $1,002 billion in 2015 (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 8). World 
Vision not only receives very substantial sums each year from individuals but also 
gets significant funds from the British, Canadian, German, US and other govern-
ments. World Vision also receives substantial amounts of money from the Euro-
pean Union and major state-funded development agencies such as AusAid and 
USAid. In addition, World Vision has a significant presence at the United Nations 
(UN). The UN is a key focus and environment of World Vision’s advocacy, where 
it works closely with a network of governments, UN agencies, FBOs and interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to pursue child-focused develop-
ment campaigns.
In sum, World Vision has evolved over time into a globally focused, devel-
opment FBO working to improve outcomes especially for children, particularly 
in the Global South. World Vision began its work explicitly as a Christian- 
orientated, child-protection entity, openly drawing on ‘Christian values’ to pursue 
and justify its work. Today, World Vision works with an array of state and non-
state actors in various contexts, including at the UN. The key issue examined in 
this chapter is: to what extent does World Vision wear its Christian values ‘on 
its sleeve’ when undertaking development work at the UN with an array of state 
and non-state, faith-based and secular, actors, working to overcome development 
shortfalls affecting children in the Global South?
The wider aim of the chapter is to examine World Vision in the context of 
FBOs and their attempts to seek to influence debate and decision-making at the 
UN. Seeking to shape international development work, World Vision becomes a 
development entrepreneur (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume). Increas-
ing attention on FBOs in this context has followed what is widely understood 
as a widespread, post – Cold War ‘religious resurgence’, which characterises a 
novel ‘postsecular’ international environment. One aspect of the new postsecular 
environment is increasing focus on global public policy at the UN, from FBOs 
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from various religious traditions. The UN is particularly important in this regard 
because: (1) it is the largest intergovernmental organisation, with 193 member 
states; (2) it is the most important global public policy focus; and (3) hundreds 
of FBOs have an institutionalised presence at the UN, via official status with the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Overall, the UN regularly engages 
with more than 3,000 non-governmental organisations afforded ‘official’ UN sta-
tus. Around 10% are classified as FBOs, implying that their activities and goals 
are significantly moulded by religious orientations and principles. This does not 
necessarily imply, however, that FBOs at the UN are ‘religiously pure’, that is, 
unwilling to work with non-religious entities, including both states and non-state 
actors. In fact, many FBOs, including World Vision, are willing to interact at the 
UN with both state and non-state entities which share ideological although not 
necessarily religious proclivities. Interacting with actors from divergent discur-
sive fields and flexibly adapting to their logics, World Vision constitutes a bound-
ary organisation (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume).
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section examines World Vision’s 
development from its origins as a Christian-focused child protection entity to 
become one of the world’s largest international FBOs. The second section focuses 
on World Vision’s activities at the UN, explaining how it seeks to pursue its objec-
tive of global advocacy for children’s development. In this section, I examine 
World Vision’s central involvement in two important projects: (1) the Global 
Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health, and (2) the Global Partnership to 
End Violence Against Children. The third section investigates how World Vision 
pursues its goals at the UN, via what are known as ‘side events’, which involve 
interaction between both state and non-state actors in order to publicise and pur-
sue specific issues.
Motivations and approach of World Vision’s  
development work
This section examines World Vision’s development from its origins as a Christian-
focused child protection entity to become one of the world’s largest international 
FBOs. Today, World Vison regularly works in partnership with both state and non-
state actors, including UN agencies and FBOs and INGOs, in pursuit of child-
orientated, development-focused goals throughout the Global South.
World Vision’s origins date from 1947. In that year, an American Baptist minis-
ter on a trip to China, Robert Pierce (1914–1978), met a teacher, Tena Hoelkedoer. 
At the time, China was enduring the aftermath of Japanese military occupation and 
civil war. Ms. Hoelkedoer introduced to Reverend Pierce a deprived, helpless and 
abandoned young child named White Jade. While Ms. Hoelkedoer was unable to 
care for the child herself, she was concerned about White Jade’s future. Ms. Hoe-
lkedoer asked Reverend Pierce if he could help the child financially. In response, 
Robert Pierce gave Ms. Hoelkedoer US $51 for the child, and also committed 
himself to sending the same sum each month for the child’s benefit. Returning to 
the US, Pierce was motivated to found an organisation dedicated to disadvantaged 
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children’s wellbeing, and World Vision was created in 1950. World Vision’s first 
child sponsorship programme began in 1953, in direct ‘response to the needs of 
hundreds of thousands of orphans at the end of the Korean War’. World Vision’s 
work expanded over the next two decades, and by the mid-1970s the organisation 
was working in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 
By the 1980s, World Vision ‘embraced a broader community development model 
and established an emergency relief division’. Later, its burgeoning activities 
expanded further, focusing on addressing ‘the causes of poverty by focusing on 
community needs such as water, sanitation, education, health, leadership train-
ing and income generation’. As a consequence, over time, World Vision ‘became 
more active in working with governments, businesses and other organisations in 
addressing issues such as child labour, children in armed conflict and the sexual 
exploitation of women and children’ (World Vision International 2016b).
World Vision’s concerns about how to bring together both Christian and ‘secu-
lar’ approaches to development is reflected in recent scholarly coverage of poten-
tial faith bias of development-focused FBOs, such as World Vision and Islamic 
Relief (Ware et al. 2016). The issue is controversial because explicitly expressed 
faith orientation of a development-orientated FBO may significantly affect not 
only how and with whom such an organisation works but also who will benefit 
from its development work. On the other hand, recent studies have found that 
several faith-based development entities, such as World Vision, Oxfam and Save 
the Children, although ‘founded by religious leaders’ became ‘more secular over 
time’ (Ware et al. 2016, p. 330).
We can see this in relation to several of the FBOs/INGOs that World Vision 
works closely with at the UN. We have already noted that World Vision is a 
child-focused, development organisation, founded in 1950, with a Christian ethos 
and a rights-based approach to its humanitarian and development work. FBOs/
INGOs that World Vision works closely with at the UN include others which 
have their roots and values in Christian beliefs. For example, Save the Children, 
founded in 1919, is today secular in orientation but when founded was overtly 
Christian in ethos and focus (Save the Children 2016). ChildFund International, 
established in 1938, is much like World Vision: a ‘global network of child- 
centered development organizations working in the poorest countries around the 
world to create opportunities for disadvantaged children’. Like World Vision, 
ChildFund International’s mission is to create long-term, sustainable, community-
based solutions to development problems affecting children and their families. 
Also like World Vision, ChildFund International shifted over time from an overtly 
Christian-focused outlook to one informed by a rights-based approach to its work. 
In fact, this affected the organisation quite significantly. Ministry Watch, which 
describes itself as an ‘independent evangelical Christian’ organisation, monitors 
and rates FBOs for the ‘seriousness of their Christian commitment’ and issues 
‘donor alerts’ if they suspect an FBO lacks ‘real commitment’ (Hopgood and 
Vinjamuri 2012, p. 46).2 In 2004, MinistryWatch.com issued an ‘alert’ about the 
‘Christian Children’s Fund’ (CCF), as it then was, claiming it was not ‘Christian 
enough’. Although it is not clear that it was related to the MinistryWatch.com 
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charge, a few years later, in 2009, CCF dropped the ‘Christian’ nomenclature 
and became ChildFund International, ‘simultaneously opening itself up to new, 
nonfaith-based funding while cutting itself off from the marketing advantages of 
wider religious branding’ (Hopgood and Vinjamuri 2012).
World Vision also works closely at the UN with avowedly secular child-
focused development agencies, for example Plan International.3 Plan Interna-
tional was founded in 1937 as a secular child-protection agency ‘with a mission 
to promote and protect the rights of children’. Its founders were a British journal-
ist, John Langdon-Davies, and a refugee worker, Eric Muggeridge. Their original 
aim was ‘to provide food, accommodation and education to children whose lives 
had been disrupted by the Spanish Civil War’ (Plan International 2016). Finally, 
SOS Children’s Villages was founded by Hermann Gmeiner in 1949 in Imst, 
Austria, to give ‘long-term care to children who had lost their homes or families 
in the Second World War’. Unlike World Vision and ChildFund International, 
SOS Children’s Villages was and is ‘non-denominational’, an apolitical charity 
which ‘respects the religions and cultures of the local community’ (SOS Chil-
dren’s Villages).
The scholarly literature on FBOs was recently comprehensively surveyed by 
Heist and Cnaan (2016) and Ware et al. (2016). Heist and Cnaan (2016) report that 
some scholars believe that there is a generic ‘faith-based’ sector involved in inter-
national development, distinct and separate from a ‘secular’ sector. Ware et al.’s 
comprehensive survey of how ‘faith’ is perceived to shape development-focused 
FBOs, such as World Vision, shows however that ‘faith’ is actually a rather flex-
ible notion, employed to a lesser or greater extent depending on the context one is 
referring to, including the UN. Hopgood and Vinjamuri (2012, p. 45) contend that 
‘[b]y controlling resources, defining access requirements and monitoring ongoing 
operations, the United Nations . . . exert[s] a dramatic effect on the organizational 
structures and branding choices’ that FBOs, such as World Vision, make. Many 
FBOs, including World Vision, are somewhat dependent on public donors, such as 
governments and aid agencies. As Table 4.1 shows, in 2015 World Vision received 
just over half of its income (56.9%) from ‘private cash donations’, $255 million 
from ‘gifts-in-kind’, $172 million (17.2%) from ‘public grants’ and $4 million 
from ‘other income’. This indicates that while more than 80% of World Vision’s 
Table 4.1 World Vision operating revenue, 2013–2015
Operating Revenue (in $ millions) 2013 2014 2015
Private cash contributions 599 600 571
Public grants (food and cash) 179 195 172
Gifts-in-kind 196 232 255
Other income, net 7 8 4
Total operating revenue 981 1,035 1,002
Source: World Vision 2013–2015.
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income comes from non-governmental sources, the amount received annually 
from public sources is significant for its overall income.
Indeed, as Hopgood and Vinjamuri note, ‘the size of their global operations 
would be unsustainable without this [public] funding’. In the US, for example, 
World Vision receives ‘substantial sums of USAID money’ (Hopgood and Vin-
jamuri 2012). What this implies is that while drawing on both public funds and 
private donations is strategically and financially wise, it also suggests that to con-
tinue to receive funding from both sources it is essential to be ‘secular’ enough to 
receive funding from public bodies, such as USAID, while also being sufficiently 
‘Christian’ to continue to receive donations from individual Christians who sup-
port World Vision with hundreds of millions of dollars a year annually because 
of its Christian values. Barnett (2012, p. 207) reports that ‘one long-time staff 
member’ of World Vision put it in the following way: World Vision ‘is “con-
stantly taking its temperature”, by which he meant the [World Vision] staff were 
always wondering about the relationship between their religious values and their 
mandates’.
In the early 2000s, World Vision addressed this issue head on, undertaking a 
wide-ranging review to ascertain what, if anything, is ‘Christian’ about develop-
ment. Justin Byworth – at the time Coordinator of Development Programming, 
Development Resources Team, World Vision – argued that World Vision’s devel-
opment work should be consistently characterised by ‘transformational devel-
opment’ (Byworth 2003).The notion of ‘transformational development’ brings 
together both ‘objective’ developmental ‘best practice’ and World Vision’s foun-
dational Christian values and beliefs. In other words, ‘transformational develop-
ment’ is conceived of by World Vision ‘in terms of both developmental “best 
practice” and the Christian values and beliefs taken to frame the work of the 
organisation’ (Wet 2011, p. 10; also see Wet 2013). For a useful general discus-
sion of ‘transformational development’, see (Meyers 2011 and cf. Freeman in this 
volume).
The evidence in this chapter bears out (Whaites 1999) assessment that World 
Vision’s transformation at the UN – from tiny, humanitarian assistance entity 
70 years ago to large, global development agency today – was characterised by 
pragmatic development of a ‘fusion of mainstream Christianity and the pursuit of 
the concept of partnership’, with various secular and faith-based, state and non-
state, entities. Hopgood and Vinjamuri (2012, p. 37), contend that World Vision 
‘has thrived because of, not despite, its religious credentials. Its field operations 
are in line with secular humanitarian norms, but it raises much of its cash and 
motivates its work and staff on a religious basis’ (emphasis added).
How does World Vision manage to square their faith principles with the secu-
lar principles of the UN and work sustainably in partnerships and networks fea-
turing UN agencies, governments and civil society actors, many of which are 
secular? (Mueller 2016). Many FBOs are interested in development in the Global 
South, as it is an issue intimately tied to many theological interpretations of the 
world and how to improve it. It may well be that such faith characteristics are 
conducive to intra-faith responses to humanitarian crisis and more generally to 
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development issues. Kevin Jenkins, World Vision President and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), points to,
Common threads that run through all major belief systems. . . [and] draw 
us together. Important foundations like the ‘Golden Rule of reciprocity and 
respect’ offer a practical basis for how to engage with others: (1) to do good 
to the widow and orphan, (2) to welcome the homeless stranger, and (3) to 
treat the sick, and feed the hungry.
(Jenkins 25 September 2015)
Peter Howard, a senior employee of a Christian FBO, Emergency Response, 
argues that six characteristics strengthen what he calls ‘faith-driven humanitari-
anism’: (1) sacredness of life, ‘Faith inherently understands the sacredness, dig-
nity and transcendence of each person’; (2) presence, ‘Faith brings to bear one 
of the strongest and most sustainable local and global networks’; (3) conscience: 
‘Faith communities are advocates for the poor and most vulnerable in humanitar-
ian response’; (4) hope, ‘Faith has a redemptive narrative of hope in the midst of 
suffering’; (5) mercy, ‘Faith brings a theology of Forgiveness and Mercy which 
can stop cycles of violence’; and (6) charity, ‘Faith brings values based sustain-
able giving vs tax based (or forced giving)’. At the same time, Howard acknowl-
edges that many donor governments as well as UN agencies – and more generally 
what he calls ‘the secular international community’ – distrust or are suspicious of 
‘people of faith in the humanitarian community’ (Howard 2015, p. 2). Howard 
argues that to counter ‘the international community’s fear of proselytism and the 
challenge of our own constituencies who may engage in humanitarian work for 
the purpose of conversion’, faith actors must ‘speak the language of the inter-
national community’ (Howard 2015, p. 3). In this respect, (Howard 2015, p. 3) 
points to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, as an example of such language, a code 
which World Vision explicitly adheres to in its humanitarian and development 
work in the Global South. The Code specifies that aid must be ‘given regardless 
of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction 
of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone’. This obvi-
ously implies that aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious 
standpoint. However, Benthall (2012, p. 67) contends that ‘whereas some Chris-
tian NGOs such as Christian Aid and CAFOD (the British arm of Caritas Inter-
nationalis) explicitly avoid any proselytism, there is some ambiguity in the case 
of the more Evangelically inspired Christian NGOS such as Tearfund and World 
Vision’. However, despite Benthall’s claim, both Tearfund and World Vision are 
members of the Disasters Emergency Committee in London which means that 
they necessarily adhere to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Code of Conduct. A key 
principle of this Code is non-discrimination and provision of services on the sole 
basis of need. At the same time, it may well be that in the field some World Vision 
employees, who are very often committed Christians, may take the opportunity to 
talk up the virtues of Christianity in the course of their work.4
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On the other hand, evidence indicates that in its work at community level, 
World Vision does not discriminate in favour of Christians to the detriment of 
those of other faiths. For example, World Vision works in many environments 
where Christians are in a decided minority, including Palestine, Niger and South 
Sudan. For example, World Vision is active among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 
where only about 6% of Palestinians are Christian and the great majority – around 
93% – are Sunni Muslims. However, World Vision’s presence and work in Pales-
tine is controversial. This is not because it disproportionately aids minority Chris-
tian Palestinians to the detriment of the Muslim majority. Rather, World Vision’s 
presence is controversial because, it is claimed by conservative, right-wing evan-
gelical Christians from the US and elsewhere, that it is anti-Israel. In addition, 
World Vision is heavily involved in current efforts to rebuild Syria after the civil 
war, a country with a tiny and declining Christian community (BBC News 2015).
However, this does not imply that World Vision condones employees’  unofficial, 
grassroots-level Christian proselytisation. Officially, World Vision adopts rights-
based, not theologically orientated, language in the context of its work in inter-
national development, including at the UN. Recently, World Vision outlined its 
‘human rights-based approach to the implementation of policies and programmes 
to reduce and eliminate preventable mortality and morbidity of children under 
5 years of age’ (World Vision International 2016c, p. 1; see also: UNICEF 2012). 
Working closely with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the World Health Organisation, as well as various governments, non-state actors 
and civil society, World Vision explicitly expressed its strategies and goals in the 
language of rights, not theology, to provide ‘input and consultation on best prac-
tices and programming in reducing and eliminating mortality and morbidity of 
children under 5 years of age’ (UNICEF 2012).
In a recent ‘Background Paper’, written for the World Vision Institute of Frie-
drichsdorf, Germany, Laura Schelenz points to the desirability of including all 
members of a community – not only those who adhere to a certain religious faith – 
in order to reduce ‘discontent and frustration’ and lead ‘to more harmonious and 
healthy community life. A rights-based approach to development as supported by 
World Vision and many other NGOs is therefore important for the development of 
communities, countries, and regions’ (Schelenz 2016, p. 11). Typically, in the con-
text of the MDGs and SDGs, UN initiatives bring together both faith-based and 
secular actors in pursuit of shared goals, related to improved wellbeing for women 
and children in the Global South. What motivates the partners in such develop-
ment initiatives is shared commitment to improving health of children and women 
in the Global South, while reducing men’s violence against them. Perhaps the only 
language which is possible to combine activities of both faith-based and secular 
actors in this endeavour is rights-based. According to Schelenz (2016, p. 6), World 
Vision draws its inspiration from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
promulgated in 1989. Overall, World Vision explicitly acknowledges both the 
necessity and value of a human rights – based approach ‘to reducing preventable 
child illness and deaths. World Vision claims to be ‘fully committed to addressing 
determinants of child health and nutrition by focusing on health programming, 
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advocacy, accountability and by empowering children’s participation in decision-
making’ (World Vision 2016, p. 2). Finally, World Vision claims that ‘[c]onsistent 
with our policies, programmes and principles as a Christian organisation, we will 
continue to invest more smartly, to foster and share information and knowledge, 
and to grow partnerships with anyone who believes in ensuring the most vulner-
able stay healthy’ (World Vision International 2016a).
In sum, while World Vision undoubtedly began as an explicitly Christian-
focused agency seven decades ago, over time it has significantly widened the 
focus of its work, both in scope and territorially, including at the UN; today, 
World Vision seeks to assist children – as well as women and adolescents – of 
any faith or none. World Vision appears to work via a rights-based approach to 
advocate for the interests of children and women in the Global South. The faith of 
recipients of its assistance does not appear to be an important issue when assisting 
those in need.
In the next section, we assess the development work of World Vision at the UN 
and see how it manages to work with an array of faith-based and secular partners 
in pursuit of development goals. Given its foundational Christian philosophy and 
values, how does World Vision manage to work with such a range of such actors, 
some of which do not identify with World Vision’s Christian values, including UN 
agencies and a Muslim FBO, Islamic Relief, which in recent years has become an 
important partner with World Vision in several parts of the world? In short, how 
does World Vision resolve the issue of working with non-Christian entities at the 
UN? Whaites (1999) suggests that, first, World Vision is primarily results orien-
tated, necessarily pragmatic and practically orientated when seeking to achieve 
its development-focused goals. Second, he avers that World Vision is aware that 
when working in partnerships with various state and non-state actors at the UN, 
that it is not realistic or sensible or good policy to seek to adhere openly or rigidly 
to Christian-focused and Christian-informed goals. This is because the UN is a 
very secular entity, where faith is customarily treated with suspicion or hostility 
(Haynes 2014).
World Vision at the UN: global advocacy  
for children’s development
The development of secularism at the UN followed a long process of secularisa-
tion which was once almost universally understood to be ‘irreversible, equated 
with modernization and progress. Religious institutions seemed to have lost much 
of their influence. Religion had little or no visible role in international relations’, 
including in relation to development (ACT Alliance 2015, p. 1). While this might 
accurately describe the position at the UN in the first decades of its existence, 
in recent years both UN agencies and governments, in seeking to address press-
ing issues such as ‘poverty, development, crisis, and conflict’ increasingly rely 
on ‘non-governmental’, including faith-based, ‘humanitarian relief and develop-
ment organizations as partners and primary actors in meeting humanitarian needs 
worldwide’ (ACT Alliance 2015, p. 2).
94 Jeffrey Haynes
Recent years have seen significant involvement of various FBOs – including, 
World Vision, Religions for Peace, Caritas Internationalis and Islamic Relief – in 
international humanitarian and development work, including in the context of the 
MDGs and SDGs (Haynes 2007, 2013; Barnett and Stein 2012). FBOs at the UN 
work on specific issues, including: reducing infant and maternal mortality, provid-
ing universal primary education, reducing adult illiteracy and arresting the spread 
of HIV/AIDS (Haynes 2014). The UN is a favoured environment to pursue these 
concerns because of its role as a focal point of global public policy and its unique 
environment, one where governments, UN agencies, NGOs and FBOs can get 
together, consult and work with each other both informally and formally.5 In this 
section, we examine and account for World Vision’s strategy and activities at the 
UN. Second, we survey World Vision’s partnerships with both FBOs and INGOs 
to highlight common ground when it comes to pursuing shared objectives, includ-
ing child-protection and the advancement of children’s rights.
The UN’s focus on international development was given both emphasis and 
momentum by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which ran from 
2000 to 2015. During that time, the UN became a key focus of the international 
community’s efforts to improve development outcomes in impoverished coun-
tries in the Global South, especially for the most vulnerable people – including, 
women and children. Like many other NGOs and FBOs, during the MDGs, World 
Vision focused much attention on its eight core goals of the MDGs.6 When the 
MDGs came to an end in 2015, the UN adopted new, ambitious and wide-ranging 
objectives – the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – to be achieved during 
2015–2030.7 The SDGs build on the MDGs – yet they are notably more compre-
hensive and wide-ranging, with a global focus and emphasis on environmentally 
sustainable development, centred on building partnerships between governments, 
UN agencies and civil society, including FBOs and NGOs as well as business 
actors (2015). World Vision ‘believes that sustainable development starts and 
ends with healthy, nourished and well-educated children free from all forms of 
violence – and the SDGs represent an unprecedented opportunity to get us there 
within a generation’ (World Vision 2016, p. 1).
In the 2000s, the MDGs and SDGs followed economically liberal structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs were ubiquitous in the Global South in 
the 1980s and 1990s, championed by several UN agencies, including the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, despite huge ideological and 
financial commitment from both the World Bank and the IMF, SAPs were a wide-
spread and egregious failure, which led to strong critiques from secular develop-
ment INGOs and FBOs, including World Vision (Haynes 2007). The WCC, an 
ecumenical body of Protestant and Orthodox churches, accused the World Bank 
and the IMF of promoting and supporting an ideologically driven and narrowly 
economistic conception of development via SAPs, which crucially lacked a holis-
tic focus on human and spiritual development (Joshi et al. 2013). Some FBOs, and 
single bodies of churches, including the WCC and World Vision, wanted to see a 
shift away from state and market-led approaches to a broader, more holistic, con-
ception of human and spiritual development, to build improved outcomes through 
World Vision, ‘Christian values’ at the UN 95
close working with a variety of partners, not only governments. The FBOs wanted 
to see more involvement from civil society and, more generally, increased grass-
roots participation with the goal to qualitatively enhance the lives of the poor-
est and most vulnerable, especially women and children. To pursue this radically 
different vision of development, some development-orientated FBOs, including 
World Vision, became ‘legitimate actors in the field of development and humani-
tarian aid’ (Jones and Petersen 2011, p. 2). In pursuit of this goal, the World Bank 
had a change of emphasis. The World Bank’s authoritative study, Voices of the 
Poor (World Bank 2000), highlighted the importance of enhanced engagement of 
FBOs in development. The World Bank’s approach in this regard was built upon 
the understanding that many people in the countries of the Global South have 
more trust and confidence in their religious leaders than in secular leaders, includ-
ing elected politicians.
To sum up this section so far: development of the MDGs from the late 1990s/
early 2000s, followed by the SDGs from 2015, together highlighted a new global 
public policy focus on civil society involvement in development, including that of 
FBOs. This followed widespread failure of SAPs in the Global South in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The aim henceforward was to develop government and non-state part-
nerships to devise ways to try to achieve better international development out-
comes. We shall see in the next section of the chapter how World Vision engages 
with a changed development focus via its advocacy work for deprived children at 
the UN in partnership with other agencies.
World Vision has a significant and active presence at the UN, working closely 
with UN agencies, including the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the 
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Women and the World Health Organisation. 
It also works closely with a network of NGOs, including Save the Children, Child 
Fund Alliance, Pan International and SOS Children’s Villages, and FBOs, includ-
ing a Muslim FBO, Islamic Relief. In early 2016, Arelys Bellorini, World Vision 
Senior Advisor on Advocacy and Partnerships, commented that,
Here in New York, we have a very strong partnership with other child-focused 
organisations. . . . We work with Save the Children, we work with ChildFund 
Alliance [sic], Plan International, SOS Children’s Villages. We work with 
them because they have an office [in New York]. So, if there were other child-
focused organisations who have offices, we would also work with them. But 
they have a representation here. So these groups were working together on 
the post-2015 [SDGs]. And every time there are major children’s issues that 
we want to raise, we come together.8
World Vision’s significant current involvement in development issues at the UN is 
framed and contextualised by the MDGs and SDGs (Boehle 2010). This is man-
ifested, first, in growing involvement in UN-related development programmes 
and, second, in participation in international networks of state and various non-
state actors, both faith-based and secular, in pursuit of development goals, espe-
cially those related to the improved well being of women and children. Third, 
96 Jeffrey Haynes
the growth in concern with child-focused development outcomes was captured 
in the SDGs, which sought to expand and extend goals of international develop-
ment outcomes as key components of international activities to reduce conflict 
and improve outcomes related to peace, co-operation and prosperity, especially in 
the Global South. In summary, World Vision’s current activities at the UN focus 
on 6 of the 17 SDGs, as noted in Table 4.2.
World Vision employs four main strategies at international fora, including the 
UN: ‘Partnerships, alliances and coalitions’, ‘Lobbying and direct engagement 
with decision makers’, ‘Media and communications for public influence’ and 
‘Children’s and youth participation’. Next, we examine World Vision’s strate-
gies in these respects by focusing on two current UN-coordinated campaigns: 
Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health and The Global Partnership 
to End Violence against Children. The overall aim is to identify the tactics and 
approaches World Vision utilises in order to pursue its activities at the UN, as it 
engages with governments, UN agencies and INGOs/FBOs in the context of the 
SDG-related goals. World Vision works from the premise that it is important to 
ensure that the voices of children are regularly and prominently heard in debates 
about development and the best ways to achieve improved outcomes for children, 
as shown in Table 4.3.
The Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health
The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, established a major new initiative, 
Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health, in September 2010 during 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Summit. Following the tran-
sition to SDGs in 2015–2016, the initiative was relaunched in order to pursue 
objectives with renewed vigour and commitment, as well as new commitments, 
new partnerships, new money and new impetus.
The Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health brings together gov-
ernments, UN agencies and INGOs/FBOs to pursue improved development 
outcomes for women and children in the Global South. World Vision and sev-
eral other INGOs/FBOs are centrally involved in the Global Strategy. In addi-
tion, several UN agencies have leading roles in the network: the UN Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) and UN Women. By 2016, the Global Strategy had attracted over 
‘$25 billion in initial commitments from over 120 organisations and over 40 gov-
ernments’. It sought to achieve two main outcomes: (1) to create ‘a roadmap to 
end all preventable deaths for women, children and adolescents, and [to] ensure 
that they not only survive, but also thrive and transform the world’, and (2) to 
‘present an accountability framework and mechanism that will align and help 
track progress of the related Sustainable Development Goals, highlight the ben-
efits of innovation while stressing that countries are in the driver’s seat and young 
people, at the heart of the Sustainable Development Goals’ (Every Woman Every 
Child 20 January 2016, pp. 1–2).
Table 4.2 Sustainable Development Goals: improved outcomes for children
Sustainable Development 
Goal
Specific area to be improved
Good health and 
wellbeing (SDG 3)
‘Good health and well-being’: ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all
Quality education  
(SDG 4)
4.7 – By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge 
and skills needed to promote sustainable development, 
including, among others, through education for sustainable 
development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, 
gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-
violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural 
diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable 
development
4.a – Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, 
disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, 
inclusive and effective learning environments for all
Gender equality (SDG 5)
5.2 – Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and 
girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking 
and sexual and other types of exploitation
5.3 – Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and 
forced marriage and female genital mutilation
Sustainable cities and 
communities (SDG 11)
‘Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’
Peace and justice, strong 
institutions (SDG 16)
16.1 – Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related 
death rates everywhere
16.2 – End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of 
violence against and torture of children
16.3 – Promote the rule of law at the national and 
international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
16.9 – By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth 
registration
16.a – Strengthen relevant national institutions, including 
through international cooperation, for building capacity at 
all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent 
violence and combat terrorism and crime
Partnerships for the goals 
(SDG 17)
17 – Strengthen ‘the means of implementation and 
revitalization of the global partnership for sustainable 
development’. Emphasises that SDGs ‘can only be realized 
with a strong commitment to global partnership and 
cooperation.’
Source: Sustainable Development Goals 2015.
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In 2010, World Vision committed $1.5 billion over the next five years to the 
Global Strategy to support ‘a family and community model of health care deliv-
ery’ (World Vision International 2016a). In 2016, World Vision announced a fur-
ther major financial pledge to support the Global Strategy: ‘$3 billion between 
2016 and 2020’ – that is, an average of $600 million a year – to improve ‘sustaina-
ble health programming, humanitarian emergency responses, operational research 
and advocacy at all levels’ (World Vision International 2016c). World Vision’s 
2016 financial investment was especially focused on pursuing its policy of ‘com-
munity empowerment and local-level advocacy’ (World Vision International 
2016c, p. 1). In addition to these major financial commitments, World Vision also 
worked in pursuit of the Global Strategy at the community level in many countries 
in the Global South. By 2016, World Vision claimed to have ‘inspired 20 million 
people in 70 countries to join us in speaking on behalf of women’s and children’s 
health through [their] Child Health Now campaign’, which saw many national 
Table 4.3  World Vision’s advocacy at the UN and at the country level in pursuit of child- 
and women-focused goals




notably the United 
Nations
‘Global Strategy for Women’s 
and Children’s Health’ and 
‘Global Partnership to End 
Violence against Children’.




notably the United 
Nations
‘Global Strategy for Women’s 
and Children’s Health’ and 





Within countries ‘Citizen Voice and Action’ 
approach and the ‘Citizens’ 
Hearings’ model, related to 
women’s and children’s issues.
Popular mobilisation Within countries World Vision’s annual ‘Global 
Week of Action’, which takes 
place in over 70 countries. 
Its purpose is to demonstrate 
public commitment to 






notably the United 
Nations
‘Global Strategy for Women’s 
and Children’s Health’ and 
‘Global Partnership to End 
Violence against Children’.
Children’s and youth 
participation
International fora, 
notably the United 
Nations
‘Global Strategy for Women’s 
and Children’s Health’ and 
‘Global Partnership to End 
Violence against Children’.
Source: World Vision International (2016c).
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policies and practices improved as a result. In addition, World Vision is in the 
process of training ‘100,000 community health workers’, and strengthening its 
‘citizen engagement’, inter alia, by establishing a ‘BabyWASH multi-stakeholder 
partnership’9 and by mobilising ‘around 300,000 faith leaders . . . in 50 countries’ 
(World Vision International 2016a, p. 1).
World Vision’s work in pursuit of improved outcomes for women and chil-
dren in the context of the MDGs was explicitly recognised by the UN Secretary- 
General, Ban Ki-moon in 2010. Ban praised World Vision ‘as a partner of the 
United Nations’ emphasising that
in many countries, World Vision has worked tirelessly to save lives, and bring 
hope through development assistance and emergency relief. . . . You have 
made significant contributions towards reducing child mortality, improving 
maternal health, and combating AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
(Secretary General 2010)
Later, in January 2016 during the introduction of the SDGs, Ban Ki-moon 
announced the Global Strategy’s 15-member High Level Advisory group, which 
was tasked by the UN Secretary-General to provide leadership and to help inspire 
action for women’s, children’s and adolescents’ health during the transition from 
the MDGs to the universal SDGs agenda. Ban Ki-moon averred that,
Women, children and adolescents are at the heart of the 2030 Agenda. Con-
tinued commitment, leadership and action will be critical to achieving our 
goal of ending all preventable deaths of women, children and adolescents by 
2030 and enabling them to reach their full potential.
(Every Woman Every Child 20 January 2016, p. 1)
Chief Executive Officer and President of World Vision, Kevin Jenkins, was 
named among the High Level Advisory Group’s members. Jenkins had previously 
‘served on the Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and 
Children’s Health in 2011’. Other members of the High Level Advisory Group 
included serving and former government ministers, heads of international organi-
sations and business figures. Jenkins was the only member of the High Level 
Advisory Group from an FBO. In addition to Jenkins, the High Level Advisory 
Group included the ‘Head of the Agency Chair of the H6 (formerly known as 
H4+)’, a joint effort comprising several UN agencies (that is, UNFPA, UNAIDS, 
UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, and the World Bank) to address reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health. The H6 serves as the lead techni-
cal partners for the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ 
Health (Every Woman Every Child 20 January 2016, p. 2).
Initial appointments to the High Level Advisory Group were for a year, during 
which its members were scheduled to meet twice to report on progress, key chal-
lenges and provide recommendations on issues such as financing, accountability 
and implementation of the Global Strategy. In addition, the High Level Advisory 
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Group was to advise the UN Secretary-General in relation to the Global Strategy 
and link its work to that of other relevant advocacy and advisory groups to encour-
age collaboration and integration within the relevant areas of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (see Table 4.2).
In conclusion, a key goal of the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and 
Adolescents’ Health is to improve wellbeing of these vulnerable groups in the 
Global South. In 2016, the SDGs provide a focus and opportunity to develop 
the Global Strategy via a network of state and non-state groups, focused on the 
UN. In addition to the Global Strategy, the SDGs also helped stimulate a similar 
campaign and network devoted to reducing violence against children, widely rec-
ognised as a key factor in undermining children’s health in the Global South. This 
initiative, the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children, is another 
good example of a partnership between various state and non-state actors which 
use the UN as the focal point of their activities, in order to deal with developmen-
tal shortfalls affecting millions of children in the Global South. It indicates that 
World Vision does not feel the need to wear its Christian values ‘on its sleeve’ 
when undertaking development work at the UN with an array of state and non-
state, faith-based and secular actors, working to overcome development shortfalls 
affecting children in the Global South.
The Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children
The world’s governments set ambitious targets to end violence against children 
by 2030 as part of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Global Partnership 
to End Violence Against Children was founded to ‘provide a platform for leaders 
from all sectors who are prepared to stand up for children’s rights to live a life 
free from fear of violence’. Working through the Global Partnership, governments 
and non-state organisations can pool their resources and expertise to accelerate 
progress toward the stated goal.
As part of the new sustainable development agenda, governments will make 
a commitment to ensuring that all people live in peaceful, just and inclusive 
societies. They will set ambitious targets to be delivered by 2030, in order to 
deliver the vision of a world where every child grows up free from violence 
and exploitation. The Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children 
will help deliver this vision.
(World Vision International 2016d)
Like the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health, the 
Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children is an initiative that brings 
together various governments, UN agencies, international organisations, INGOs 
and FBOs, the private sector and children themselves. The key partners in the 
initiative from the UN are: UNICEF, WHO, UN Women, UNFPA and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The INGO/FBO par-
ticipants are: ChildFund Alliance, Plan International, Save the Children, SOS 
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Children’s Villages, World Vision and Elevate Children Fund, plus ‘various foun-
dations, private sector, leaders of faith, children and young people’ (Partnerships 
for the SDGs 2016).
Referring to the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children, Cathy 
Turner, World Vision UK’s Child Rights Policy Manager, stated that: ‘The scourge 
of child abuse destroys children’s lives in every corner of the world [and] protect-
ing children has long been a core part [of the work of World Vision]’. Turner 
promised that World Vision would continue to play a leading role in ‘the drive 
to end violence against children. The UK Government has set the right example 
with a new fund to tackle transnational internet child abuse’ (World Vision Inter-
national 2016d and interview with Cathy Turner).10
Government ministers from Sweden, Mexico, Indonesia and Tanzania com-
mitted their governments to developing explicit and detailed plans to combat vio-
lence against children in their countries. The aim was to tackle and deal with 
behaviours and traditions that further violence, as well as seeking to make schools 
and state institutions safe for all children, while strengthening and improving data 
collection about violence and children. The four governments were identified to 
be among a small group of ‘pathfinders’. ‘Pathfinders’ are governments that seek 
to be in the vanguard of the design and implementation of novel approaches, such 
as the Global Partnership, which are developed in the context of the SDGs, and in 
this case designed to prevent and respond to violence against children. Pathfinder 
governments aim to be leaders in efforts to respond to and set the lead in dealing 
with violence against children, in order to try to make their country’s children 
safe. In addition, pathfinder governments also seek to ensure that child victims of 
violence are no longer marginalised by the global development agenda. To do this, 
they will ‘confront the many factors that leave children vulnerable to violence, 
assess evidence for what works, and bring together the partners and investment 
needed to make their societies safer’. Finally, pathfinders are representative of a 
broad spectrum of countries which would over time aim to take the lead in build-
ing ‘the political will, plans, and partnerships necessary to play a leadership role 
as a “champion for children”. We are convinced, however, that strong country 
ownership and a focus on results and evidence will create a virtuous cycle where 
success breeds further success’ (Partnerships for the SDGs 2016).
During the first five years of the initiative (2016–2020), efforts are to be 
devoted to ‘generating sufficient data to establish trends in pathfinder countries, 
and addressing gaps in the evidence for the violence prevention building blocks’ 
(Partnerships for the SDGs 2016). During 2016, the Global Partnership exam-
ined the potential for launching several global initiatives in order to demonstrate 
the potential for introducing and spreading pioneering approaches to the preven-
tion of violence against children. The aim was to share relevant knowledge via a 
‘Solutions Summit’, to be held in 2017, which would also be the starting point of 
a regular forum for both state and non-state actors, including UN agencies, FBOs 
and INGOs, working to end violence against children in the context of the SDGs. 
In short, the Global Partnership aimed to produce a coordination mechanism and 
governance structure which would offer an opportunity for both state and non-state 
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actors engaged in efforts to end violence against children to come together, link 
up their efforts and seek as a result to maximise individual impacts via collec-
tive actions. The Global Partnership aimed specifically to bring together states 
and non-state actors in the understanding that various entities working together 
could make a stronger and more focused collective endeavour with the potential 
to have more clout and influence than if working separately. While each of these 
stakeholders could make a valuable individual contribution, and while it is recog-
nised that many entities, both state and non-state, are already working to eliminate 
violence against children, the Global Partnership works on the premise that such 
efforts have not in the past been well coordinated and supported, while few if any 
were universal in scope. In addition, it is envisaged that the Global Partnership’s 
national and global added-value would emanate from its multi-sectoral convening 
and coordinating role, providing a space at both national and global levels where 
different actors from different sectors, state and non-state, faith-based and secular, 
can combine efforts to achieve common goals focused on ending violence against 
children in the context of the SDGs. The emphasis is on developing, assessing 
and sharing solutions, to seek to ensure that preventing violence against children 
becomes a global policy priority during the SDGs period.
In conclusion, the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children is 
likely to succeed only if participants, state and non-state, faith-based and secular, 
are able to work together to rise above current sectoral and disciplinary bound-
aries which historically have tended to reduce the impact and potency of such 
endeavours. Participants in the Global Partnership agreed that the SDGs provided 
an excellent opportunity to pool efforts for greater effectiveness while also con-
curring that solutions to violence against children can only be delivered at scale 
if the energies, skills and resources of all parts of society are harnessed. This 
implies a necessity of reaching out to all those who work for children, either 
professionally or on a voluntary basis, whether from government, civil society, 
or the private sector. In addition, it is crucial to build and strengthen networks 
involving all participants working to end violence against children, to include 
those working to reduce conflict and strengthen fragile societies and those whose 
efforts seek to strengthen justice systems and other institutions. Overall, the work 
of all interested parties, secular and faith-based, state and non-state, needs to be 
well coordinated and focused to achieve its objectives.
In this section, we have seen the importance of World Vision’s engagement 
with governments, UN agencies and INGOs/FBOs in pursuit of objectives linked 
to the SDGs. But how does World Vision work at the UN? What strategies and 
tactics does it employ there in order to pursue campaigns in which it is signifi-
cantly involved, such as the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Ado-
lescents’ Health and the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children? 
The next section examines what World Vision does at the UN to pursue its objec-
tives in relation to these two campaigns. We will see that, on the one hand, this 
involves ‘partnerships, alliances and coalitions’ and ‘lobbying and direct engage-
ment with decision makers’. On the other hand, in order to express ‘children’s and 
youth participation’ and ‘media and communications for public influence’, it also 
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involves World Vision explicitly adopting tactics to achieve maximum impact in 
these respects.
‘Side events’ at the United Nations:  
children’s development and the SDGs
What approaches does World Vision employ at the UN to pursue its goal of 
improved development outcomes for children in the Global South?11 A key role 
of the World Vision staff in New York, housed in a building a few hundred metres 
from the UN, is to organise what are known as ‘side events’, in order to pursue 
improved development outcomes for children in the context of the MDGs and 
SDGs. Below, we look briefly at three of these recent events, in order to see how 
World Vision facilitates ‘children’s and youth participation’ and ‘media and com-
munications for public influence’.
The main focal point of World Vision’s public and media-related activities at 
the UN are ‘side events’. Side events are ‘activities organized outside the formal 
programme of the session of the Commission, [providing] an excellent oppor-
tunity for Member States, UN entities and NGOs to discuss themes of common 
interest the Commission and other critical gender equality issues’ (Side Events 
2016). There are two kinds of side events. First, Permanent Missions to the UN 
and UN entities, such as UN agencies, are permitted to hold side events on UN 
premises. Second, INGO/FBOs may also organise side events, although they 
must be held outside United Nations premises, often taking place in the Church 
Center (located at the intersection of 44th Street and First Avenue, across from the 
UN Secretariat building). Subject to space availability, any INGO/FBO, including 
World Vision alone or in partnership with others, may organise and attend these 
events. Because side events taking place within the UN itself are probably more 
likely to attract much media attention compared to those which take place outside 
the UN building, INGOs/FBOs will often seek co-organisers among Permanent 
Missions and UN entities, so that the event can take place within the UN itself.
The first side event we shall note was entitled: ‘Amplifying the voices of chil-
dren’. World Vision and Plan International co-organised the event to provide a 
forum for children to call for the inclusion of young people’s voices in post-2015 
development decisions. It took place during the afternoon of 24 September 2013 
at the Instituto Cervantes New York, a building close to UN headquarters. The 
event took place within the context of a wider initiative at the UN, when ‘chil-
dren from around the world’ had gathered in New York to ‘demand leaders at 
the United Nations General Assembly take seriously their views on what should 
follow the Millennium Development Goals.’ The event brought together delega-
tions of children from nine countries from the Global South, who claimed to be 
representative of children demanding a voice in decision-making, including at the 
UN.12 As World Vision noted, ‘Children and young people represent 43% of the 
world’s population, but their voices are regularly excluded from decisions that 
affect them’ (World Vision International 2013). World Vision’s Executive Advisor 
on Child Rights, Corina Villacorta added that: ‘One in every three people in the 
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world is under age 18. In many countries, children and young people make up half 
of the population. And it is children who are more vulnerable and less able to cope 
with the damaging effects of poverty’ (World Vision International 2013).
The World Vision/Plan International side event aimed to build on the momen-
tum of the youth takeover at the UN in July 2013 led by Malala Yousafzai, and 
subsequent participation of youth delegations at the High-Level Panel on Post-
2015 events held in the United Kingdom, Liberia and Indonesia. The success of 
these events led two High-Level Panel members to call on the UN Secretary Gen-
eral to support a Youth High-Level Panel on Post-2015, a proposal that will be 
discussed at the General Assembly.
The second side event was held on 5 February 2014 and entitled ‘A World 
without Violence against Children’. It took place at UN headquarters in New York 
and was organised in the context of the eighth session of the inter-governmental 
Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. It was co-hosted by the 
governments of Canada and Paraguay, co-organised with six ‘child-focused agen-
cies’ – ChildFund Alliance, Plan International, Save the Children, SOS Children’s 
Villages International, UNICEF and World Vision International – and endorsed by 
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Violence against Children, the 
African Child Policy Forum, Child Protection in Crisis, End Child Prostitution in 
Asian Tourism, the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 
Global Movement for Children and Terre des Hommes International Federation. 
The six child-focused agencies involved in the side event were already work-
ing together to advocate for child-focused issues in the post-2015 development 
agenda. They worked collectively in pursuit of the following goals: (1) eradicat-
ing all forms of extreme poverty, (2) tackling inequalities, (3) stopping all forms 
of violence against children and (4) ensuring locally led and transparent mecha-
nisms for monitoring progress and ensuring accountability (MacDonald 2014).
The aim of the side event was to focus media attention and serve as a communi-
cation medium for public influence in order to proclaim and highlight that: ‘Every 
child has the right to live and thrive in a safe and caring family environment, free 
from all forms of violence’ (MacDonald 2014). It was billed as ‘an important 
opportunity to bring the prevention and response to violence against children to 
the debate around the next generation of development goals, and ensure focus, 
investment, commitment and results for children in every country – because 
nowhere in the world are they free from abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence’ 
(MacDonald 2014).
The event was co-chaired by Guillermo Rishchynski, Permanent Representa-
tive of Canada to the United Nations, and by José Antonio Dos Santos, Permanent 
Representative of Paraguay to the United Nations. The meeting was opened by 
the representative of the six child-focused agencies, Jim Emerson, Secretary Gen-
eral of ChildFund Alliance. After welcoming the government co-hosts, the par-
ticipating children and the speakers, Emerson highlighted the pervasive presence 
of violence against children, and the importance of the post-2015 development 
agenda addressing this issue. Emerson emphasised that ‘it’s not just our organiza-
tions saying this. Most importantly, this is a call from children all over the world. 
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Children are asking for an end to physical and humiliating punishment; sexual 
violence and abuse; harmful child work and child marriage; trafficking and other 
harmful practices’. Both Ambassador Rishchynski and Ambassador Dos Santos 
then spoke, responding to Jim Emerson’s concerns and proclaiming their govern-
ments’ continued commitment to the child-focused goals of the SDGs (2014).
Following Jim Emerson and the Permanent Representatives, the next speaker 
was Migena, who joined the meeting via Skype. Migena is a young girl who par-
ticipated in post-2015 consultation in Albania, organised by SOS Children’s Vil-
lages International. Migena stressed the importance of children’s engagement in 
the post-2015 process, and highlighted the need for the next generation of devel-
opment goals to address the different forms of violence, exploitation and abuse 
against children. She pointed out the need to take measures for the protection of 
children from violence, including more awareness-raising about this issue, and 
more periodical control on the part of state agencies in the areas where violence 
occurs. ‘Please use the information we are giving you, to make the change we 
want to see for a better future world’, Migena concluded (2014).
The side event then proceeded via an ‘interactive panel’, moderated by an Al 
Jazeera journalist, Ms. Femi Oke. The panel took place in front of an audience of 
more than 80 people, which included representatives from UN member states, UN 
entities and civil society organisations, including INGOs and FBOs. The panel-
lists answered questions from the audience in New York and online, who engaged 
in the event via Twitter. After the panel, Ms. Diah Saminarsih, from the Office 
of the President’s Special Envoy on Millennium Development Goals, Republic 
of Indonesia, closed the side event. Ms. Saminarsih took the opportunity to reaf-
firm Indonesia’s commitment to women, youth and children’s protection, and to 
the inclusion of children’s protection from violence as a global priority. ‘Let us 
proceed for development without violence’, she concluded (World Vision Inter-
national 2014).
This side event highlights several aspects of the child-focused agenda of the 
SDGs. First, it was an event which brought together members of partnerships, 
alliances and coalitions in order to lobby and enter into direct engagement with 
decision makers both in governments and at the UN. Second, the side event fea-
tured input from children while also being concerned to have a high level of media 
and communications for public influence, via both the audience in New York and 
online via Twitter, as well as by the involvement of Al Jazeera.
Our third example is a side event which took place in March 2015 and its 
follow up a few months later, in June 2015. The aim was to exemplify World 
Vision’s commitment to try to ensure that children’s voices were heard in the run 
up to the SDGs and to highlight the issue for media attention via widespread com-
munication with interested parties. Prior to the March 2015 event, World Vision 
had helped organise two children’s consultation processes, in order publicly to 
consult with vulnerable children on the draft SDGs. The Global Movement for 
Children in Latin America and the Caribbean, of which World Vision is a member 
(along with UNICEF, SOS Children’s Villages, Child Fund, Plan International 
and Save the Children), developed a child-friendly version of the Open Working 
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Group proposal for the SDGs and specific targets. The child-friendly version was 
designed to help children and young people better to understand the 17 proposed 
SDG goals and to enable them to express their views on them. More than 1,000 
children and young people took part in a consultation process on the SDGs in 10 
countries in Latin America, using the child-friendly version, and supported by the 
Global Movement for Children member organisations (World Vision Side Event 
25 March 2015).
Following the consultation process, World Vision organised a side event: ‘Chil-
dren speak out on the Sustainable Development Goals’ (World Vision Side Event 
25 March 2015), which took place on the afternoon of 25 March, 2015, in the UN 
headquarters. The event was moderated by New York – based, Ms. Arelys Bel-
lorini, Senior Advisor-Advocacy and Partnerships, World Vision.13 Attending the 
event were representatives from two Permanent Missions to the UN, those of Bra-
zil and Chile. The side event featured particular inputs from two teenagers, Maria 
Antonio from Brazil and Rodrigo from Chile. Both Maria Antonio and Rodrigo 
spoke about the importance of child-focused goals being pursued with energy and 
vigour in the SDGs. The representatives of the Permanent Missions responded 
by reaffirming their commitment for the inclusion of children in the Post-2015 
Development Agenda. Two INGOs, Save the Children and ATD Fourth Vision, 
also stated their importance for child-focused goals in the SDGs, including in rela-
tion to poverty alleviation and societal inclusion in the SDGs process. Finally, the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against 
Children spoke, urging ‘everyone to hold governments and themselves account-
able for the achievement of the SDGs’.
The March 2015 side event was followed up a few months later, in June 2015, 
when World Vision was involved in facilitating consultation with more than 900 
children and young people on the draft SDG Declaration. This was part of a global 
online consultation organised in 2014–2015 by UNICEF and the ‘World We Want’ 
initiative, which sought to facilitate ‘Dialogues on the implementation of the post-
2015 development agenda’ (United Nations Development Group n.d.). The multi-
stakeholder the ‘World We Want’ children’s consultation was conducted online 
which limited the participation opportunities for the most vulnerable children that 
the SDGs aimed to reach. Within that limiting context, the World Vision consulta-
tions were nevertheless recognised as valuable ‘since they were among the few 
offline consultations with children from rural communities, including from frag-
ile, emergency and conflict settings. World Vision’s consultation is highlighted in 
the final report which was shared with UN Member States before the final SDG 
negotiations’. World Vision’s consultations were done in rural locations in seven 
countries – Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Zambia. More than 300 internally displaced children were con-
sulted on the SDGs in child-friendly spaces in CAR (World Vision International 
2016c; United Nations Human Rights 2016).
The overall importance of the consultation process and the two related side 
events was to highlight and affirm the importance attached to child-focused goals 
in the SDGs by governments, FBOs, INGOs and a UN entity, thus underlining 
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again the importance of partnerships in the pursuit of child-focused goals in the 
SDGs.
This section looked at three side events held at or near the UN in New York 
in 2014–2015. World Vision was centrally involved in each of them. Each of the 
side events took place in the lead up to the SDGs, during the transition from the 
MDGs. Their collective purpose was to hear the voices of ordinary children in 
order to inform government policies in relation to the SDGs and to highlight the 
importance of INGOs and FBOs in that process.
These side events collectively highlight how World Vision works at the UN, 
in order both to focus on its campaigns in relation to children and also, most 
importantly, to try to reduce the distance from what is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘UN bubble’14 to the concerns and travails of ordinary people, including chil-
dren, struggling to do the best for themselves often in very difficult circumstances. 
We saw that World Vision and its partners employ four strategies in the over-
all context of the SDGs and in particular in relation to the Global Strategy for 
Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health and the Global Partnership to End 
Violence Against Children. On the one hand, this involves side events at the UN 
aiming to emphasise and build ‘partnerships, alliances and coalitions’, while also 
allowing ‘lobbying and direct engagement with decision makers’. In addition, 
the importance of allowing to express their concerns is not only for the benefit 
of  decision makers but also to enable the media to highlight their concerns for 
increased  public influence.
Conclusion
The UN’s liberal-secular focus compels all actors at the UN, including World 
Vision and other FBOs which wish to influence debates and discussions, to adopt 
‘appropriate’ UN-sanctioned language in their engagements with UN actors. 
FBOs, such as World Vision, which seek to maximise their influence at the UN 
typically seek to link up with allies – including, other FBOs, secular NGOs and 
friendly governments – which share their ideological but not necessarily theologi-
cal norms, values and beliefs. Some FBOs active at the UN, such as World Vision, 
manage to achieve persistent influence, via regularised and/or institutionalised 
access to opinion formers and decision makers located in friendly governments 
and intergovernmental organisations (for further discussion of these issues, see 
Barnett and Stein 2012; Boehle 2010; Haynes 2014; Schelenz 2016). By feed-
ing its development priorities and notions into the discursive fields of interna-
tional development at the UN, World Vision acts as a development entrepreneur 
(Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume).
The aim of this chapter was to examine the role of a Christian-orientated devel-
opment agency, World Vision at the United Nations, in relation both to its Chris-
tian foundations and its wider partnerships with other development entities, both 
secular and faith-based. The chapter sought to determine the extent to which World 
Vision’s general Christian values encourage the organisation to pursue faith-based 
development goals at the UN, or whether its wider development concerns are for 
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the needy, more generally, irrespective of their faith. To do this, we looked at its 
partnerships and networks with various state and non-state organisations at the 
UN, including governments, UN agencies, secular INGOs and FBOs.
The chapter evinced World Vision’s history and development over the last 
seven decades, since its starting point in 1947. Over time, it has progressed from 
being a very small, explicitly Christian, humanitarian organisation with an inter-
est in children in China alone, to becoming a global development agency with an 
annual income of more than US $1 billion and employing 46,000 people around 
the world. World Vision especially targets individual Christians via its appeals, 
mainly from its website, while also engaging with state and other institutional 
agencies, to seek funding for its child-orientated development activities. Different 
language is used in each context, with notably more ‘Christian-focused’ language 
in its financial appeals to individual donors, compared to the language it employs 
in relation to state and other institutional entities (Tedham 2012). The flexible 
adaptation of its language enable World Vision to successfully moving in differ-
ent discursive fields. The organisation has become an efficient boundary agent 
that bridges diverse discursive fields (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume).
A second key concern of the chapter was to examine why, how and with what 
outcomes World Vision engages with the secular and faith-based, state and non-
state, development community at the UN. We saw that World Vision focuses 
much effort on activities at the UN, using the UN as a focal point of its partner-
ships, alliances and coalitions, as well as a key environment for lobbying and 
direct engagement with decision makers. During the last two decades, in the con-
text of the MDGs and the recent transition to the SDGs, World Vision has been 
centrally involved in organising side events at the UN. We saw that such side 
events are a significant way not only to include children’s and youth participation 
in its activities but also to seek to influence media and communications for public 
influence.
Evidence presented in the chapter suggests that World Vision spends much 
time, energy and significant financial resources at the UN on short-, medium- and 
long-term development needs of the most vulnerable and needy constituencies in 
the Global South: poor women and children. A key outcome of World Vision’s 
financial, organisational and territorial focus over time at the UN is that it appears 
to have the capacity to positively influence development outcomes. While World 
Vision’s Christian roots continue to influence its thinking, it focuses resources at 
the UN where they are most needed rather than in the direction of Christians and 
to the detriment of those of other faiths.
Notes
 1 US $5 in 1950 was worth the equivalent of c.US$50 today.
 2 ‘MinistryWatch.com profiles Public Charities, church and parachurch ministries. It 
is also a place to learn about how to be a responsible giver. MinistryWatch.com is 
an independent donor advocate facilitating the information needs of donors. It pro-
vides information on organizations alleging to be charitable and its key leadership 
in order to identify materially misleading behavior, or wasteful spending practices, 
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as well as identifying those operations that are above board and running efficiently’ 
(MinistryWatch).
 3 Interview with Sarah Pickwick, World Vision UK Senior Conflict Adviser, London, 3 
March 2015.
 4  Interview with Mae Elise Cannon, Senior Director of Advocacy and Outreach, World 
Vision, Washington, DC, 27 January 2012.
 5 Interviews with Daanish Masood, 27 January 2016, Politics Affairs Officer at the 
United Nations, and Azza Karam, Senior Advisor on Culture at the United Nations 
Population Fund, New York, 28 January 2016.
 6 MDGs are listed at End Poverty.
 7 SDGs are listed at Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform.
 8 Interview with Arelys Bellorini, World Vision Senior Advisor on Advocacy and Part-
nerships, New York, 26 January 2016.
 9 ‘The BabyWASH Coalition is a group of organisations focused on increasing inte-
gration between water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), early childhood development 
(ECD), nutrition, and maternal newborn and child health (MNCH) programming, 
policy-making and funding to improve child well-being in the first 1000 days’ (Baby-
WASH Coalition).
 10 Interview with Cathy Turner, World Vision UK’s Child Rights Policy Manager, Lon-
don, 14 February 2016.
 11 World Vision’s main advocacy efforts take place at the UN in New York. In addition, 
the organisation has an office in Geneva, home to several UN and other specialised 
agencies, including: International Committee of the Red Cross, Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Human Rights Council, UN Refugee Agency, 
World Health Organization and World Trade Organization. ‘World Vision’s Geneva 
office works to influence United Nations programmes and specialized agencies, as 
well as other decision-makers based in the city, in order to connect policy with practice 
to achieve the fulfilment of the rights of the most vulnerable children of this world’ 
(World Vision International).
 12 The countries were: Albania, Brazil, Bangladesh, Malawi, Mexico, Pakistan, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia and Uganda. No information is available regarding who the children 
were or from which communities they came.
 13 Interview with Arelys Bellorini, World Vision Senior Advisor on Advocacy and Part-
nerships, New York, 26 January 2016.
 14 Interviews with Katherine Marshall, former senior World Bank official and author of 
Marshall (2013), Oslo, 20 December 2015, and Azza Karam, Senior Advisor on Cul-
ture at the United Nations Population Fund, New York, 28 January 2016.
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Looking for FBOs
When I first contacted Prakash2 in September 2012, I had just seen his advertise-
ment of a clothing drive that he was organizing and which he was announcing 
on Facebook. In this post, he explained that he was collecting used and new 
garments in the surroundings of his New York – based home, to then ship them 
to Guyana, where he would hand them out to the ‘poor’ and ‘needy’. Prakash 
is a young Guyanese Indian man in his thirties, who migrated from the Guya-
nese countryside to Queens in New York with his family in the 1990s. Having 
been educated in the USA and having graduated from a local college, he was 
able to ‘make something good’ of his skills and therefore started to organize 
charitable projects and to volunteer for various humanitarian and development 
organisations in Guyana. Among these organisations was the Save Abee Foun-
dation (SAF), which I refer to in detail later in this chapter. As I was seeking 
to understand the shifting power dynamics between Christian and Hindu social 
actors in Guyana, and particularly how power relations are negotiated through 
clothing (re-)distributions, I had contacted him to learn about his motivation for 
conducting a clothing drive (Kloß 2017). He replied to my enquiry via email, 
explaining that his motivation is based on the fact that he is a Hindu, and that it is 
his dharma to ‘serve humanity’ and ‘keep up’ his traditions to ensure that future 
generations will maintain them and not ‘stray away from our such rich culture’ 
(personal communication 3 Sep 2012). Dharma is a central concept in Hindu 
philosophy that has manifold meanings, from ‘ “truth” and “order” (both cosmic 
and social), to “law” (both universal and particular), “teaching”, “duty”, “virtu-
ous behaviour”, and “religion” ’ (Johnson 2010, p. 102). According to Prakash 
and many other Hindu informants, clothing (re-)distributions were necessary as 
organisations – which he labelled as Christian – used charitable distributions 
of food and clothing as a means to convert Hindus to Christianity, a discourse 
I return to later. Although charitable distributions, labelled as Christian, seem to 
have largely diminished in the coastal areas of Berbice, they continue to exist in 
the imagination of my informants, are frequently interpreted as ‘conversion strat-
egy’, and have become part of their collective memory of Hindu inferiorization 
in Guyana (Kloß 2017).
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Having described his volunteer work in terms of challenging Christianity – par-
ticularly Christian mission work – and by specifically declaring his perspective 
and practices as those of a Hindu, I immediately considered him as a potential 
informant for my most recent anthropological research on concepts of develop-
ment in faith-based organisations (FBOs). In this new research project – part of 
which appears as this chapter – I analyzed how religious identities and processes 
of ethno-politicization influence concepts of ‘development’ in Guyana. For this 
purpose, I conducted anthropological fieldwork on the East Coast Demerara and 
in Georgetown, Guyana, for four months in 2015 engaging in participant observa-
tion and ethnographic interviews. Throughout this period and also drawing from 
my previous research experience in Guyana, I was able to spend time in various 
rural and urban Christian communities – particularly with Seventh Day Advent-
ists – as well as within rural Hindu communities. I accompanied and interviewed 
employees and volunteers of several faith-based and non-governmental organisa-
tions. Having made his acquaintance only virtually through email and Facebook, 
I was fortunate to meet Prakash in August 2015 at a medical outreach programme, 
which SAF co-hosted with the Nirvana Humanitarian Society (NHS) in the vil-
lage Meten-Meer-Zorg. When I arrived in the buzzing community centre, a few 
hundred people – NHS and SAF volunteers, medical doctors, and patients with 
their families – had already gathered, offering or receiving medical checkups. Par-
ticularly high in demand were tests of blood sugar and blood pressure. Deservedly 
proud, Prakash showed me the arrangements for the one-day clinic and introduced 
me to other volunteers. After he had handed me a T-shirt with the Save Abee logo, 
marking me as an official volunteer, he provided me with some general informa-
tion about the foundation and event. When I asked him almost randomly if he 
defined the organisation as a faith-based organisation, he immediately negated. 
Save Abee, like Nirvana, he commented, were not ‘religious organisations’, but 
instead were ‘open to all’ and not specifically Hindu or directed towards Hin-
dus. Being somewhat surprised at his seemingly sudden distancing from religion, 
only later did I realize that I had spoken, classified, and interpreted his motives 
and ongoing actions of the organisations from my Western European background 
and on the basis of current academic discussions about classifications concerning 
FBOs and NGOs (Clarke 2006, 2008; Occhipinti 2015). Questions of definition in 
mind, I had approached my field and informants ‘looking for’ FBOs – expecting 
to find some – but was reminded that possibly no such thing may be found in the 
Guyanese context, where classifications of organisations are not necessarily based 
on a faith-based/secular distinction.
To the great majority of my informants, both Hindu and Christian, a person can-
not be irreligious, and as organisations are constituted, maintained, funded, and 
brought into action by people who necessarily belong to one of the many religious 
traditions, organisations must be faith-based in one way or the other. My inform-
ants usually reject the differentiation of secular and religious/spiritual spheres of 
life. To them, there exists nothing outside of the spiritual or the religious, and 
even science is no secular sphere in which deities and/or spirits are restricted 
from exerting influence. To them, there exists only an overall religious/spiritual 
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sphere that is life and creation. Spirituality is expressed in specific daily routines, 
such as following dietary rules, sexual restrictions, or adhering to specific sarto-
rial practices. To follow these necessary modes of behavior, a person has to adapt 
his or her entire lifestyle and cannot compartmentalize or differentiate religious 
and secular spheres of life. Particularly Hinduism is considered to be immanent 
to and inseparable from the everyday. Not only do Hindus emphasize this as a 
characteristic of their traditions, but Christians also sometimes admiringly speak 
about this ‘spiritual’ side of Hinduism and describe it as ‘virtuous’. Additionally, 
in informal conversations political activists and scholars comment that Hinduism 
is all-encompassing for Hindus. Thus, one scholar points out that
[o]ne of the differences between African religions and religious practices and 
Hindu . . . is that . . . for Hindus, Hinduism is all of them. There is no separa-
tion between the church and them. Among Christians, you go to church on 
Sundays, and on the rest of the week you are secular. . . . But for Hindus is a 
24/7 thing.
(Daniel, personal interview)
Hinduism is thus often portrayed as ‘more worldly’ than Christian religion. Cer-
tainly, this is viewed differently among members of the various Christian denomi-
nations and for example Pentecostals or Seventh Day Adventists would disagree 
and emphasize their spiritual lifestyles in which religion is a ‘24/7 thing’ (Jacob, 
personal interview). The emphasis on diet and nutrition among Seventh Day 
Adventists is frequently pronounced in conversation with Adventists, in which 
vegetarianism and abstinence from alcohol is most commonly referenced. The 
relevance of nutrition for Seventh Day Adventists is also discussed in brochures 
available for purchase in the local SDA bookstore in Georgetown, such as ‘A 
Call to Medical Evangelism and Health Education’ (White 2010), in which the 
preparation of ‘healthful’ and ‘wholesome’ food is promoted. For example, my 
informant Michael, who converted to Seventh Day Adventism ‘a few years ago’, 
is in his thirties, lives on the outskirts of Georgetown, and works in an administra-
tive position in the agricultural sector, frequently explained his dietary plans and 
his ideas of healthy living to me. His emphases on nutrition certainly contained 
educational messages, but he also applied them as expressions of his belief in Sev-
enth Day Adventism and as proof for the genuineness of his faith, as it influences 
his everyday life and routines. In this sense, no clear line may be drawn between 
Hindu and SDA perceptions concerning their views on their faiths’ impact on 
daily life. However, they both strongly differentiate between themselves and 
orthodox Christian traditions, such as Catholicism and Anglicanism, whose mem-
bers, according to them, distinguish between secular and religious spheres of life.
Hindu and Adventist perspectives on spirituality challenge the distinction 
between the secular and the religious that is also part of (Western) definitions of 
FBOs. To apply a differentiation of FBO and NGO may be a misleading approach 
in contexts, in which the majority of social actors do not differentiate between sec-
ular and religious spheres of life. This is opposed to Western European contexts, 
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in which more people define themselves as secular. Therefore, for my further 
research, I found it necessary to refuse an ‘a priori distinction between secular-
ism and religion’ (Fountain 2013, p. 26), in order to provide a context-sensitive 
study of religion and development, as has been called for in recent publications 
(Tomalin 2012). Social actors may strategically apply the categories FBO and 
NGO in varying contexts, for example if donors prefer to build relationships with 
organisations that promote a specific secular or faith-based identity. On the other 
hand, concerning development and humanitarian work, social actors frequently 
play down religious identities or reject the label ‘FBO’ altogether. This may be 
the case when organisations are mistrusted on the basis of alleged proselytization 
motives or, in general, when religion is considered a ‘sensitive issue’ (Tomalin 
2012, p. 694). In the tense and contested ethnic environment of Guyana, Prakash’s 
variable labelling of SAF reveals that classifications of development organisa-
tions have to be considered as contextual and strategic.
This chapter is based on the case study of two ‘development organisations’ 
operating in Guyana: the Save Abee Foundation (SAF) and the Adventist Devel-
opment and Relief Agency (ADRA). These organisations were selected after an 
assessment of the various organisations active in Guyana, and for their willing-
ness to engage in the research project. SAF is a non-profit organisation, which 
was registered in the USA in 2010 and operates in rural areas of Guyana. It was 
founded by a Guyanese migrant, who today resides in Florida with his family but 
who frequently travels to Guyana to conduct SAF projects together with his wife. 
Initially, SAF opened a centre for children in Cotton Tree Village, West Coast Ber-
bice, in order to provide computer education classes. While its official mission, as 
stated on the website, continues to focus on children,3 SAF projects have diversi-
fied over the past years and now include, for instance, charitable distributions 
of clothes or toys and medical outreach programmes. SAF has expanded these 
programmes to various other villages in the coastal areas of Guyana (Save Abee 
Foundation 2016, August 13, 2015). The foundation conducts fundraising shows 
and parties, usually in the Guyanese diaspora in the USA and Canada through the 
sales of tickets, supported by popular Indo-Guyanese artists.
ADRA is a transnational organisation with headquarters in the USA and is 
an agency of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA). According to the SDA 
Guyana Conference, a sea captain was asked to distribute SDA pamphlets at the 
docks of Georgetown as early as 1883, founding the basis for the SDA Church 
in Guyana.4 Various missions and the continued dissemination of literature fol-
lowed and led to the opening of the first churches in the late 19th century. In 
1906, the British Guiana Conference was established, comprising 12 churches 
and 350 members. In 2016, the SDA Guyana Conference counted approximately 
60,000 members, divided into 209 congregations and 27 pastoral districts (Guy-
anaadventists). SDA Guyana defines itself as a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic 
organisation (Kaieteur News 2015a). The self-reliant Guyanese section of ADRA 
is currently setting up its programmes from the head office in the capital George-
town. Ideas for projects were collected in SDA churches and community cen-
tres by SDA representatives. Current and future projects include the building of 
Giving and development 117
physical infrastructure – such as water wells, mobile sawmills, water tankers, 
bridges, or a cassava industrial factory – as well as training programmes for farm-
ers, a youth centre, or counselling services. These projects are located both in the 
so-called ‘interior’ (Guyanese hinterland) as well as the coastal areas of Guyana, 
here mostly in rural areas.
Both organisations do their own fundraising and are transnational in character, 
as head offices are located in the USA and employees and/or volunteers frequently 
travel between Guyana and North America (see Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in 
this volume). As discussed later, they import specific know-how, organisational 
structures, concepts of governance and leadership, and consequently concepts of 
development that are adapted locally. Both SAF and ADRA described their objec-
tives and programmes in terms of improving and building physical infrastructure, 
education and schooling, as well as health facilities and health education.
Describing no specific differences in their programmes and objectives, it would 
seem obvious to consider the organisations as doing ‘the same’. But when pay-
ing attention to the specific context of Guyana and when reflecting the situation 
of religious competition and the seemingly insurmountable link between ethnic 
and religious identities that extends not only to people and parties but also organi-
sations – as discussed later – one may start to wonder whether these practices 
are indeed the same. Therefore, this chapter raises questions such as: If different 
organisations, each labelled as belonging to a different ethno-religious tradition, 
claim to say or do the same thing, is this really the case? If one takes their different 
social positioning, the historical background, and past and present power relations 
into consideration, do they perhaps instead challenge established power structures 
and socio-religious hierarchy? What is the relevance of giving and the notion of 
holistic development in this context? To understand the significance of doing and 
giving development in the context of challenging the established social hierarchy, 
I first discuss the notion of holistic development according to my informants, pro-
vide a socio-historical background by describing Guyanese ethno-religious iden-
tities and groups, highlight how these different groups compete in local systems 
of power, in nation-building and in processes of ethno-politicization, and discuss 
the notion of leadership.
The notion of holistic development
Definitions and interpretations of what is understood as development change and 
transform over time. Certainly, there are also different views and opinions on 
what is development among the various social actors and organisations. Numer-
ous Guyanese apply the term development in terms of transformation and growth 
at present. The majority of my informants explained that development is a process 
which becomes manifest and materializes in physical infrastructure such as roads, 
houses, shopping malls, or airports. This does not imply that they consider spir-
itual enhancement and development as less significant. When directly enquiring 
what development means, they usually listed growth and the increasing avail-
ability of material goods first. For example, Premwattie, who is an 80-year-old 
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Guyanese Indian Hindu widow living with one of her daughters and son-in-law 
in a small wooden house in rural Berbice, picked up a plate from the table, held 
it up in the air, and answered my question stating: ‘Development mean: like you 
get this plate, and you nuh get more than this plate, but if you get more than 
this plate . . . is development’ (personal interview). She further interpreted devel-
opment in terms of status enhancement and the transformation of living condi-
tions and social hierarchy, stating that, ‘Development mean you ah get up in life’ 
(Development means you rise in/enhance your status).
Although at first statements like Premwattie’s seem to indicate material expan-
sion only, my informants further indicated the intricate link between development 
and spirituality or religion. In this way, and although economic development is 
still frequently referenced as an indicator of national development, my inform-
ants pronounced broader definitions of, and more holistic approaches to develop-
ment. For instance, following her explanation of material expansion and growth, 
Premwattie added that material and personal enhancements are processes which 
are directly linked to ‘god and prayers’. She elaborated that you ‘get up in life by 
devotion to god’ (you raise your status while alive/you raise your status in society 
by devotion to god) and that, ‘god nuh mek beggarmen, you put yuhself suh’ (god 
does not make beggars, you put yourself into that position/condition). As Prem-
wattie is a Hindu and has expressed her belief in karma before, her statement also 
indicated the influence of reincarnation on personal development, as she referred 
to the consequences of spiritual behavior for past, present, or future lives.
Seventh Day Adventist Jacob – who holds a leading position at ADRA, a 
55-year-old ‘Indian’5 man, lives with his family in the countryside, travels to the 
SDA head office in the capital every day, and expressed different concepts of 
life – highlighted the need to consider development as ‘holistic’. This, according 
to him, includes a spiritual dimension. Commenting on concepts of development, 
he emphasized that he prefers ‘holistic approaches’ that require looking not only 
at the material aspects of development. According to him, spiritual development 
is an ‘integral part’ of development, as ‘not all aspects of life that are of relevance 
are visible’ (personal interview). His statement is indicative of the international 
discourse on holistic development, which developed in order to divert the atten-
tion from solely economic and material development to additionally containing 
cultural aspects and subjective understandings of wellbeing. The notion of holistic 
development includes
macroeconomic management, global democratization and planetary ethics. 
Identifying with the whole means that development can no longer be simply 
geared to material aims and achievements but includes non-material dimen-
sions, as in cultural development. It means that development can no longer be 
anthropocentric but encompasses the planetary ecology. Stretching the mean-
ing of development to its fullest, it may be summed up as a collective learn-
ing process of human self-management according to the most comprehensive 
standards conceivable and practicable.
(Nederveen 2010, p. 148)
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Such understandings of development, which include human wellbeing and 
environmental sustainability, has broadened particularly since the 1980s 
(Freeman 2012).
Both my Christian and Hindu informants commented that a sole focus on 
material aspects would be short-sighted, as upon death a person has to leave all 
material goods behind and may only ‘take along’ his or her spiritual achieve-
ments such as merit. For example, Premwattie highlighted that ‘reincarnation is 
an eternal thing’, that a person is ‘just passing through this one [life]’ but that, 
when ‘you have to die, you leave all of that’. According to her, material objects 
are like a cage or a spider web that create ‘material ties’. People should instead 
prefer ‘more simple ways’ of living and turn away from an orientation on things. 
Jacob, although as a Christian not referring to reincarnation, similarly discussed 
that spiritual wealth is the only good a person keeps or that will be of benefit to 
him or her when he or she dies. The higher a person develops spiritually, the purer 
will be his or her thoughts and intentions, and the more he or she will be in line 
with his social and natural environment. According to the interviews conducted, 
to the majority of Guyanese, regardless of their religious affiliation, holistic devel-
opment thus requires and refers to a ‘change of mindset’ (spiritual development) 
that ultimately leads to material expansion, for instance the expansion of physical 
infrastructure, which is combined with the growth of social, cultural, and eco-
nomic capital.6
The notion of spiritual development as part of ‘holistic development’ is not 
particular to devout Christians, Hindus, or Muslims in Guyana. Besides religious 
groups, another group of social actors applies the notion of spiritual development. 
Social actors who actively engage in nation-building processes or (postcolonial) 
scholars often discard ‘Western’ imperialist tendencies by emphasizing and prior-
itizing the notion of spiritual development, opposing spirituality to religion. For 
instance, Kwesi, a Guyanese postcolonial and Africanist scholar who today lives 
in the UK and whom I met during the lecture series ‘Restoration of African Pride 
in Guyana’, where he also presented, commented that the
spiritual development of a people is extremely important. . . . If you don’t 
have spiritual development, you only have material expansion. . . . Spiritual 
development is the development of the totality of the human being, their rela-
tions with themselves, other people, and the environment. Their whole under-
standing of cosmos.
(Personal interview)
Highlighting that development has to be understood as holistic, a combination 
of spiritual and material, he emphasized that it must occur in accordance with 
the environment. According to Kwesi, development cannot happen ‘away from 
nature’, but needs to be in line with it. While in Europe, material and cultural 
development may be noticed, spiritual development does not exist to the extent it 
would be necessary to achieve sustainable, holistic development. Spiritual devel-
opment, accordingly, is what makes material development sustainable and thus 
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effective in the long run. Material development, he continued, forms a prerequi-
site to or basis for spiritual development; it provides a specific level of comfort 
that is necessary to develop spiritually. The ‘West’ threatens its development pro-
cess by destroying the environment and ignoring the fact that humanity is part of 
it. Similar views were expressed by my Hindu and Christian informants, including 
the employees and volunteers of SAF and ADRA.
In Guyana, the emphasis on spirituality and spiritual development further-
more has to be understood as part of anti-imperial and anti-colonial discourse 
and practice. It is further linked to anti-religious discourse. Social actors often 
interpret religion as an orthodox structure and as an imposition of former colo-
nizers on colonized people. They discuss how colonized people were stripped of 
their spirituality and ‘original’ spiritual traditions, proposing that former colonial 
governments and populations lacked spirituality. Some argue that this imposition 
continues today and that particularly Christianity has always been a means of 
Western nations to maintain their dominant status positions in global power rela-
tions. While regarding religion as something that is imposed on people and that is 
linked to discipline, institutions, and division, they define spirituality as a process 
of self-realization, (individual) transformation, and as something that is linked to 
unity, individuality, and human equality.
While this discourse is particularly prominent among Guyanese African Chris-
tians, Guyanese Hindus also refer to this opposition of religion and spirituality. 
A large proportion of my Hindu informants reflected on religion as something 
hypocritical in opposition to spirituality. For instance, they often stress that their 
beliefs are ‘no religion’ but instead have to be understood as ‘ways of life’. Such 
statements are usually embedded in the discourse of the ‘invention’ of Hinduism 
as a religion. Frequently, Guyanese pandits (Hindu priests) point out the history 
of how the term Hinduism had been invented by colonizers during the various 
phases of Mughal and British invasions of India. They often explain that ‘Hindu’ 
originally translates to ‘a person who lives beyond the river Indus’, and highlight 
that the various Hindu traditions were labelled in opposition to non-Hindu beliefs 
and systems of classification (Fuller 2004; Michaels 2004). Even within the het-
erogeneous Guyanese Hindu population, the different Hindu traditions contest 
their validity and legitimacy on the basis of degrading other traditions as ‘religion’ 
and claim that their own traditions are ‘ways of life’. They point out the other 
traditions’ syncretism and supposed lack of authenticity. For example, Seeram, a 
62-year-old cane worker and convinced follower of the local ‘Madras tradition’ – 
a marginalized shaktistic tradition that combines elements of healing, manifesta-
tion of deities, and animal sacrifice (Kloß 2016) – commonly emphasized that 
as a Madrassi, he has to adapt his daily habits and his ‘way of life’ in order to 
fulfill the requests of the deities. In contrast to this and according to him, adher-
ents of the mainstream, orthodox Sanatan tradition supposedly compartmentalize 
their lives by only adapting their lifestyles on Sundays or even only on Sunday 
mornings. According to him, such practice is superficial and inauthentic, more 
‘like religion’. As addressed earlier, Seeram thus claimed superior status on the 
basis of living a spiritual instead of a religious life, which would imply notions of 
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secularism. He differentiated the various Hindu traditions similar how Adventists 
oppose themselves to orthodox Christians. These internal negotiations, intricate 
to all denominations, challenge the established socio-religious hierarchy, as for 
instance Seeram claimed higher morality and authenticity on the basis of living a 
spiritual – not a religious – life.
Ethno-religious identities and competition
In light of these critical perspectives on ‘religion’, it is not surprising that in Guy-
ana there exist ambivalent perspectives about whether and to what extent religion 
may support national development and nation-building. Some Guyanese highlight 
religion’s particular capacity to unite people, as it promotes morality, respect-
ability, and familial and communal values, which they claim to be the core of all 
religions. For example, Jacob of ADRA emphasized that religion should not be 
regarded as a barrier, but a bridge, and that ‘religion is a key ingredient to bring 
people together’ (personal interview). Others, however, remained sceptical or 
openly questioned the unifying character of religion, stressing that religion more 
often creates tensions, borders, and rupture. Regardless of their perspectives, they 
usually agreed that inter-ethnic tensions and a lack of social cohesion hinder Guy-
ana’s development (Nascimento 2000). Although they listed various factors that 
restrict the development – for example the extensive outward migration and the 
related brain drain, the remoteness of some hinterland communities, corruption, 
the lack of industrial production, deficient health care and educational systems – 
they emphasized that social cohesion among the ethnic groups is a key aspect for 
local socio-economic development.
When engaging in conversations on opportunities for and challenges to develop-
ment, informants – including SAF and ADRA representatives – usually described 
the lack of national unity and the incomplete nation-building process that fails 
due to a lack of ‘good governance’. They highlighted that whichever govern-
ment is in charge, it has to invest in specific domains and industries that are no 
longer economically feasible but remain of crucial relevance in the construction 
of ethno-religious identities. Despite the often-proclaimed slogan ‘Sugar is dead’, 
any action ‘against’ the sugar or rice industry, such as cutting state subsidies, is 
considered an affront against the Indian ethnic group, as the agricultural sector is 
significant to the construction of Indian ethnic identity. ‘Ethnically, you cannot let 
it down’, Daniel explained and continued his elaboration by stating that ‘sugar is 
now a prisoner of our ethnic politics’ (personal interview). Similar observations 
were pronounced in an informal conversation with a prominent figure of the Guy-
anese rice sector, who wishes not to be named. The significance of social cohe-
sion for national development was furthermore highlighted by the first actions of 
the newly elected government, which included the renaming and restructuring of 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Cohesion, created to foster a ‘more posi-
tive’ inter-ethnic environment in May 2015 (Kaieteur News 2016; Kaieteur News 
2015b). For instance, President David Granger explained the government’s struc-
tural changes as a way to emphasize a turn towards involving the community in 
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plans of development: ‘We hope to infuse the feeling of community solidarity and 
provide not only physical facilities but social and cultural facilities to transform 
the communities’ (Kaieteur News 2015b). Highlighting that both physical and 
socio-cultural facilities are required to transform the nation and its communities, 
he indicates the locally adapted notion of ‘holistic development’.
Indeed, ethnic identities fundamentally impact all aspects of Guyanese life. 
They consolidate in different ethnic groups, which in contemporary Guyanese 
society are: Indian, African, Chinee (Chinese), Potogee (Portuguese), Amerindian 
(indigenous), and European/White. According to the 2012 census, ‘Indians’ and 
‘Africans’ form the two biggest groups with 39.8% of the population categorized 
as ‘Indian’ and an ‘African’ percentage of 29.3 (Bureau of Statistics 2012).7 Guya-
nese ethnic groups construct their ethnic identities mostly on the idea of shared 
common descent.8 For example, Indians – sometimes also referred to as East Indi-
ans – define themselves as descendants of Indian indentured laborers, who were 
shipped from British India to the Caribbean between 1838 and 1917 to work on 
sugar plantations after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire. Africans, on 
the other hand, define enslaved Africans as their ancestors, who had been forced 
to the Caribbean prior to the system of indentureship. These ethnic groups as 
well as concepts of ‘Indianness’ and ‘Africanness’ have to be considered as social 
constructions, as they are defined and continuously reconstructed by social actors, 
cultural practices, and discourse (Williams 1991; Kloß 2016). They are based 
on othering processes and in relation to each other (Hall 2000), with the Afri-
can and Indian ethnic groups forming constitutive others (Premdas 1992; Ramey 
2011). This ethnic division extends to religious groups and denominations as well. 
Hinduism and Islam are perceived as Indian religions in Guyana, hence serve to 
consolidate Indian ethnic identity and have to be considered as ‘ethnic religions’ 
(van der Veer and Vertovec 1991). Christianity, on the other hand, is predomi-
nantly associated with ‘African,’ ‘Mixed,’ and ‘Portuguese’ groups. According 
to the latest published national census, 64% of the Guyanese population is Chris-
tian, 24.8% is Hindu, and 6.8% is Muslim (Bureau of Statistics 2012). In such a 
diverse religious context, struggles for authority and community leadership take 
place and result in contestations as well as the hierarchization of religious beliefs 
and practices. For example, the history and development of Hinduism in Guyana 
has been influenced by syncretistic exchange with Christianity and Islam but also 
by inferiorization processes, proselytization, and stigmatization (Younger 2009).
Religious and ethnic identities are related and cannot be considered distinct 
in this multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. Although the ethnic division in 
congregations and along denominational lines has diminished over time, it has 
not totally been erased. ‘Why is it that the 11 Sunday morning service is the most 
[racially] segregated hour in Guyana?’, asked a social commentator in a local 
newspaper in December 2014, indicating and criticizing that congregations are 
usually dominated by a particular ethnic group (Pantlitz 2014). While Hindu and 
Muslim congregations consist almost exclusively of Indians, Christian denomina-
tions are more diverse. In the Elim Pentecostal and Wesleyan churches that I vis-
ited near and in Georgetown, the congregations consisted of mostly Africans and 
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Indians. Officiating priests were both African and Indian, although predominantly 
African. Preferences for specific Christian denominations are prevalent among the 
different ethnic groups today as they have been in the past, although these prefer-
ences change over time. For instance, Africans used to be predominantly Anglican 
or Methodist before the rise of Pentecostalism, while the majority of Potogee were 
Roman Catholic. Guyanese Indians predominantly converted to the Presbyterian 
denomination as a result of the Canadian Presbyterian Mission’s work in then 
British Guiana. At present, according to Guyanese scholars to whom I talked in 
person, ‘most’ Indian Christians are Catholic and ‘some’ are Pentecostal (Dan-
iel and Ram, personal interviews). These observations are in line with my own 
impressions gathered in the various religious institutions as well as through my 
involvement in the local communities since 2011. For example, in my Indian host 
family, three of my host mother’s nine siblings have converted from Hinduism to 
Christianity, two of them joining the Catholic Church and one of them the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church. Interestingly, in conversation about the various religious 
traditions, my Hindu informants highlighted that there are similarities between 
Hinduism and Catholicism. They frequently commented that Catholics would do 
‘the same’, for example they would also worship ‘idols’ – pictures and statues of 
Jesus.9 These practices, which reminded them of the veneration of Hindu deities, 
continue to be degraded as ‘idol worship’ by proselytizing Christian groups. The 
Seventh Day Adventists have started to attract Hindu converts in rural regions 
of the country, for example the Indian-dominated eastern region of Berbice. As 
discussed earlier, my informants listed the holistic approach of SDA theology 
including its emphasis on, for example, nutrition and dietary rules as particularly 
adaptive to Hindu understandings of life and dharma.
More recently established churches and religious traditions such as Pentecostal 
churches or the Hindu Madras tradition attract members of different ethnic/reli-
gious groups. These are charismatic and ecstatic religious traditions, which are 
continuously growing and have to be contextualized within the general transfor-
mation of the Guyanese religious environment and national neoliberal restructur-
ing from the 1980s. Table 5.1 demonstrates the significant increase of Pentecostals 
from 7.5% in 1991 to 16.9% in 2002 and 5.2% in 2012, as well as a decline of par-
ticularly the traditional denominations such as Anglicans (from 13.8% (1991) to 
6.9% (2002) and 22.8% (2012)) and Roman Catholics (from 10% (1991) to 8.1% 
(2002) and 7.1% (2012)).10 Drawing from my interviews and personal observa-
tions, this trend continues at present. The significant decline of Hindus from 35% 
to 24.8% between 1991 and 2012, although at first seeming to indicate high rates 
of conversion to Christianity, has to be relativized by taking the large scale of 
migration to North America into account, numbers of which were particularly 
high among the Guyanese Indian population during the 1990s. Ecstatic traditions 
are on the rise, although they often continue to be frowned upon and dismissively 
called ‘clap-hand churches’.
The ethnic composition of congregations is influenced by residential segrega-
tion among Indians and Africans, which has been influenced by categorizations of 
villages and space as ‘Indian’ or ‘African’. While traditionally the urban centres 
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of Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and Linden were associated with the African 
population, the countryside was considered Indian. This segregation intensified 
in the course of inter-ethnic conflicts in the 1960s (Horowitz 1985; Misir 2006; 
Spencer 2007; Garner 2008). Generally, residential areas are defined as either 
African or Indian, a categorization that extends to villages today. This does not 
mean, however, that no Indians can be found in African villages and vice versa. 
The places where development organisations conduct projects are hence inevi-
tably linked to Indian or African identities, or, in case of the interior, with the 
Indigenous groups.
Nation-building and ethno-politicization
Struggles for political power in Guyana were and are usually regarded as strug-
gles for resources and ethnic domination. As religious and ethnic identities are 
inextricably related, these struggles extend to the various religious traditions. 
Particularly during national elections, inter-communal violence between Africans 
and Indians has been frequent. The most severe inter-ethnic tensions and instances 
of violence occurred in the period of 1961 to 1964 and in the aftermaths of the 
1997, 2001, and 2006 elections. This development is linked to the process of 
ethno-politicization, due to which voting is primarily based on ethnic affiliation 
rather than for political objectives (Hinds 2004, 2011a; 2011b; Hyles 2014). Eth-
nic voting is influenced by the ascribed ethnic identity of the Indian or African 
party rather than the ethnic identity of individual candidates (Horowitz 1985; Bis-
sessar and La Guerre 2013).
Ever since the independence movement in the 1950s, politicians and ethnic 
entrepreneurs on both sides have fostered and institutionalized anti-African or 
Table 5.1 Religious affiliations in Guyana, National Census 2012
Religious Group 2012 (2002) %
Christian Total 64 (57.7)
Other Christians 20.8 (17.7)
Pentecostal 22.8 (16.9)
Roman Catholic  7.1 (8.1)
Anglican  5.2 (6.9)
Seventh Day Adventist  5.4 (5.0)
Methodist  1.4 (1.7)
Jehovah’s Witness  1.3 (1.1)
Hindu 24.8 (28.4)
Muslim  6.8 (7.2)
None  3.1 (4.3)
Other  0.9 (1.3)
Not Stated  n/a (0.9)
Rastafarian  0.5 (0.5)
Bahai  0.1 (0.1)
Source: Bureau of Statistics 2012.
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anti-Indian sentiments in order to maintain or challenge power (Karran 2000, 
2004; Allahar 2004). Election campaigns are often echoed in local temples and 
churches (Alexander 2000). For example, I witnessed how some Hindu priests 
called for the congregations’ support of the ‘Indian’ PPP/C during both campaigns 
of 2011 and 2015, highlighting the need to consolidate and to support those politi-
cians who do not marginalize Hindu traditions. This occurred not only within their 
sermons, but also on social media such as Facebook, where much political cam-
paigning takes place at present. Similarly, Christian faith was applied to vow for 
votes, the most popular catch-phrase in this regard suggesting that ‘Jesus would 
vote [party X]’. Such discourse and the link between religion and politics have 
historical continuity and are not new phenomena in Guyana.
This background information is particularly relevant to provide a context-
sensitive study, as my fieldwork for this research took place at a particular time: 
the campaigning for and the aftermath of the 2015 national elections. During this 
time, ethnic identities are more clearly accentuated and otherwise hidden pro-
cesses and dynamics are revealed. Having witnessed the campaigns and national 
elections of 2011 and 2015, like my informants, I observed increased expres-
sions and proclamations of ethnic identities during these periods. Commenting 
on this ‘rise’ of ethnic identities during election time, Jacob of ADRA explained 
in a conversation on development in Guyana: ‘Election time come, suddenly 
their antennas are up. . . . Suddenly they know, “I’m a Indian”, “I’m a Portu-
guese” ’ (personal interview). He further stated that after elections, everything 
goes ‘back to normal’. Indeed, most Guyanese, particularly those who live in the 
countryside, described friendly inter-racial relations with neighbours and within 
their communities. Although sometimes stereotypes of other ethnic groups were 
brought up, in general there was a consensus that aside from the ‘big’ people in 
politics, ‘we nuh living the racial’ (We don’t live ‘the racial’; we are not racist). 
Yet, Premwattie, an 80-year-old Indian woman from the Guyanese countryside, 
anxiously explained to me a few months before the 2015 elections, like many 
others, that she is seriously concerned and even scared about the possibility that 
for the first time in 23 years – since 1992 – the ‘Indian’ PPP/C may lose elections. 
She commented that ‘if Blackman rule, abee dead’ (If the Black people rule, we 
[Indians] are dead), and ultimately added: ‘me friken’ (I am scared; personal 
interview). Similarly, Guyanese Africans proposed the alleged clannishness of 
Indians and the PPP/C government, who supposedly only worked towards the 
progress of Indian people and discriminated against other ethnic groups, particu-
larly Africans. Until my fieldwork in 2015, the year that marked the first change 
of government since 1992, Guyanese Africans frequently pointed out that the 
government was only working towards economically developing Indians. They 
were fast to point out that most of the ‘big houses’, which are currently built 
all over the country, are owned by Indian families. Guyanese African political 
activists openly discussed the government’s favouritism towards Indian compa-
nies, and one of the most common examples referred to was physical infrastruc-
ture which, according to them, was built specifically in Indian communities and 
villages.
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Daniel, who is a political scientist, scholar of African and African Ameri-
can Studies in North America, and a political activist in Guyana, where he was 
born and to where he frequently travels, explained such stereotypes and ethno- 
politicization by highlighting that both ethnic groups ‘view being out of governance 
as an assault on their dignity, their ethnic dignity’ (personal interview). According 
to him and many other informants, who were hesitant to comment on these issues 
in formal interviews, in Guyana there exists a ‘winner-take-all-system’ and that 
so far, all governments have sought domination over the other groups instead of 
attempting to serve all people equally (Seecoomar 2000; Hintzen 2008; Singh and 
Narine 2000). Guyanese scholar Clive Thomas similarly comments that, ‘[f]rom 
slavery to the present, domination and authoritarianism have characterized state 
rule in Guyana’ (Thomas 2000, p. 25). Political and economic domination is often 
justified through ‘narratives of suffering’ (Daniel, personal interview) that are told 
by the various ethnic groups. These narratives often revolve around the notion of 
contribution. ‘Contribution’ is a central concept in the Guyanese context which 
significantly impacts local development practices.
Discussions on which ethnic group has served or contributed ‘more’ to society 
and the Guyanese nation have become a ground for negotiations of ethnic hierar-
chy (Williams 1991). Guyanese frequently assert that their own ethnic group’s con-
tribution to the development of Guyana, for example in the agricultural sector, is of 
higher value than the contribution of ‘other’ groups. Based on these assumptions, 
each group claims superiority and their right to economic advantages and politi-
cal dominance. Claims for national resources are often based on the evaluation of 
the groups’ contributions and Guyanese often declare that they expect to receive 
as much as they ‘deserve’ for having contributed to this extent in the past and at 
present. They thus call for reciprocity that is not based on the equal redistribu-
tion of national resources among all ethnic groups, but a redistribution that instead 
rewards groups based on their ‘greater’ efforts at and ‘higher’ outcomes of giving.
Giving and taking consequently have become highly charged topics in Guya-
nese society and ethnic groups are defined as either ‘essential’ givers or takers 
(Williams 1991, p. 160). At present, my informants often referred to and stressed 
the practices of contributing, giving, and taking in informal conversations about 
inter-ethnic relations and social relations in general. For instance, Guyanese Afri-
cans frequently described themselves to be the ‘quintessential giving’ group, as 
their enslaved ancestors had built the plantation system through hard and manual 
labour (Williams 1991). They highlighted that they have suffered the longest and 
hardest from economic and political repressions in the colony. Indians, on the 
other hand, often claimed that the emancipated Africans had almost ruined the 
colony in the 19th century because of their refusal to work regularly and their 
demands for high(er) wages. From their perspective, it ‘was the labor of the East 
Indian immigrants that not only brought it back from the brink of ruin but also 
made possible the expansion of the plantation system and economy’ (Williams 
1991, p. 163).
In this tense ethnic context, it is not surprising that my informants found it more 
necessary to classify the various development and humanitarian organisations and 
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their work on the basis of ethnic identities than to define them as either religious 
or secular. For development work and policy-making, this background illustrates 
that local actors do not consider organisations as neutral. Ethnic identification 
extends not only to political parties, groups of people, villages, or religions, but 
also to development and humanitarian organisations, NGOs and FBOs. Although 
organisations such as the Guyana Red Cross Society do not define themselves as 
faith-based, Guyanese commonly identify it as Christian, pointing out that they 
use a cross as their symbol. This circumstance necessarily influences the organi-
sations’ work, outreach, and impact. This leads to the question: how does this 
specific context influence local concepts and practices of development? How does 
the notion of contribution influence development work on the ground?
Development and leadership
What is understood as development is transformed over time and may also vary 
according to different socio-cultural contexts. Today’s understanding of develop-
ment in Guyana, as much as it differs among the different social actors, has been 
changing in light of the local and international development paradigms. Interna-
tional development discourse has been particularly influenced by European and 
North American discourse. In the 1950s and 1960s, the notion of development 
was considered in light of modernization theory and was conceptualized in terms 
of a basic needs strategy (see introduction in this volume). From the 1980s, neo-
liberal thinking dominated development discourse, according to which the role 
and influence of local governments had to be reduced or at least diminished in 
order to enhance the development process. Local governments increasingly came 
to be regarded as incapable of ‘developing’ due to (alleged) incompetence and 
high levels of corruption. In this period, European development discourse shifted 
from a focus on responsibility to efficiency, leading, in practice, to a move away 
from providing for the basic needs of the ‘less developed’, for example through 
giving material goods, to providing knowledge and advice in order to ‘help peo-
ple to help themselves’ (Karagiannis 2004, p. 108). Development theory and 
practice were consequently transformed into a ‘new orthodoxy in development 
praxis’ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997, p. 67), consisting of ‘a stress on participation, 
on empowerment, on bottom-up as opposed to top-down approaches to develop-
ment, a stress on process rather than blueprint projects, on indigenous rather than 
on expert knowledge’ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997, p. 67). Various levels and kinds 
of NGOs developed that started to create networks and co-operations. Commonly 
today international NGOs collaborate with local NGOs, who are often said to be 
more ‘efficient’ in grassroots development practice due to their knowledge and 
involvement in the communities. Such co-operations are usually framed in terms 
of ‘partnership’, a term that often leads to the blinding out of the hierarchical 
relationships of the different NGOs involved, a point that I return to later (Stirrat 
and Henkel 1997, p. 75).
Guyanese development discourse has been influenced by these international 
ideas and concepts. However, the highly specific contexts of post-independent 
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Guyana have also affected what has been defined as ‘development’. Particularly 
noteworthy were the 1980s, a period in which the country experienced a severe 
economic crisis and increased poverty under the authoritarian rule of Forbes 
Burnham. In an attempt to make Guyana an autarkic nation and the food basket of 
the Caribbean, the socialist Burnham government applied a national development 
plan that focussed on feeding, clothing, and housing the nation (Garner 2008). 
During my fieldwork – almost 30 years later – I was frequently told that during 
the early 1980s, locally also referred to as the ‘Burnham Years’, Guyana ‘ranked’ 
only slightly higher than Haiti in terms of development. Negative statements 
such as ‘the World Bank had Guyana rated just above Haiti’ (Jacob, personal 
interview) are intricate to narratives of national history and narratives of suffer-
ing. With the liberalization of the economy towards the end of the 1980s and the 
implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme under Desmond Hoyte 
in 1988, Guyanese development discourse was influenced by the international, 
increasingly neoliberal development discourse. Today, government officials and 
employees of development organisations often explain the process of develop-
ment in terms of (what they describe to be) World Bank categorizations. Jacob of 
ADRA, for example, highlighted the transition of Guyana from ‘less developed’ 
to ‘more developed’ in our conversation on Seventh Day Adventist development 
work. Working-class Guyanese frequently explained and elaborated that Guyana 
is a ‘Third World country’ while nations such as the USA, according to them, are 
‘developed’ countries.
In conversation with volunteers and employees of ADRA and SAF, they usu-
ally referred to development in terms of providing both material goods and advice 
to help the ‘poor’, thus combining basic needs and self-help approaches, as dis-
cussed earlier. They often named the lack of leadership and good governance 
as the main criteria that hinder the development of Guyana. According to them, 
Guyanese politicians have lost the population’s faith and trust due to corruption, 
favouritism, and immoral behaviour. They explained that the state does not work 
for the people, but instead acts like a company that only seeks to maximize profit 
for itself. Terms like ‘politricks’ – a blend of politics and tricks – have become 
prominent in public discourse, indicating the level of how politics are considered 
to be characterized by self-interest and corruption. Good governance is hence 
regarded as a key factor in developing the nation and society, and representatives 
of both ADRA and SAF addressed the lack of ‘good’ leaders. For example, Vijay 
of SAF, who has migrated to the USA and frequently returns to Guyana to conduct 
charitable events and ‘spiritual development’ programmes (such as music classes 
and theatre workshops), explained that the ‘mindset’ of the Guyanese in Guyana 
‘needs to change’, and that for this ‘they need the leadership’. Opposing Guya-
nese in Guyana to Guyanese who live elsewhere, particularly in the ‘developed’ 
North, he indicated that ‘leadership’ is brought along by Guyanese-American vol-
unteers, including himself. He commented that ‘our [Guyanese-American] men-
tality is go-go-go, and their mentality is like, I go when I want’, implying a lack 
of discipline, motivation, or ideas. He further highlighted that ‘you physically 
have to be here’ to achieve something, as ‘you [may] get the volunteers, but you 
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have to lead’. He finally added that most Guyanese in Guyana ‘don’t know how 
to execute’ (personal interview). This conversation was framed by him telling his 
wife to show me the two-week schedule they had prepared for their current trip 
to the Guyanese countryside from New York – a truly impressive and neat list 
of meetings, events, and organisational tasks prepared on two sheets of paper. 
They further emphasized that they were ‘giving’ and ‘sacrificing’ their annual 
leave from their jobs in the USA to be even busier and loaded with work on their 
so-called holiday. A similar statement was taken as a quote for the foundation’s 
Facebook profile, highlighting the relevance of the notion of giving, to which 
I will return later: ‘The greatest gift you can give someone is your time, because 
when you are giving someone your time you are giving them a portion of your 
life that you will never get back’ (Facebook, September 2016). The discourse on 
(the lack of) good governance extends to other organisations and lay people. In 
particular, religious organisations highlighted the need for better leadership in 
order to ‘move forward’. Representatives and leaders of the Catholic Church 
in Guyana, for instance, similarly addressed the lack of good leaders, stressing 
their programmes for stewardship, as stewardship ‘has a development side to it’ 
(interview with a representative of the Roman Catholic Church of Guyana).11
Jacob and Vijay’s discussion on good leadership and governance exemplifies 
how they consider themselves as providers of advice and better knowledge due to 
their involvement in international organisations and for having moved and having 
been exposed to work processes in a ‘developed’ country. They thus claim to have 
the know-how to develop, although this does not prevent them from engaging in 
‘partnerships’ with local actors. Development, in this context, is thus viewed as 
only possible with ‘Western’ influence, know-how, advice, and funding, which 
highlights an influence of modernization theory. My informants either affirmed 
this perception and evaluated this influence as positive, as enabling ‘modernity’, 
or they rejected this idea and regarded this influence as negative, for example 
people who conceive development as a kind of ‘Western’ imposition and mode 
of subordination. Such discussion on ‘good governance’ and ‘good leadership’ is 
intricately linked to the discourse of efficiency and the ‘knowing how to do better’ 
(Karagiannis 2004, p. 110).
In order to provide knowledge and to contribute to development and nation-
building, a person has to ‘give’ something – in the case of SAF this is understood 
to include various aspects, for example the giving of a person’s time. As this 
discourse on gifts and contributions is prominent in Guyanese conversations on 
development, this analysis has to consider local notions of gift-giving.
Doing and giving development
The Guyanese discourse of development is linked to the notions of giving, taking, 
and receiving, and hence to the concept of gift exchange. This holds true when 
looking at the significance of contributions in the local construction of ethnic 
groups and for the discourse on nation-building, as discussed earlier. Practices of 
contributing are ultimately related to reciprocity and hierarchical relations that 
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develop or transform through practices of giving or sharing. The relevance of gift 
exchange theory in development discourse and practice must not be considered as 
an exception for the Guyanese context. Commonly, gift exchange and reciproc-
ity are linked to pre-modern or archaic societies. However, the differentiation of 
reciprocal gifts and contractual commodities of market exchange has to be consid-
ered as artificial (Widlok 2017). As discussed by Frank Adloff and Steffen Mau, 
‘[m]odern social relationships seem too complex, too strongly institutionally or 
systemically mediated to be capable of being traced back to arrangements of reci-
procity’ (Adloff and Mau 2006, p. 95). However, reciprocal relationships exist in 
all kinds of social interaction, not only within families and other close relation-
ships, but also macro-processes organized by states or the market (Adloff and Mau 
2006). Similarly, R. Kowalski argues that in the context of International Develop-
ment Aid, concepts of exchange are based on market approaches that stress the 
need to formalize exchange. As International Development Aid is ‘embedded in 
the modernity project’, Kowalski states, ‘donors both act from a position in which 
The Gift system is downplayed and which seeks to annihilate its existence whilst 
illogically being entirely dependent upon relationships at both state and personal 
levels that only the system of The Gift can provide’ (Kowalski 2011, p. 196). 
Relationships between givers and receivers of development funding are usually 
presented as partnerships ‘between organisations bringing different but equal 
resources and skills’ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997, p. 75) and are masked by chains of 
intermediaries that conceal the unequal relationship of giver and receiver.
According to classical gift exchange theory, the giver or provider of a gift, 
alms, or aid, claims a higher status in relation to the receiver. Although not always 
directly pronounced, negotiations of hierarchy are always intricate in such prac-
tices and (re-)distributions. By being able to give and provide, a person claims 
and creates the status of giver and donor, generates symbolic capital, high social 
status, and prestige. The giver’s status rises in relation to the receiver of the gift, 
who has to return the gift to recreate his or her status. According to Marcel Mauss, 
the ‘[f]ailure to give or receive, like failure to make return gifts, means a loss 
of dignity’ (Marcel 1966, p. 41). Only when the receiver reciprocates the gift 
is his or her status reconstituted. Displaying the capacity to provide, initiate, or 
facilitate the process of development, social actors may point out others who are 
needier, may challenge their developed status, and may enhance their own status 
in society. It has been widely discussed among anthropologists whether ‘pure’ or 
‘free’ gifts exist or whether gifts can ever be disinterested. For example, Jonathan 
Parry claims that the Indian/Hindu concept of the gift is not based on the expecta-
tion that a gift has to be returned and that Indian gifts are non-reciprocal (Parry 
1986). Similarly, Narmala Halstead describes how in the Guyanese context, Indi-
ans ‘exchange gifts as part of an ideology of giving without receiving’ (Halstead 
2011, p. 278) and give to express their love, duty, and devotion. However, as 
I have discussed elsewhere, although my informants indeed confirmed this ideal 
of altruistic giving, numerous times, they also expressed that they would certainly 
‘hope for’ something in return, and that giving will benefit them by receiving 
blessings, higher status, and/or good karma in return (Kloß 2016).
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In the context of development practice, beneficiaries and receivers of devel-
opment work are usually perceived as a ‘generalized impoverished other’ (Stir-
rat and Henkel 1997, p. 72) by those who provide and fund the development 
activities and programmes. In this context, being labelled as receivers of charity 
or beneficiaries of development work, one’s social status is inevitably lowered 
in relation to the providers and facilitators. This view is especially pertinent in 
the multi-ethnic context of Guyana. During my fieldwork, when enquiring for 
instance whether an informant had ever gone to a charitable distribution, this was 
usually immediately negated and it was stressed that ‘only the poor does go’ (Kloß 
2017). Similarly, the director of the Guyana Red Cross Society described several 
instances and operations during its disaster relief programme in which villages, 
labelled by Red Cross volunteers as severely affected by flooding, rejected their 
support by pointing out that other village communities were in much greater need 
of support. The director described that some of the village councils had explained: 
‘We can manage, but there is a different group further down [the river], can you go 
to them?’ (personal interview). She explained and concluded that nobody wants to 
be marked as ‘receiving’.
While SAF and ADRA do not pronounce significant differences in their pro-
jects and objectives, there is a difference in who should be the receivers and ben-
eficiaries of their work. SAF only focusses its work among the rural communities 
along the coast, the stretch of the country where 90% of the Guyanese population 
lives. Although they did not confirm this aspect, from personal observations it has 
to be remarked that the villages in which they conduct their projects are usually 
identified with the Guyanese Indian population. In addition to this, the organisa-
tion’s name ‘Save Abee’ is Guyanese Creole and translates to ‘Save Us’. The term 
‘abee’ is connoted with rural Indo-Guyanese Creole at present, and hence with the 
‘Indian’ ethnic group. Contrary to this, ADRA includes the Amerindian communi-
ties in the so-called interior (Guyanese hinterland) into their work, communities 
that are also heavily influenced by SDA missionary activities.
These aspects reflect the organisations’ concepts as to who needs but also who 
deserves development and who is considered poor from their perspectives. As 
SAF’s volunteers are usually ‘overseas Guyanese’ or members of the local upper 
class, they consider all rural communities along the coast and in the interior as 
poor and needy, but have to prioritize their work on specific communities. I sug-
gest that SAF may also consider Amerindians and other rural groups as poor, but 
may prioritize their work especially among the Indian group due to restricted time 
and funding, and to empower the Indian/Hindu group, which they perceive to 
have been inferiorized and maltreated. They are, without exception, members of 
the Indian ethnic group, thus are perceived as ‘Indian’ or even ‘Hindu’ by most 
Guyanese. On the other hand, ADRA employees usually live in Guyana and con-
sider Indigenous people as needier than ‘other’ Guyanese, of which they are a part, 
and therefore include them in demonstrating good and inclusive leadership and 
possibly also to support SDA missionary ‘outreach’ programmes. My informants 
consider ADRA as Christian, and thus in moments of ethnic tension members of 
opposing groups will necessarily label their work as ‘religious’ and ‘proselytizing.’
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Challenging power structures
In this context acts of giving and ‘doing development’ become missions to chal-
lenge local power structures. Both organisations compete for status and negotiate 
power relations in the Guyanese community through practices of giving, taking, or 
rejecting. This competition not only reflects individual endeavours, but implies and 
extends to status negotiations of specific ethno-religious groups, who development 
organisations (are said to) represent. The work of specific development organisa-
tions hence influences ethnic group and identity formation in present-day Guyana. 
For example, Guyanese Hindus regularly link the practice of conducting chari-
table distributions – as part of their combined development-charity-humanitarian 
approach – to Christian churches and pejoratively comment on these practices. 
They describe that Christian missions, now and in the past, have actively tried to 
convert Hindus to Christianity by such distributions, including organisations such 
as the Red Cross.12 Indeed, Guyanese Hindus have converted to Christianity in 
order to achieve upward social mobility in the past. Being Christian was regarded 
as a prerequisite to claiming and creating ‘respectability’ in the predominantly 
Christian society in which Hinduism was denoted as ‘idol worship’ and ‘back-
ward’.13 Those Indians who converted to Christianity were frequently dismissed as 
‘belly-Christians’ within the Hindu and Muslim communities, meaning that they 
were regarded to have converted only for food, schooling, and the comfort of spe-
cific material goods (Jayawardena 1966; Kloß 2017). Even today and although, in 
general, numbers of inter-faith conversion are not exceedingly high, the ‘threat of 
conversion’ is a common topic in conversations and Hindu sermons. Missionary 
work should not be considered as a historical practice, but today the number of mis-
sionaries is the highest in historical comparison, US Protestant missions forming 
the dominant force (Hearn 2002). This force is visible in contemporary Guyana, for 
example at popular ‘expat’ meeting spots in the capital, where (White) Christian 
groups often meet. Vijay, who is a volunteer at SAF and the Nirvana Humanitarian 
Society, thus commented during the medical outreach programme in August 2015 
that Christian organisations are still very active in proselytization. According to 
him, they offer Hindus material goods such as clothing or educational services such 
as sewing classes. He commented that Christians are ‘converting them wholesale’ 
(personal interview), indicating not only the large amounts of people they (seek to) 
convert, but furthermore the material and economic implications of this process.
Similarly, Prakash, whom I introduced at the beginning of this article, explained 
his motivation for his voluntary work with SAF as a way to contest Christian mis-
sion work and dominance. Similar to many Hindus in Guyana, he emphasized 
Christian mission work as a direct threat to and assault on local Hindu traditions. 
He described:
I cant stand to see my people living in poverty when i know i can do some-
thing to help them. Christian missionaries go to guyana and tell the people 
them if they become christians that their life will become better and how they 
will get food and clothing from them . . . and i tell u this alot of people give in 
to it . . . i cant stop that from happing but i can aid my people them to become 
Giving and development 133
stronger, believe in our way of life. . . . Hinduism may not be perfect in all 
aspects of life in everyones point of view. . . . I have nothing against no one 
religions but for some one to tell my people that my religion is not real and 
the only way to god is through christ, that i have a problem with.
(Email, 3 September 2012)
In this context, Prakash regarded his volunteer work as a possibility not only to 
support those people whom he defined as poor and needy, but furthermore to dem-
onstrate the capacity of Hindus to organize charitable and developmental work.
Gift exchange consists of three stages – the acts of giving, accepting, and return-
ing a gift. The non-acceptance of a gift, of support, or of specific services may 
thus be regarded as transforming and challenging social hierarchy. The rejecting 
person denies lower status and hence directly or indirectly challenges the giver. 
When rejecting a gift, a person or group has the capacity to counteract the label 
of ‘taker’ and to reject a lower status position. By not only rejecting Christian 
charitable gifts, hence denying a lower status of Hindus, Prakash implemented 
his distributions as a practice of resistance – and development – that enabled him 
and Hindus in general to take on the societal position of giver and to (re)define 
who is ‘poor’ and ‘needy’. He consequently dismantled the (colonial) idea that 
Hinduism is an obstacle to development, highlighting that Hinduism indeed is no 
source of under-development and does not lack social concern (Renders 2002; 
Nadkarni 2007).
Asking himself, ‘why is it that there are only Christian missionaries that travel 
the worlds to convert to Christianity? Why [do] they target third world countries? 
Why do they feed off the poor and uneducated to their standards? What makes 
them think that their way of life is the only way of life?’ he pronounced his general 
resentment towards practices of cultural imposition and conversion. Emphasizing 
that SAF’s intentions are not to convert people to Hinduism by offering develop-
ment support and humanitarian services, he also pointed out his and the founda-
tion’s greater morality in relation to Christian organisations. Although he admitted 
that among his intentions is the warding off of Hindu conversion to Christianity, 
he claimed to be acting based on more genuine and humanitarian principles com-
pared to Christians, claiming a higher status of Hinduism at the inter-religious 
level and thus contesting Guyanese socio-religious hierarchy and the dominance 
of Christian churches. In a similar way, ADRA challenges the socio-religious 
hierarchy; it challenges the more established Christian churches – Anglicans, 
Methodists, Catholics – and their positioning in the local hierarchy. Thus, both 
organisations claim to be, and create, better leaders, who are ‘more moral’ and 
‘more spiritual’. These claims accentuate the perceived relevance of morality and 
spirituality for good leadership and governance, hence for holistic development.
Conclusion
Holistic development is a concept used to contest hierarchy in Guyana. It supports 
claims for more efficient development, to achieve better living conditions on the 
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one hand, but on the other hand intricately serves as a means to claim or main-
tain powerful positions in social relations as well as local socio-religious hierar-
chies. To most of my informants in Guyana, holistic development consists of both 
material and spiritual dimensions, which have to be combined in order to achieve 
sustainability. Disseminating an alternative notion of development, the studied 
organisations may be regarded as development entrepreneurs, as discussed in 
the introduction of this volume (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019). Claims of conduct-
ing holistic and hence more effective development enable and support specific 
development organisations’ acquisition of funding and status. Such claims imply 
concepts of ‘good’ or ‘better’ ways of doing development. Furthermore, social 
actors, ethnic groups, and development organisations claim and negotiate status 
on the basis of claiming societal positions of giver, or of being a ‘better’ (more 
moral) giver. Giving as a social act between people requires a taking, receiving, or 
rejecting; hence the capacity to provide for oneself and to define others as needier 
contests established power structures in society. Development organisations must 
hence take on a view of development that does not mask the continuing and intri-
cate relations of power. They have to acknowledge that although they may claim 
a secular identity and a multi-religious, multi-ethnic approach, local actors and 
‘beneficiaries’ may have different perspectives on how the identity and work of an 
organisation is constituted, focussing for instance more on the aspects of where 
and with whom an organisation works. As the relation between power dynamics 
and faith-based development work is under-researched at present, this seems to 
be a promising topic for further research, particularly in multi-religious societies 
and inter-religious co-operations.
Notes
 1 The author would like to thank the members of the fellow group ‘Religion and Devel-
opment in the Global South’ of the Center for Religion, Economy and Politics (Uni-
versity of Basel) for their helpful comments and suggestions throughout the research 
and writing process. For sharing their knowledge and providing support, the author 
also thanks many other contributors, including Rishee Thakur, David Hinds, Kemani 
Nehusi, members of Save Abee, Nirvana and ADRA in Guyana, Karen and Glenda 
Obermuller, Simmone La Rose, Priya Singh, Rollingston ‘Sam’ Robinson, Shanya 
Cordis, Oveanne Manswell Austin, Anto Bhowandin and family, the Walker family 
and the staff at Oasis Café, Scheherazade Khan and family, Hans Neher and family, 
the Outram family, Wanita Huburn, Sunil, Hugh Todd, Elizabeth Persaud, and Mark 
Anthony Benschop.
 2 All names have been changed to ensure my informants’ anonymity.
 3 The mission statement is: ‘Providing education and quality of life to the children 
of tomorrow living in poverty around the world’ (capitalized in original, Save Abee 
 Foundation, 2016, np).
 4 The Seventh Day Adventist Church was formally established in 1863 in the USA.
 5 Indian denotes an ethnic group in Guyana, which is socially constructed through other-
ing processes particularly in relation to Guyanese ‘Africans’.
 6 Here I refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of capital (Bourdieu 1984/2010).
 7 Mixed: 19.9%; Amerindian: 10.5%; Chinese: 0.2%; Portuguese: 0.3%; White: 0.1% 
(Bureau of Statistics 2012, p. 4).
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 8 Both ‘African’ and ‘Indian’ are emic terms used among my informants.
 9 In this context, my interest in Guyanese Hinduism as focus for my doctoral dissertation 
was explained as well: having explained that I used to be a (nominal) Catholic, most of 
my informants confirmed that they ‘now understand’ my interest in Hinduism, as both 
denominations are ‘essentially the same’.
 10 The category ‘Other Christian’ consists of ‘Baptists, Moravians, Brethren, Method-
ists among others’ (Benjamin 2002, p. 31). Note the double-mention of the category 
‘Methodist.’
 11 Catholics define stewardship as a kind of leadership that exceeds the function of shar-
ing resources, stewardship theory advocating that ‘the duty of an organisation leader 
was to maximize long-term wealth creation to benefit society and all stakeholders’ 
(Caldwell and Hayes 2010, p. 501).
 12 As mentioned earlier, the Guyana Red Cross Society does not label itself as a Christian 
organisation.
 13 Respectability is a specific value system in Guyana and other parts of the Anglo-
phone Caribbean on the basis of which social status is ranked (Wilson 1969, 1973; 
Stoler 1989). While initially the ‘mores advocated by the church, including especially 
monogamous marriage, [were] the ultimate referent for respectability’ (Wilson 1973, 
p. 100), standards of respectability were adapted, challenged, and promoted espe-
cially in the post-independence era since Guyana’s independence from Great Britain 
in 1966.
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6  Contextualized development 
in post-genocide Rwanda
Exploring the roles of Christian 




In 1994, violence exploded in the small country of Rwanda in Central Africa. 
Within 100 days, up to 1,000,000 children, women and men were slaughtered 
before the eyes of a world that silently stood by (Dallaire 2004).2 Most of the 
victims were members of the Tutsi-minority (accounting for about 15% of the 
Rwandan population), yet countless moderate Hutu that refused to participate in 
the bloodshed were murdered as well. For the survivors, the prospects were bleak. 
The country had been turned into debris and ashes. Even before the civil war, 
starting in 1990 and culminating in the devastating genocide of 1994, Rwanda had 
been a country of “Low Human Development” according to the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI). After the end of the genocide, the country’s Human Develop-
ment Index Value (HDIV) had dropped from 0.291 in 1980 to 0.238 in 1990 (cf. 
United Nations Development Programme).
Yet recent years have witnessed a remarkable change. Rwanda’s HDI value 
has steadily increased to 0.524 in 2018. Credit Suisse, one of Switzerland’s most 
renowned banks, has recently praised Rwanda’s “economic miracle” and “irre-
pressible entrepreneurial spirit” (Amman 2015, p. 31). Indeed, banks and business 
around the world have started to pay attention to Rwanda. As “foreign investors 
are coming in droves, net direct investments have increased more than 20-fold” 
(Amman 2015, p. 40). At the same time, concerns regarding a political climate 
that tends to stifle basic human rights such as freedom of opinion, of press and of 
political opposition continue to be voiced (Thomson 2015; Bouka 2018).3
This chapter is an attempt to follow Rwanda’s quest for political stability and 
development by looking at some of the factors that are transforming a country 
devastated by bloody conflict into a thriving community and expanding economic 
force. Of the many factors that influence Rwanda’s development in key areas 
such as education, infrastructure and the health system, we will examine two in 
particular, the role of Rwanda’s religious actors, especially Christian churches, 
and the role of the Rwandan government’s emphasis on reconciliation. With over 
90% of Rwanda’s population adhering to the Christian faith, the questions guiding 
my research include: What roles do Christian churches play in reconciliation and 
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development efforts? How is the relationship between reconciliation and develop-
ment being perceived? And are there any differences between the developmental 
and conflict resolution activities undertaken by these religious actors and those 
exerted by secular actors such as the government?
After an introduction into the specific context of post-genocide Rwanda, three 
main parts will serve to explore the questions above. The first two parts are 
devoted to the roles of Christian churches, in the context of development as well 
as in the context of conflict resolution. In order to include different voices from 
the Christian faith, I will look at Rwanda’s Anglican, Presbyterian and Pentecos-
tal churches. A third part then seeks to compare and contrast the role of religious 
actors in development and reconciliation with the role of the Rwandan govern-
ment. In the end, we will see a contextualized understanding of development 
emerge that links development inextricably to conflict resolution and reconcilia-
tion. In the context of post-genocide Rwanda, developmental endeavours cannot 
be viewed separately to efforts for reconciliation. Hence, Christian churches as 
specific types of FBOs in Rwanda have to adapt to the national field of develop-
ment discourses where reconciliation is the key issue.
In my methodology, I make use of a combination of approaches. A hermeneu-
tical perspective aimed at the analysis of scholarly literature is utilized together 
with a modest empirical investigation based on material available online as well 
as the evaluation of qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with central 
actors within Rwanda’s development and reconciliation context in February 2016.
The context: country, culture, genocide
In 1994, this small country – which is about half the size of Switzerland – leapt 
into the consciousness of the world community by being ravaged by one of the 
fastest and shortest genocides in human history. This eruption of violence that 
cost about 1,000,000 people their lives was preceded by decades of violent hatred 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Here, it is pertinent that Hutu (84% of the popula-
tion), Tutsi (15%) and Twa (a minority of about 1%) are not considered conven-
tional ethnic descriptions. Rather, they refer to social groups sharing one and the 
same language and culture. The social ascriptions Tutsi, Hutu and Twa depend 
on wealth and occupation. Whoever had more than ten heads of cattle was con-
sidered a livestock farmer and thus a Tutsi. Whoever had less was a tiller and 
Hutu. It was the colonial powers – first Germany, then Belgium after the First 
World War – that encouraged the rivalry among these groups by their strategies 
of divide et impera. Religious sociologist Richard Friedli thus rightly speaks of a 
“historical responsibility of Europe” (Friedli 2000, pp. 138–139) with regards to 
Africa’s ethno-political conflicts, including Rwanda. After Rwanda’s independ-
ence in 1962, these rivalries intensified, resulting in massacres with hundreds of 
thousands killed.
At the time of the genocide in 1994, Rwanda was one of Africa’s most “Chris-
tian” countries. Still today, over 90% claim adherence to the Christian faith 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2014). Even though the Christian 
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churches, in particular the Roman Catholic church, have lost a lot of credibility 
due the complicity of some of their clergy and members in the genocide, the 
Christian faith is still deeply ingrained in Rwanda’s sense of self-identity. This 
accords for the fact that the Christian churches hold a paramount position as sig-
nificant players in Rwanda’s civil society. Rwanda thus presents a social and reli-
gious makeup quite different from the Western secularized countries with its strict 
separations between public/secular and private/religious spheres.
Being among the smallest African countries with about 12 million inhabitants, 
Rwanda is at the same time Africa’s most densely populated country. It is therefore 
impossible for perpetrators and victims to permanently avoid each other. Here, 
we face a situation entirely different from, for instance, Germany and its former 
European enemies after World War II with Europe’s clear-cut borders. After they 
are released from prison, perpetrators usually go back to their families and their 
home villages which are not uncommonly also the place of their atrocities and the 
home of the survivors. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that for many 
people, everyday life in Rwanda cannot be managed by the individual. Harvest, 
building houses, even daily tasks such as fetching water depend on the interaction 
and mutual support of family and village structures.
The Rwandan genocide distinguishes itself not only by preventability, its sys-
tematic preparation, its brevity and its intensity, but also by its cruelty. Most people 
were killed with machetes, which were used to cut the victims into pieces, men, 
women, children. Due to the violent sexual excesses in the Rwandan genocide, 
sexual violence and mutilation has since become considered and punishable as a 
genocidal crime (cf. the so-called “Akayesu ruling” of 1998). Another character-
istic of this genocide is the fact that many of the victims and the perpetrators knew 
each other, they were friends, or even family. While any genocide is directed at the 
total annihilation of the opponent, in Rwanda, it was directed in particular against 
the next generation, the children. A UNICEF study of 1998 found that 96% of 
children had been affected actively or passively by the massacres (Gupta 1998). 
84% of the children, who had lost their parents, siblings or other relatives, had 
been direct witnesses of their brutal murder. 27% had witnessed rapes and 22% 
of the children managed to save their lives by hiding underneath human corpses. 
These children, having survived the slaughter, are now the generation that is faced 
with the task to rebuild their country.
According to the most recent UN Income Index of 2018 (cf. United Nations 
Development Programme 2018), Rwanda is considered a poor country, ranking 
158 of 189. Yet since 2005, Rwanda’s GDP per capita has steadily and consist-
ently increased, as has its HDI value. Indeed, recent years have seen a remarkable 
economic progress. I have already mentioned Credit Suisse’s enthusiastic praise 
of Rwanda’s current economic miracle (Amman 2015). Indeed, banks and busi-
ness around the world have started to pay attention to Rwanda; Rwanda’s capital 
Kigali has become a buzz centre for commerce, banks and business. The economy 
has grown by 7% to 8% each year over the past decade, benefitting large seg-
ments of the population. Compared to 20 years ago, life expectancy has doubled 
to 67 years, child mortality has dropped by 80% and 98% of children, including 
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girls, attend primary school. There is a nationwide health insurance plan, a quite 
remarkable achievement for a developing country. In the World Bank’s “ease of 
doing business” index, Rwanda ranks 46th, thereby outperforming Italy, Greece 
and Luxembourg (Amman 2015, p. 34). With these comments on the context serv-
ing as a background to the following deliberations, we will now take a closer look 
at the roles of Rwanda’s religious actors in the country’s developmental process.
“Holistic development”4: Rwandan churches  
and development
The religio-scape of Rwanda shows remarkable differences between pre- and 
post-genocide times.5 The most significant difference is a sharp decline of mem-
bership within the Catholic church, which dropped from 65% in 1990 to 44% post- 
genocide. In contrast to this, there is a noticeable increase within the Protestant 
denominations that almost doubled in membership and are now at 38%. The mem-
bership of the Church of the Seventh-Day Advents increased after the genocide, 
progressing from 8% to 12% (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2014, 
p. xv). With over 90% of the population adhering to the Christian faith, the Chris-
tian churches function as significant actors in Rwanda’s civil society. As such, 
they assume a crucial role in all processes affecting Rwandan society, including 
development and reconciliation.
Below, I explore the concepts of development as displayed by three different 
FBOs in Rwanda, the Presbyterian Church, the Anglican Church and the Pen-
tecostal Church. In the following, I employ the term FBO according to Susan 
 Dicklitch and Heather Rice’s proposal that “FBNs [Faith-based NGOs]6 can be 
defined as non-state actors that have a central religious or faith core to their phi-
losophy, membership, or programmatic approach, although they are not simply 
missionaries” (p. 662). As such, churches can be viewed as a specific kind of 
FBO. Part of this specificity surfaces when regarding the issue of evangelism 
or proselytization. As Heist and Cnaan note, FBOs are often suspected of using 
development as a means for converting locals and adding new members (Heist 
and Cnaan 2016, p. 11). Many Christian churches, however, view evangelization 
as part of their DNA. Development is thus not employed as a disguise for evange-
lization. Rather, a concern for development often arises from their understanding 
of Christian responsibility and love of their neighbour.7 Regarding the issue of 
FBOs and proselytization, Heist and Cnaan also point to the fact that not only 
FBOs, but “all organizations aim to transform the way people in developing coun-
tries think and operate” (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 12). Nevertheless, they add that 
the majority of FBOs focus on providing developmental services rather than on 
proselytization. A comprehensive overview of the academic literature on FBOs 
has recently been presented by Ware et al. (2016) and Heist and Cnaan (2016). 
Neither of them, however, discuss local churches within developing countries and 
their role in development, which is the focus of this chapter.8 In a first step, we will 
look at similarities and differences between these three different Christian play-
ers with regards to their understanding of development. Special attention will be 
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given to the way they relate to developmental norms as presented by the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs).
We will begin by taking a closer look at the developmental endeavours of the 
Église presbytérienne au Rwanda (EPR). The EPR’s beginnings date back to 1907, 
when German missionaries from the Bethel Mission came to Rwanda. In 1959, 
the church became independent and took on its current name. Today, the EPR has 
about 300,000 members. With 50,000 new members in the past five years alone, 
the EPR belongs to the fastest-growing Christian denominations in Rwanda. The 
steady increase in membership is not least due to its current focus on evangelism 
and church growth. The EPR’s vision is to “build a strong church whose Chris-
tians are spiritually mature, able to testify God’s kingdom in the world and whose 
social environment is fully bloomed” (Église presbytérienne au Rwanda (EPR)). 
In order to achieve this vision, it views itself under a twofold mission, evangeliza-
tion and development: “firstly to evangelize by proclaiming the love and salvation 
offered by God through his son Jesus Christ . . . and secondly to manifest the love 
of God through the concrete actions of human and social development” (Église 
presbytérienne au Rwanda (EPR)).
To the current President of the EPR, Pascal Bataringaya, the mission of “social 
development” is church oriented and based on the development of families. “We 
can develop the families. For if the families can develop, we can develop the 
church”.9 This is elaborated in more detail by Odile Nagahire, the director of 
development of EPR’s Gitarama Presbytery under the perspective of “holis-
tic development”. “The developmental concept of the Presbyterian Church in 
Rwanda which stipulates that the process of Development has to be holistic in 
terms of addressing all dimensions of life (spiritual, social, economic, intellectual, 
cultural and ecological) at all levels of the church (individuals, families, grass-
roots churches, chapels, parishes, presbyteries and the national level of EPR) in a 
bottom-up approach (from the grassroots to the top level) as it is believed that if 
individuals and families are strong, the church will also be strong” (Église pres-
bytérienne au Rwanda (EPR) 2016).
With the long-term goal of developing the church in mind, the Presbyterian 
Church engages in a variety of developmental projects that take up different devel-
opmental norms put forward by the SDGs as the following examples show.10 SDG 
3 (“Good health and well-being”) and SDG 4 (“Quality education”) are taken up 
by the church’s engagement in a number of co-operations with both other reli-
gious as well as secular partners. In a specific kind of public – private partnership 
with the Rwandan state, the Presbyterian Church manages more than 100 schools, 
2 hospitals and 7 health centres. While the church is responsible for the buildings, 
the infrastructure and materials necessary, the government pays for the teachers 
and the medical staff. Furthermore, in co-operation with an international religious 
NGO, the Presbyterian Church has built a care centre for more than 100 homeless 
boys in Kigali, providing food, care and education. This can be linked to SDG 
1 (“No poverty”), SDG 2 (“Zero hunger”) in addition to SDG 3 and 4. Through 
their training of women to become pastors, the Presbyterian Church promotes 
gender equality (SDG 5) in a predominantly patriarchal culture as they also teach 
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care of the environment as God’s creation (SDG 6 “Clean water and sanitation” 
and SDG 13 “Climate action”). The EPR, we can sum up, is engaged in a wide 
variety of developmental efforts that link to different SDGs. Their faith dimension 
is clearly visible in their concept of holistic development, which is characterized 
by an ecclesiological dimension. The ultimate goal of developmental endeavours 
is thus the development of the church of Jesus Christ.
Next to the EPR, we will take a closer look at the Anglican Church’s under-
standing of development. With about 1 million members, the Anglican Church has 
become a significant player in Rwanda’s civil society. The Anglican Church has 
its roots in the former Rwanda Mission that established is first station in 1925 (cf. 
Anglican Communion Rwanda). The Anglican Church – as well as the EPR – exem-
plifies a specific type of FBO: While it is an FBO in its own right, it is at the same 
time part of a larger international network of churches and mission organisations, 
the German-based FBO United Evangelical Mission (UEM).11 As a member of the 
larger FBO body UEM, the EPR and the Anglican Church thus profit from person-
nel exchanges and financial aid through UEM partner churches. Heist and Cnaan 
point to this specificity as a strength unique to FBOs. “[M]any faith-based interna-
tional NGOs have the advantage of local congregations that they can mobilize in 
their development and welfare services. Having supporting allies on the ground is 
a strategic advantage that many secular NGOs lack” (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 7).
Developmental endeavours by the Anglican Church have been channelled in 
the Rural Development Interdiocesan Service (RDIS) with its vision of “ ‘a holy 
soul in a healthy body’ with a focus on the person as a whole” (Kabango 2003). 
The aim is, according to RDIS’s former leader John Wesley Kabango,12 to work 
for the “development of the poorest of the poor” (Kabango 2003) through projects 
that aim at building livelihoods in poor areas, through occupational training in 
areas such as animal husbandry, food production, micro-enterprise development, 
fisheries, beekeeping and tree nurseries. Similar to the EPR, development for the 
Anglican Church is set in a church context: “It is our conviction that the church 
holds the key to the real development of life in Rwanda and that God is longing 
to use its ministry to transform the physical, spiritual and social lives of ordinary 
people and the environment in which they live” (Kabango 2003). By referring 
to the physical, spiritual and social dimensions, the Anglican Church displays a 
holistic understanding of development. Yet the Anglican Church clearly distin-
guishes “Christian development” from other kinds of development: “Christian 
development does not mean organizations, buildings or projects, but building up 
mature Christians and teaching them skills to improve the quality of their lives 
and communities” (Kabango 2003). This concern, according to Kabango, takes 
different shapes, including building homes for the homeless, contributions for 
medical bills, food for the vulnerable and sharing of seeds as well as increased 
participation in church activities. With its Christian outlook clearly perceptible 
in its holistic understanding of development, the RDIS displays a wide variety 
of projects aimed at the “development of the poorest of the poor”. Within this 
variety, however, a strong focus on the alleviation of poverty and hunger (SDG 1 
and 2) is noticeable.
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Our third focal point, the Pentecostal Church of Rwanda (ADEPR), presents 
again a somewhat different picture. Representative of the fast-growing Pente-
costal movement in Rwanda, the ADEPR started in 1940 by the Swedish Free 
Mission. Today, it claims to have about two million members13 and describes 
itself as a “religious organization with the vision consisting of quantitative and 
qualitative transformation of the Rwandan Community by Jesus Christ Integral 
Gospel” (ADEPR Education Ministry). In addition, ADEPR “aims at helping the 
community to its holistic development” (ADEPR Education Ministry). Devel-
opment in particular is viewed in terms of education (SDG 4), for which the 
ADEPR presents itself as “government partner” (ADEPR Education Ministry). 
By aiming for “education for development” (ADEPR Education Ministry), its 
concept of development focusses specifically on education issues as a “funda-
mental human right” (ADEPR Education Ministry) and “a way to achieve devel-
opment and poverty reduction in Rwanda” (ADEPR Education Ministry). As 
such, ADEPR is responsible for 80 nursery schools, 158 primary schools, 58 
secondary schools, 6 vocational and technical schools and 4 biblical schools. In 
addition, ADEPR has literacy programmes throughout the country through its 
chapels (3,108 centres). Their literacy programmes PANA (Programme National 
d’Alphabétisation) was awarded two prizes by the UNESCO in 2001 and 2012. 
In marked difference to the EPR with its variety of different developmental activ-
ities, the ADEPR’s focus on development is conceptualized primarily in terms of 
education (SDG 4), with some developmental concerns relating to health (SDG 3) 
and empowerment of women (SDG 6). Even though the ADEPR describes itself 
as a religious organisation, it distinguishes itself from both the EPR and the 
Anglican Church by using human rights language, which is not found so overtly 
in the other two FBOs.
The overview of the developmental engagements of three different churches 
in Rwanda, the EPR, the Anglican Church and the ADEPR, has yielded a mixed 
picture. While the EPR displays a wide variety of development projects linked 
to a number of SDGs, the Anglican Church focusses on rural development, in 
particular on the alleviation of hunger and poverty (SDG 1 and 2). The ADEPR in 
turn conceives of development primarily in educational terms (SDG 4). All FBOs, 
however, are united by their focus on holistic development and their perception 
of development in terms of the church. In contrast to the EPR and the Anglican 
Church, the ADEPR additionally employs human rights language.
What, then, can be said in terms of these FBOs’ relationship to the SDGs? At 
first glance, the churches’ developmental activities by the churches do not seem 
to differ much from developmental activities by non-faith-based actors. These 
similarities are also noted by Ware et al. who detect “little observable difference 
between FBO and NGO activity” (Ware et al. 2016, p. 328), for instance, in the 
sector of education and health services. Correspondingly, FBO activities directed 
at “building livelihoods in poor communities” as displayed particularly in the 
Anglican Church’s engagement for the poorest of the poor constitutes “another 
area of similarity” between FBOs and NGOs (Ware et al. 2016, p. 328). How-
ever, despite these similarities, it would be too hasty to conclude that the religious 
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actors in Rwanda simply reiterate the developmental norms proclaimed by the 
SDGs. The relationship is more complex. Rather than merely echoing secular 
developmental norms, the churches take them up and creatively adapt or trans-
form them. This leads to certain characteristic features of the Rwandan churches 
with regards to developmental norms that are not necessarily shared by their secu-
lar counterparts.
First, the churches tend to view development not as an end in itself, but rather 
as a means to an end. Bataringaya, for instance, points to church development as 
the main goal. In a similar way, Kabango believes that “the church holds the key 
to the real development of life in Rwanda” (Kabango 2003). Development thus 
becomes a tool in aiming for the implementation of Christian values such as love, 
hope and peace. This observation is in line with Josephine Sundqvist’s assessment 
of the Pentecostal movement. “The Pentecostal movement has been active in this 
field [i.e. development] but is has not been their focus” (Sundqvist 2011, p. 170). 
This must not be misinterpreted, however, as though religious actors considered 
development to be irrelevant. The contrary is the case as, as evidenced by the dif-
ferent development activities of the religious actors outlined so far in this section.
Second, the religious actors’ concern for development is characterized by their 
holistic perspective. Churches like the Presbyterian Church care for both the indi-
vidual and their family. They care for both their spiritual and their material needs. 
The ADEPR phrases this engagement in the terms of “holistic development”, 
echoed by Kabango’s “focus on the person as a whole”. This difference to non-
FBOs is also noted by Ware et al. “FBOs have often been established with holistic 
emphases embracing both physical and spiritual well-being” (Ware et al. 2016, 
p. 327). With their emphasis on individual transformation and changed relation-
ships, the churches succeed in engaging their members on a deep and existential 
level, thereby “build[ing] trust” (Kabango 2003). Heist and Cnaan also consider 
trust a specific strength of FBOs in comparison with secular NGOs (Heist and 
Cnaan 2016, p. 5).
We can thus summarize our findings so far by stating that many of the devel-
opmental norms as proposed by the SDGs are being taken up by the Christian 
churches in Rwanda, yet in a way that adapts them creatively and dynamically. 
As development entrepreneurs, the churches effectively participate in and shape 
prevalent development concepts (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume). By 
viewing development not as a goal in itself, but in relationship to the church and to 
their Christian values, Christian churches such as the Anglican, Presbyterian and 
Pentecostal manage to engage their members in programmes on poverty allevia-
tion, education or health care on a deep, holistic and existential level that govern-
ment programmes have a hard time attaining. Furthermore, through their focus on 
transforming behaviour and lasting relationships, they manage to build trust and 
thereby achieve a high degree of sustainability.
These findings are in line with evidence yielded by other studies exploring 
the relationship between religious actors and development. With regards to 
Pentecostal churches, anthropologist Dena Freeman argues that “Pentecostal 
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churches are often rather more effective change agents than are development 
NGOs” (Freeman 2012, p. 3). She gives four reasons for this claim (Freeman 
2012, pp. 24–26). (1) Pentecostal churches, contrary to many secular NGOs, are 
usually self-funded and self-sustainable. The mutual dependency of congregation 
and church leadership results in a high degree of both accountability and identi-
fication of the members with “their” church. (2) “Pentecostal churches focus on 
transforming individual subjectivities” (Freeman 2012, p. 25). By emphasizing 
the necessity to be “born again” and to “break with the past”, new behavioural 
patterns are encouraged that are often prerequisite in order to achieve sustain-
able economic improvement. (3) Not least through numerous weekly activities, 
Pentecostal churches are rather successful in cultivating participation. Church 
members are meant to feel “at home” in the “church family”, thus regarding the 
church as an integral part of their identity. Secular NGOs, on the other hand, 
often remain on the periphery of individual and communal identity. (4) While 
many secular NGOs ignore the religious fabric of much of African reality, Pen-
tecostalism has found a meaningful way to “relate to the past and to traditional 
African religions and cultural practices” (Freeman 2012, p. 26). Not only does 
Pentecostalism incorporate traditional social and cultural forms, it also offers 
ways to transform them.14
Observing the developmental impact of both a church and a secular NGO in a 
Ugandan village, anthropologist Ben Jones summarizes the differences between 
faith-based developmental work and that of secular NGOs as follows: In the end, 
the “work of community development has mostly technical functions and rep-
resents an ideological agenda – of rights, empowerment or participation – that 
had little purchase. In a fundamental way the work of NGOs lacked meaning” 
(Jones 2012, p. 200). Rather than playing off religious and secular developmental 
work against each other, it seems that the chances for sustainable development 
are greatest when both are joining forces, balancing each other’s weaknesses by 
their own respective strengths. It is in their mutual co-operation that “the overall 
potential for change is phenomenal” (Freeman 2012, p. 26).
So far, we have looked at developmental activities of three different religious 
actors that can be linked to different SDGs, such as alleviating poverty and hunger 
or focussing on health and education issues. As such, the projects described need 
not necessarily be situated in Rwanda, but could be found in any other country 
undergoing processes of development. The specific history of Rwanda, however – 
with a civil war starting in 1990, culminating in the excess of blood and violence 
of the 1994 genocide – demands a more contextualized understanding of develop-
ment. Development in post-genocide Rwanda is inextricably linked to the coun-
try’s ongoing quest for stability and sustainable peace. Faced with this challenge 
only one generation after the genocide, when mutual distrust, hate and fear is still 
prevalent, the quest for stability and security has been turned into a quest for con-
flict resolution and reconciliation. Again, the significance of Christian churches as 
major players in Rwanda’s civil society and their part in the national reconcilia-
tion process, cannot be overestimated.
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“Development and reconciliation go together”:15  
Rwandan churches and reconciliation
In this section, I will explore the churches’ roles in Rwanda’s process of reconcili-
ation. My key research questions will include how the churches engage in the pro-
cess and how their efforts in reconciliation is linked to their developmental efforts 
described above. Again, my approach will be inductive, starting from the analysis 
of the three different church players, that is, the EPR, the Anglican Church and 
the ADEPR. Prior to entering into the analysis of the churches, I will give a brief 
introduction into the concept of reconciliation.
The formerly religiously connoted term reconciliation, has long since become 
established in historical and political discourse. Linked to the idea of a “new 
beginning”, of stability, safety and (economic) growth after a violent past, the 
term has been frequently employed by societies in transition. South Africa and 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is the most well-
known example of this quest (Braun 1999). Yet what exactly is “reconciliation”? 
While both academics as well as practitioners have pointed to the term’s com-
plexity (Leiner and Schliesser 2018), I would like to draw attention to some of 
its fundamental features that are of particular relevance to the specific context 
of post-genocide Rwanda. In alignment with theologian Stefanie van de Loo 
I understand reconciliation as a relational term that refers both to a procedure and 
a result. It is a “reciprocal process between at least two parties, who in immediate 
or mediated contact with each other reflect on their mutual relationship, and who 
aim to design this relationship in a positive and new way by mutual acceptance, 
as well as the result of this process” (van de Loo 2009, p. 16).16 The process of 
reconciliation may include “different elements such as the confession of guilt, 
atonement, asking and granting of forgiveness . . . up to a newly ordered relation-
ship” (Enns 2013, p. 24).
The relationship aspect as displayed in reconciliation is fundamental to the 
Rwandan context, which views itself under the perspective of ubuntu, the African 
concept of community. According to Desmond Tutu, ubuntu “presupposes that 
we are all connected to one another. Nobody can be a human being by him or 
herself” (Tutu 2008, p. 12). This means, “my personality is bound up into yours. 
If I destroy your personality, mine will eventually be destroyed as well” (Tutu 
2008, p. 144). Bataringaya summarizes it like this: “To us, social harmony is the 
‘summum bonum’ ” (Bataringaya 2012, p. 174).
While the EPR’s first mission is to evangelize, its second mission is to “mani-
fest the love of God through the concrete actions of human and social develop-
ment” (Église presbytérienne au Rwanda (EPR)). These “concrete actions”, as 
represented in the developmental projects described above, are characterized by a 
common factor, namely reconciliation. As Bataringaya puts it, “development and 
reconciliation go together. We care for reconciliation. And when reconciliation 
is an option, people can develop. They can work together, they can, for instance, 
found a cooperative”.17 Bataringaya employs the following example to explain 
the unique situation of Rwanda, “Imagine there is a project in our village and 
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everybody should help. We must rebuild parts of a street that the rain had washed 
away. I come to the place to help. Now I see that Innocence, who is my enemy, is 
there as well. I cannot bear seeing Innocence. I cannot bear working together with 
him. I turn around and go. See: No reconciliation, no development”.18
The close link between development and reconciliation is displayed on several 
levels within the EPR. I will now turn to addressing the following two levels, 
pastoral training as well as the individual parishes. In order to equip current and 
future pastors to lead development and reconciliation programmes in their par-
ishes, the EPR founded the “Centre de formation et de documentation” (CFD) in 
1996, shortly after the genocide. The objectives of this centre are, “on one hand, 
to contribute to the reconstruction of the vitality of religious denominations after 
the 1994 Genocide tragedy, and, on the other hand, to serve as a cornerstone to the 
unity and reconciliation process for the people of Rwanda” (cf. Église presbytéri-
enne au Rwanda (EPR)).
As one paradigmatic example on the parish level, we will take a look at the vil-
lage of Remera. Through the guidance of the local EPR pastor, a trained mediator, 
a mediation team called the “lights” was assembled that aims at building rela-
tionships with perpetrators and with victims. Once these relationships are estab-
lished, the “lights” aim at fostering links between the perpetrators and victims 
themselves. While they meet regularly in a group setting to discuss, the “lights” 
also encourage perpetrators and victims to bond directly by visiting each other. 
Again, we encounter the developmental aspect as well: perpetrators and victims 
are supported in establishing small businesses. In the case of the “lights”, they 
have founded a micro loan system that assists perpetrators and victims in growing 
and selling tree saplings.
A very similar picture emerges when we look at the Anglican Church’s engage-
ment in development, which cannot be separated from efforts in reconciliation. 
In the programme description of the previously discussed Rural Development 
Interdiocesan Service (RDIS), the following issues are mentioned: “Mobilizing 
the church, rural development, reconciliation, integral mission” (Kabango 2003). 
As with the EPR, the church comes first, followed by development and reconcili-
ation. The final point, integral mission seems to sum up the three preceding terms. 
The inherent connectedness of the three endeavours is exemplified by the list of 
activities describing the RDIS. “Activities include evangelism, teaching on for-
giveness and reconciliation, animal husbandry, food production, micro-enterprise 
development, fisheries, beekeeping and tree nurseries” (Kabango 2003). This cat-
alogue thus includes evangelistic efforts, conflict resolution endeavours as well as 
a variety of rural development enterprises. The undifferentiated mixture of these 
activities demonstrates how all of them are, in the view of the Anglican Church, 
tied together.
During an interview, Nathan Gasatura, Bishop of the Anglican Church in Butare 
diocese, situates these efforts of his church into the historical context of the geno-
cide by utilizing the metaphor of a building that had been completely destroyed, 
with its foundations damaged badly. “Rwanda was like ‘Ground Zero’. . . . Mor-
ally, spiritually, socially, economically broken to the core. To be able to get a 
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nation like Rwanda back on track, you need to re-strengthen the foundation. Peo-
ples’ hearts were broken, peoples’ trust was betrayed, and to bring a child to ever 
trust another family again was out of the question”.19 He then refers to the gov-
ernment’s politics of reconciliation, while emphasizing that this policy is not an 
option to the people, but is rather enforced from above.20 “Now the government 
forces people to live together . . . so this country has had its foundation rebuilt 
and that is reconciliation” (Kabango 2003). Still within the metaphor of the build-
ing, Gasatura then draws the connection between reconciliation and development, 
“Now the building gets back on its stand; because now reconciliation has hap-
pened, development can go. . . . Reconciliation and development are inseparable, 
inextricably connected” (Kabango 2003). With 1 million of Rwanda’s total popu-
lation of 12 million people being members of the Anglican Church, the church’s 
activities in both reconciliation and development work has a substantial impact on 
people’s lives. As one example, Gasatura points to International Prison Ministries, 
a church-led programme that focusses on bringing victims and perpetrators and 
their respective families together. There, the aim is to
not only reconcile, but to do projects together, they give them cows together, 
to feed together, milk the cow together, share the milk together, sell what 
remains of the milk together, divide the cash together. They would get medi-
cal insurances together, build their homes together . . . get into cooperatives 
together, maybe it is rice, maybe it is bee hives, maybe about credit and sav-
ings. They also go to church together, celebrate together. 
(Kabango 2003)
With both the EPR and the Anglican Church drawing an innate connection 
between their developmental activities and their efforts in reconciliation, it comes 
to no surprise that the interdependence of development and reconciliation is found 
in the work of the ADEPR as well. Consistent with their focus on development as 
education, they engage in a variety of projects aimed to sensitize and to instruct the 
population on alternative approaches to conflict resolution, on healing and on recon-
ciliation. “Education has played a great role during the reconciliation process since it 
has been used to sensitize the Rwandese society to build the skill of living with diver-
sity” (Sundqvist 2011, p. 183). One of the vehicles employed in this endeavour is the 
radio. While few households in Rwanda own a television, radios are widely popular. 
During the genocide, the radio had been instrumentalized as a conduit of hate and 
abuse, serving to incite and radicalize genocidal attitudes and behaviour. Radio-
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) became synonymous with hate radio. 
ADEPR now makes use of the popularity of radios for its own purposes that prior-
itize evangelism, but also emphasize development and reconciliation. By “becoming 
an important radio announcer by broadcasting a weekly show on the governmental 
radio” the ADEPR “has also contributed to peace” (Sundqvist 2011, p. 183).
One example of their efforts in facilitating reconciliation, is ADEPR’s initiation 
of a “healing and reconciliation ministry” in 2010 (ADEPR Healing and Recon-
ciliation Ministry). Under the heading of “ADEPR has built unity in Rwandans” 
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(ADEPR Healing and Reconciliation Ministry), three different kinds of contribu-
tions are meant to help achieve this goal, all based on the Word of God: giving space 
to share one’s feelings, opening room for questions and discussions and arranging 
for practical help such as “provid[ing] them with shelter, cows and basic materi-
als which they need” (ADEPR Healing and Reconciliation Ministry).Other efforts 
that display the ADEPR’s joint interest in development and reconciliation include 
reconciliation villages in the Southern parts of Rwanda. In these villages, former 
perpetrators who had sought refuge in Tanzania live together with survivors affili-
ated with the ADEPR. Emphasis is placed on communal life as displayed in com-
mon projects, similar to the ones described by the EPR and the Anglican Church. 
Another significant aspect that is found in all three churches is the combination of 
reconciliation and remembrance activities. Again, we recognize the ADEPR’s typi-
cal focus on education, even within their reconciliation efforts. “Genocide remem-
bering activities within ADEPR have enabled Christians who have survived the 
genocide to regain hope and confidence. This has driven those who had dropped 
out of school to resume schooling” (ADEPR Healing and Reconciliation Ministry).
From this section, focusing on the contributions of religious actors to the coun-
try’s reconciliation process, a very specific understanding of development has 
emerged: Development in Rwanda, as it is viewed by the churches, cannot be sep-
arated from reconciliation. The churches’ emphasis on reconciliation thus takes 
up a developmental norm as it is displayed by SDG 16, namely to promote peace, 
justice and strong institutions. The religious actors portrayed here, however, add 
their own emphasis by focusing on sustainable peace as achieved through rec-
onciliation. As such, the churches both embrace SDG 16 as well as modifying 
it according to the specific needs of their own context. In more general terms, 
we might say that the Rwandan churches illustrate how FBOs function as devel-
opment entrepreneurs, moving as boundary agents between different discursive 
fields while adapting and conceptualizing development according to their own 
specific socio-geographical context (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume). 
We will now compare and contrast the specific contributions of the churches to 
development and reconciliation with those of the Rwandan government.
The Rwandan government and the churches: complementary 
partners in development and reconciliation?
A 2005 UN Development Programme report accorded Rwanda the status of 
“special case” (United Nations Development Programme Report 2015) with 
regards to achieving the MDGs due to the devastating material and psychologi-
cal havoc wrecked by the genocide. The trauma of 1994 significantly worsened 
the complex social and economic problems that had already existed pre-genocide 
as all MDG indicators were dramatically declining during the genocide, going 
significantly below the levels achieved in 1990. According to the UNDP report, 
while many other countries were already quite on track to implement the MDGs 
 during the 1990s, “Rwanda is beginning from behind the ‘starting line’ in trying 
to achieve the MDGs” (United Nations Development Programme Report 2015). 
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The report furthermore points to the “main challenge for Rwanda”, namely, “to 
stabilize the country through unity and reconciliation” (United Nations Devel-
opment Programme Report 2015), thus emphasizing the crucial significance of 
conflict resolution and reconciliation in order to achieve stability in a country 
uprooted by crime and violence. For without political stability, all developmental 
activity is doomed to either fail from the beginning or to remain short-lived.
This perception is shared by the current Rwandan government who are well 
aware that conflict resolution, unity and reconciliation are indispensable prerequi-
sites for effective and sustainable development and socio-economic growth. Busi-
nesses will only come to places that are safe and stable. With its ambitious aim 
to turn Rwanda into Africa’s Singapore, the government has turned reconciliation 
into a political target. By implementing a “National Politics of Reconciliation”, 
it pushes reconciliation on several different levels. On the judicial level, Rwanda 
revived her traditional judicial courts, gacaca (Friese 2010).21 Their far-reaching 
impact for the societal process of reconciliation and development necessitates 
a closer look. After the genocide, Rwanda’s judicial system broke down. Most 
judges had been killed; prisons were overcrowded with up to 120,000 people. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had only limited capaci-
ties, so in search for alternatives, Rwanda turned to the gacaca, its traditional 
courts of alternative justice. From 2001 until their official termination in 2012, 
there were about 11,000 gacaca courts throughout the country, with respected 
people serving as lay-judges to preside and to deliver judgments. The establish-
ment of these gacaca courts pursued a number of goals: accelerating the trials, 
bringing to trial most every person who had participated in the genocide, assign-
ing individual guilt and responsibility, finding the truth, and encouraging a large 
proportion of the population to participate. The overall goal was less to achieve 
retributive justice, but rather transformative justice in the sense of reconciliation. 
The implementation of the gacaca courts was also meant to end a culture of impu-
nity, which had been prevailing in Rwanda for decades, particularly for ethnically 
motivated crimes. Though not without contestation, when “compared to its alter-
natives, gacaca should still be judged in a positive light. It is the only feasible and, 
therefore, the best solution to Rwanda’s problems and the legacy of the genocide” 
(Molenaar 2005, p. 165).
On a national level, Rwanda’s “National Unity and Reconciliation Commis-
sion” (NURC) was founded, which offers a number of unity and reconciliation 
projects throughout the country. The ethnic descriptions “Tutsi,” “Hutu” and 
“Twa” were banned by law. Rather, Rwandan unity is now proclaimed by the 
official motto “We are all Rwandan”. Different projects on the communal and 
individual level were initiated, such as education and sensitization projects and 
organized encounters between perpetrators and victims.
With a past of division, hatred and terror, unity and reconciliation are being 
perceived as fundamental to Rwanda’s future. They are the “cornerstone to heal-
ing and restoring social cohesion among Rwandans,” as Fidele Ndayisaba, the 
Executive Secretary of the NURC emphasizes in a contribution called “Ndi Umu-
nyarwanda [‘We are all Rwandan’]. Key to healing and human development” 
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(Ndayisaba 2016). Ndayisaba believes that “When people trust each other, they 
feel safe and work together for their better future” (Ndayisaba 2016). This ties in 
with Bataringaya’s picture of people building a street together: people will only 
work together when there is reconciliation. In a similar vein, Ndayisaba contin-
ues: “More specifically, Ndi Umunyarwanda [‘We are all Rwandan’] spirit . . . has 
become a bridge to healing and human development” (Ndayisaba 2016). In an 
analogous manner, John Rucyahana, president of the NURC and a former Angli-
can bishop, points out during an interview that reconciliation is not only an end 
in itself, but also a means to an end: “We reconcile for a purpose: for unity, for 
development, to recreate our dignity, our desire to make a nation, a living hope for 
this nation”.22 The common quest for development depends on the united efforts 
of all: “If we unite for development, if we unite for the best of this nation, this 
does not exclude anybody” (Ndayisaba 2016).
The data so far suggests that the government and the churches are close part-
ners in their common quest for development and reconciliation. The churches 
emphasize their collaboration with the government in their joint efforts of nation-
building, unity and stability. “We can say that ADEPR has played a very sig-
nificant role in building Rwandan society” (ADEPR Healing and Reconciliation 
Ministry). When asked if there are any differences between government-led and 
church-led development and reconciliation work, EPR’s president Bataringaya 
emphasizes their similarities.23 He points to different health projects to illustrate 
the close partnership between the churches and the government. Both hospitals of 
the EPR, for instance, are run jointly by the church and the government. While the 
church provides the infrastructure and the material, the medical and administra-
tive staff are paid for by the government. Another example of the collaboration 
of the church with the government is, according to Bataringaya, the co-operation 
between the government-led NURC and numerous “Unity and Reconciliation 
Commissions” (URCs) on the local level throughout the country and also within 
the churches. In the case of the Presbyterian Church, there is a local URC within 
each of its 7 presbyteries as well as in each of its 162 congregations. This tight 
net of URCs accounts for the fact that the strategies employed and the emphases 
set are nearly identical throughout the country. On a regular basis, the NURC 
meets with URCs on a semi-local and local level to ensure the quality of their co-
operation. As one example of the close collaboration between the churches and 
the government, Bataringaya points to the country’s annual “Week of Commemo-
ration”, held each year in April in to commemorate the genocide. The preparation 
for this week is done jointly by the NURC and the different URCs throughout the 
country.
The close collaboration then begs the question whether there are any differ-
ences at all between the government and religious actors with regard to the dif-
ferent reconciliation projects. And the answer is, yes, indeed, there are. While 
there are similarities on the strategical and pragmatic level, a look at the content 
reveals significant differences between government-led and church-led initiatives. 
After stating their similarities, Bataringaya continues: “It [i.e. reconciliation] is 
not easier when you are a Christian. But: Christians have the word of God. This is 
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a big help. The pastor and the church can play a great role in healing. It is better 
if you have the word of God to find the way for bringing people together and help 
them for reconciliation. This is hope and the way to healing, to reconciliation and 
to life”. This is hope”.24 Bataringaya also points to other helpful options of secular 
conflict transformation work such as psycho-social therapy or trauma counselling, 
yet highlights the main differences between secular and religious reconciliation 
work: “The power by the word of God that the church possesses. This is missed 
by the state. The churches have something special. They walk with the people, 
with the perpetrators, with the victims. People feel that they are not alone. This 
is lacking in the government. But they complement each other”.25 With the gov-
ernment employing a political and target-oriented conception of reconciliation, 
that is, aiming towards national unity and development, the churches add a more 
personal dimension that stresses relationship building. As they “walk with” the 
people, they impart a sense of community, support, trust and hope.
A closer look at the example of Remera, mentioned above, helps to illuminate 
further the difference between religious actors and government actors. In the vil-
lage of Remera, we recall, the EPR has established a group of trained mediators, 
the “lights”, that work together with perpetrators and victims. In Remera, recon-
ciliation activities go hand in hand with developmental projects such as micro 
loans and small farm projects. What at first glance might look like one of the 
government organized victim – perpetrator villages, shows some distinct features 
that underline its Christian nature. In particular, three aspects serve to highlight 
the specificities of this Christian reconciliation and developmental project.
First, the Christian message of individual transformation, of breaking with the 
past, of healing and of forgiveness provides helpful resources. The normative 
implications following from this message are relayed through weekly sermons, 
group activities such as youth groups, bible study groups or women’s groups as 
well as through worship. Connected to sermons, group activities and worship is 
a second valuable aspect: while public expressions of pain and suffering are not 
acceptable in society in general, the sphere of religion is an exception to this rule. 
In church services, for instance, through the medium of song and dance, trauma-
tized victims have a chance to express their emotions, a first step towards healing. 
Third, there are additional church activities and services such as Christian-based 
seminars offered on healing and trauma counselling or trained mediators. Mixed 
strategies are employed that combine the insights of non-faith-based mediation 
with the resources of the Christian faith, set in the familiar context of the church 
setting in the home village.
To sum up, we have seen that on the one hand the churches view themselves as 
close partners of the government in terms of joint developmental and reconciliation 
efforts. Not least due to their close collaboration and regular planning meetings, 
the churches’ and the government’s activities display strong similarities in terms of 
strategy and pragmatic implementation. For instance, the joint care of a cow as a 
means to facilitate encounters between perpetrators and victims is a common pro-
ject of both the government and different churches. On the other hand, to view the 
churches as simply echoing the government would entail a reductive perspective, 
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as the churches supplement the government in important ways. With its tight net 
and its top-down strategies, the government manages to reach into every corner of 
the country. At the same time, some criticism of this kind of enforced reconcilia-
tion “from above” has been voiced as it tends to achieve mere “outer”, “formal” 
reconciliation as opposed to “inner”, “authentic” reconciliation. Complementing 
the government’s top-down strategies, the churches provide bottom-up reconcilia-
tion strategies from within civil society, including grassroots activities, needed to 
achieve sustainable peace (Abu-Nimer 2001) through healing and forgiveness – 
what Jacques Derrida calls the “exceptional and extraordinary, standing the test of 
the impossible” (Derrida 2000, p. 12). From this analysis thus emerges a clearer 
picture of how churches as FBOs act as boundary agents, moving effectively 
between the established lines of secular and religious organisations and in different 
development contexts and discourses (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume).
In order to better understand the distinct contribution of religious actors such 
as churches, Marc Granovetter’s differentiation between strong-tie and weak-tie 
communities continues to be helpful (Granovetter 1973). Strong-tie groups refer 
to communities that are rather closed. Examples of strong-tie groups are found in 
devoutly religious groups, a small village or members of a specialized academic 
discipline. Weak-tie communities, on the other hand, are made up of people that 
are loosely connected, for instance, through social media networks. While strong-
tie groups offer emotional support and meaning to their members, they tend to be 
resistant to change and new ideas. Weak-tie groups may offer less support, yet 
they allow for greater mobility and access in terms of ideas and influence. Reli-
gious communities are often considered strong-tie communities. This makes them 
resistant to new ideas. On the other hand, once new ideas have entered the group, 
for instance, through trusted and influential individuals such as pastors, the poten-
tial for change throughout the group is substantial. In a post-genocidal context 
such as Rwanda, conflict resolution and reconciliation processes are nothing less 
than paradigm shifts in thinking and behaviour. For these to occur, the strength 
and coherence of strong-tie communities such as churches is needed (Gopin 2009, 
p. 78).26 For the “transformation of human relationships can only be achieved by 
actors outside the government and therefore a multilevel peace process always 
must include social movements on the local scene” (Sundqvist 2011, p. 164). 
For ground-shifting societal processes – such as development and reconciliation 
after a genocide – to occur, the collaboration of weak-tie governmental actors and 
strong-tie religious actors is needed.
Conclusion
We began this chapter by looking at the specific context of Rwanda. Literally burnt 
to ashes in a devastating civil war that culminated in the 1994 genocide, Rwanda 
lay in ruins; its survivors traumatized. Development in Rwanda,  according to the 
UN, had been set back by years. Yet recent years have seen a  remarkable change 
as an economic miracle has started to take hold of the country, with positive side-
effects for most of the population. Many developmentally relevant figures testify 
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to a change for the better: life expectancy is increasing, children and mother 
mortality is declining nationwide health insurance was installed, primary school 
education was made mandatory. In many respects, Rwanda is clearly thriving – 
although the human rights situation in this country has not been improving in an 
equal manner. Nevertheless, Rwanda’s progress is all the more remarkable con-
sidering that neighbouring countries such as Burundi or the DR Congo with simi-
larly violent histories had started off better on the Human Development Index in 
1990 than Rwanda, yet had already been overtaken by Rwanda in the year 2000.
Of the many factors contributing to Rwanda’s development, this chapter looked 
at two in particular: the roles of Rwanda’s religious actors, especially churches, 
and the role of Rwanda’s emphasis on reconciliation. Due to Rwanda being a 
largely Christian nation, we looked at three different Christian denominations, 
the Presbyterians, Anglicans and Pentecostals and their conception of develop-
ment and reconciliation. Finally, we compared the churches’ understanding and 
approaches to development and reconciliation with those of the Rwandan govern-
ment. The results can be summarized under the following three aspects.
“Holistic development”
For all three churches, development is of crucial significance. All three churches 
are actively engaged in a variety of development activities, with church-specific 
emphases. As such, the churches’ developmental activities tie in with a number 
of developmental norms as put forward by the SDGs. The EPR was seen to dis-
play the broadest range of activities, linking to a number of SDGs. The Angli-
can Church’s development programme Rural Development Interdiocesan Service 
(RDIS) focusses on the development of the poorest of the poor (SDG 1 and SDG 
2), while the ADEPR views development through the particular lens of educa-
tion (SDG 4). Despite the variety of developmental activities displayed by the 
churches, two characteristics serve to unite them. First, the religious actors ana-
lysed do not view development as an end in itself to be pursued, but rather as a 
means to an end. Secondary goals such as contributing to the development and 
unity of the country are subordinated to the prime goal: “to build a strong church” 
(EPR). Second, all three churches are united in their quest for “holistic devel-
opment”. Holistic development understands development as going beyond mere 
material progress and to include the spiritual and the material, the individual and 
the communal dimensions.
“Development and reconciliation go together”
From my analysis, a very specific contextualized understanding of development 
has emerged. In a national discursive field that stresses reconciliation, develop-
ment becomes a question of reconciliation. FBOs that engage in Rwanda relate to 
these discourses by combining development and reconciliation. All three churches 
point to reconciliation as the sister of development. Given Rwanda’s excessively 
violent history on the one hand and its cultural emphasis on ubuntu, that is, on 
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community, on the other hand, development acquires here a strong social dimen-
sion. Any long-term developmental success will depend on the sustainability of 
peace as brought about by reconciliation. The analytical distinction between rec-
onciliation and development thus seems to be on the verge of collapsing in this 
particular context, especially when it comes to the level of practical application. 
Whether the joint care for a cow in a certain instance is in theory primarily for 
reconciliation purposes or for developmental purposes, appears in practice to be 
of secondary significance.
Churches and government as “complementary partners”
My analysis has shown the churches to view themselves as partners of the Rwan-
dan government’s national politics of reconciliation as well as of the national 
quest for development. Churches continuously emphasise their role as support-
ers of the government through references on their official websites praising their 
credit in contributing to the nation’s unity (ADEPR Education Ministry) and, not 
least, through direct collaboration with the government itself. Churches co-operate 
with the government in developmental and reconciliation activities such as the 
joint management of hospitals or the collaborative design of the nation’s annual 
week of commemoration of the genocide. Despite their joint activities, how-
ever, the churches do not simply echo the government. Rather, FBOs have their 
own approach to reconciliation work. They act as development entrepreneurs by 
focussing on bottom-up projects and new reconciliation techniques by bringing 
in the religious dimension of reconciliation (e.g. the Christian message of love 
and forgiveness) (Koehrsen and Heuser 2019 in this volume). While the churches 
thereby show themselves to be competent boundary agents, frequently crossing 
the lines between secular and religious spheres and connecting different discur-
sive fields, this rarely includes any criticism of the government. Critical utterances 
against the government are remarkably absent in the churches’ discourses. Rather 
than as outspoken critics, the churches act in way of supplementation. Where 
the NURC’s president Rucyahana emphasizes, “We reconcile for a purpose: for 
unity, for development, to recreate our dignity, our desire to make a nation”.27 the 
churches add, they develop and reconcile “to build a strong church whose Chris-
tians are spiritually mature, able to testify God’s kingdom in the world and whose 
social environment is fully bloomed”.28
Notes
 1 I thank Jens Koehrsen for his helpful suggestions in the final draft of this contribution.
 2 Roméo Dallaire, commander of the UNAMIR-forces stationed in Rwanda during the 
genocide, recounts in this book his experiences during the genocide and points to the 
failure of the world community, which could have stopped the killings (Dallaire 2004).
 3 Even the overall positive Credit Suisse report points to the current challenges to 
democratic values in Rwanda, while at the same time highlighting the government’s 
achievements: “The Rwandan government offers its citizens peace, safety, a relatively 
high level of economic freedom and a steadily improving quality of life. The price is 
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strict political control and a taboo surrounding discussion of sensitive topics like eth-
nicity” (Amman 2015, p. 43).
 4 While this term is here taken from the Pentecostal Church of Rwanda (ADEPR) home-
page, the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda (EPR) and the Anglican Church employ it as 
well (cf.).
 5 For a detailed treatment of religio-scapes in the specific context of the prosperity gos-
pel cf. Heuser (2015).
 6 In recent scholarship, the term FBO (faith-based organisation) has been more fre-
quently used than the term FBN (faith-based non-governmental organisation).
 7 Some churches, however, seem to focus exclusively on proselytization with no or lit-
tle concern for development as Narayan et al. (1999). These are often found in small 
highly evangelical circles.
 8 While Ware et al. do not even mention local churches as FBOs engaged in develop-
ment work, Heist and Cnaan acknowledge their relevance yet state that “we do not 
cover in-country organizations that strive for social and economic development such 
as local churches or local denominations” (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 2).
On a side note, Heist and Cnaan draw a comparison between FBOs and welfare 
services provided by churches in their native USA. “Our findings, so far, suggest that 
faith-based international social and economic development is similar to welfare ser-
vices provided by congregations in the USA” (Heist and Cnaan 2016, p. 14). This 
paper can be viewed as the attempt to draw out to the comparison in order to include 
local churches in developing countries as agents of development.
 9 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya. President of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda. 
Kigali, 21 February 2016
 10 The following details are based on an interview with the President of the EPR, Pascal 
Bataringaya. Cf. the homepage of the EPR.
 11 The United Evangelical Mission (UEM) is rooted in three different mission 
 organisations: the Rhenish Mission (since 1828), the Bethel Mission (since 1886) and 
the Zaire Mission. In 1996, it became an international communion of churches, with 
all its partner churches enjoying equal status. While UEM headquarters are in Wup-
pertal,  Germany, there are regional offices in Africa (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) and 
Asia (Medan, Indonesia). UEM employs about 120 co-workers. UEM places particular 
significance on diaconia, HIV and AIDS, the rights of women and children, scholar-
ships, development cooperation, intercultural meetings and project support. (Vereinte 
Evangelische Mission).
 12 John Wesley Kabango is now the head of the office for African affairs at the UEM.
 13 Manooks, Kwizera, administrative staff member of the ADEPR (1 October 2016).
 14 Much of what Freeman points out with regards to Pentecostal churches can be applied 
to other Christian denominations as well. For an assessment of the specific strengths of 
FBOs in development work cf. Heist and Cnaan (2016). They point to the trust in faith-
based organisations by the addressees, FBOs’ helpful networks, religious volunteers, 
funding and the share of the faith community. At the same time, they indicate some 
weaknesses such as FBOs’ inclination to proselytize, their tendency to work alone and 
avoid co-operation and religion’s role in contributing to religious violence (Heist and 
Cnaan 2016, p. 4).
 15 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 16 My emphasis.
 17 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 18 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 19 Interview with Nathan Gasatura. Bishop of the Anglican Church. Butare Diocese. 
Butare (Rwanda), 23 February 2016.
 20 Gasatura hints at the restrictive political climate of his country. These restrictions 
are noticeable throughout civil society, for instance, regarding freedom of the press 
Development in post-genocide Rwanda 159
and freedom of political opposition. In 2014, the World Press Freedom 2014 Index 
of Reporters Without Borders ranked Rwanda 162nd of 180 countries. As Susan 
Thomson points out, “international and domestic human rights organizations regularly 
accused the RPF government of harassment and intimidation of its political opponents 
and journalists” (Thomson 2015, p. 325).
 21 [gaˈʧaʧa]. The Kinyarwanda term means “grass” and refers to the place in the village 
where the traditional gacaca courts take place. For a detailed treatment of the gacaca 
courts cf. Friese (2010, pp. 59–72).
 22 Interview with John Rucyahana, President of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC), Kigali/Rwanda, 26 February 2016.
 23 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 24 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 25 Interview with Pascal Bataringaya.
 26 At the same time, strong ties serve as boundary markers and can thus serve to cre-
ate and enhance already existing or newly formed boundaries, in this case, centered 
around religious identities.
 27 Interview with John Rucyahana.
 28 Église presbytérienne au Rwanda (EPR).
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